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# PROPAGANDA AND DICTATORSHIP

*A COLLECTION OF PAPERS*

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PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS

PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY

1936

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*First Printing, April, 1936*

*Second Printing, July, 1936*

PRINTED AT THE PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS  
PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY, U.S.A.

## FOREWORD

GENERAL SMUTS, veteran of the Paris Peace Conference and as knowing a political leader as one can find in the Anglo-American world, observed some time ago how "politicians today are often baffled and almost paralyzed by the incalculable forces of public opinion." General Smuts was speaking, of course, of politicians in democratic countries, among whom his observation must surely find a wide and sometimes sorrowful acquiescence. To make the forces of public opinion more calculable is a problem upon which the future of democracy may turn.

The dictatorships have appeared now in Europe. Having established themselves by force, they rely primarily upon force to retain their control of government, but as ancillary weapons they have seized also upon those very forces of public opinion which have tended to baffle the democratic statesmen, and by means of propaganda are using them for their own ends. How this has been accomplished in each particular situation is precisely described in the papers which make up the present book. Also some calculations are offered for the future, and certain lessons are made clear for the United States. The papers are of both scientific and general interest and eminently timely.

Recognizing the importance for democracy of the problem in its various aspects, an increasing number of scholars have been addressing themselves during recent years to the scientific study of public opinion. Among them are Professor Harwood L. Childs, the editor of this volume, and the six who were associated with him, first, in a round-table discussion at the last annual meeting of the American Political Science Association and then in the present work. Professor Childs joined the faculty of the School of Public Affairs at Princeton three years ago, following a year of study and investigation of the forces of public opinion in Germany. While continuing scholarly investigation in his field he has accomplished also the pioneer task of organizing a successful undergraduate course on Public Opinion at Princeton. Last year the School of Public Affairs was able to publish the syllabus and bibliography of this course under the title *A Reference Guide to the Study of Public Opinion*. It is gratifying that the School can now add to its research publications

the present interesting and important contributions. I wish to thank Professors Catlin, Jászi, Lasswell, Marx, Maxwell and Zurcher very heartily for their cooperation.

Princeton, October 1935

DEWITT C. POOLE

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## INTRODUCTION





## INTRODUCTION

HARWOOD LAWRENCE CHILDS

THE publication of this collection of papers on the subject of *Propaganda and Dictatorship* is directly an outgrowth of round-table discussions during the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association at Chicago in December 1934. Indirectly it is a consequence of an ever increasing interest in the subject provoked by the spread of dictatorial forms of government since the War, with the accompanying emphasis upon propaganda. The contributors to the present volume were among those participating in the Chicago conferences, and subsequently expressed their willingness to elaborate for publication statements informally made at that time. All of them write, not only as careful, objective students of the countries and topics with which they deal, but from a vantage point of personal contact with the political life of these post-war dictatorships.

The subject matter of these studies scarcely calls for an introduction. The world is both propaganda-conscious and dictator-conscious. Propaganda itself has been propagandized with quite as much zeal and effectiveness as the tenets of fascism and communism. It may be helpful, however, to set forth at least a few of the many perspectives from which these papers may be examined, thereby indicating some of the objectives that have motivated their preparation. These aims may be couched in the form of questions, answers to which are pertinent to a fruitful consideration of the bonds that exist between post-war dictatorships and the phenomenon of propaganda.

(1) In what respects and to what extent is state propaganda as exemplified in present-day European dictatorships different from official propaganda in the past? Propaganda, in the sense of conscious attempts to manage the minds of others, either by means of symbols, conditions, or events, has always played an important rôle in the exercise of sovereign power. Moreover, the practice of propaganda by official agencies of government is not and never has been peculiar to dictatorial forms of government. The exercise of political power has always been a psychological as well as a physical matter. Governments have never been fashioned exclusively out of the bodies of men, nor out of their material

possessions, but ingeniously erected upon the foundations of collective attitudes, habits of thought, and mental interrelationships. Officialdom has always recognized the importance of opinion leadership, and its dependence upon public opinion; upon prevailing currents of desire, expectation, even fear; upon streams of opinion that trickle through a population or rush madly over the body politic.

What, then, is novel about state propaganda in Europe today? Is it merely a continuance of age-old strategies of argument, persuasion, publicity, organization, and force, buttressed and implemented by some of the newer agencies of mass impression, or may we discover the existence of radically new techniques? If not, is the practice of propaganda in Russia, Italy, or Germany distinguishable from propaganda of the past by the extent and character of its influence; by the effects, not only domestically in the relations between government and citizen, but internationally, in the relations of states to each other? To some extent the papers by Professors Marx, Zurcher, Maxwell, and Jászi suggest the answers to these queries, in that they seek to portray as vividly and accurately as possible the organization of propaganda activities, the practices and techniques employed, as well as the effects resulting in the states considered.

(2) The four papers just mentioned also outline answers to a second question of equal significance. What are the limits, if any, to conscious opinion management when reinforced by the wealth and physical resources of a state? Do dictators, in company with their more circumscribed propagandist colleagues, experience reverses? Is it possible that even the most autocratic of princes finds that public opinion is frequently the resultant of some forces over which he may exercise little if any control?

The coincidence of Allied success and strenuous propaganda activity during the War, the biographical revelations of super-shrewdness on the part of public personages, the claims of some advertisers and professional propagandists, to say nothing of academic searches for theses and formulas to explain past events, have resulted in a marked glorification of the art of opinion leadership. It is above all necessary, therefore, that the student of public opinion relegate propaganda to its proper place among the innumerable factors that function in the opinion-forming process; some latent, others active; some capable of conscious control, others at work beyond the range of human management. Students of politics who expect to discover in manuals of propaganda strategy conclusive explanations of opinion changes are foredoomed to disappointment, for dictators as well as local politicians often find their propaganda activities

conditioned by influences of long standing, incapable of modification by ingenious stunts, or elaborate publicity campaigns. In view of the heights to which propaganda as a science and an art has attained, at least in the minds of many, it will be instructive to examine in the following pages such evidence as comes to us concerning these conditioning factors, forces that confound and in some cases defeat the best devised techniques of dictatorial advisors.

(3) Although the papers herein presented deal primarily with propaganda in its relation to European dictatorships, the American student, at least, will certainly have in mind the implications so far as democracy is concerned. Does the rise of mammoth propaganda machines in so many European countries indicate that the democratic ideal of freedom of opinion dissemination and opinion leadership has been outmoded? If by freedom of opinion is meant the absence of conscious guidance by others, it is unlikely that such a state of personal independence has ever existed. Men have always looked to others for some degree of opinion leadership, and the crucial problem in any political society is not whether there shall or shall not be such leadership, but rather, who shall do the leading?

One of the most striking differences between a democracy and a dictatorship lies in the character of opinion leadership provided for. In a dictatorship, there prevails the tacit, if not the explicit assumption, that, inasmuch as truth cannot be discovered in its final and complete form, it is better for the masses, present and to come, to give up the futile and wasteful search, and accept a single and unified leadership. After all, may it not be wiser to accept one creed and cast aside all doubts, than to be forever "questing"? This philosophy of opinion leadership is alluring to any would-be leader, and not less so to modern Caesars. In a democracy, however, there persists a sort of protestant unwillingness to give up the personal search for truth, and complacently accept official edicts in matters of opinion. In place of such leadership, the democratic adherent prefers a variety of creeds and propagandas from which to make his own selection. It will be noted that both schools of thought subscribe to the inevitability and even the desirability of propaganda, but in a democracy the evil, if such it is, of one propaganda is to be remedied by a multiplicity of propagandas.

The philosophical implications involved in this dispute are of long standing, and the differences may not easily be resolved. Nevertheless, the American student of European state propaganda may well ask the question, What have been the consequences of applying what may be termed the "state monopoly" principle? Does adherence to it facilitate

the attainment of that optimum balance between stability and change, between security and progress so generally desired? Some aspects of this most difficult problem are considered in Professor Catlin's article, although he directs attention primarily to the query next raised.

(4) In the light of recent European experience, where, in democratic countries, should the line be drawn between the desirable use of propaganda by state officials, and its undesirable use? The question is timely. The people of the United States have been witnessing, not only an ever widening extension of control by government over agencies of opinion dissemination, but a rapidly expanding use of positive propaganda, in many respects modelled upon governmental practices during the War. The potentialities of state propaganda, so dramatically exemplified in post-war Europe, have not passed unnoticed in political circles in the United States. Professor Catlin has contributed much to clear thinking in this matter by his careful analysis of alternatives. To what extent are political leaders, elected to office with express mandates to carry out given policies, warranted in utilizing all the propaganda instruments and techniques at their command? Are there limits to their responsibility for preserving democratic institutions and carrying out the wishes of citizens expressed through elections or through their representatives? If so, what are these limits?

(5) Of particular interest to the specialized student of propaganda in all its aspects is Professor Lasswell's contribution. What types of propaganda research, other than the historical and the descriptive, may profitably be undertaken? Notwithstanding the quite revealing outpourings of students, to say nothing of commissions of inquiry, relative to the subject of propaganda, some are beginning to ask, "Where do we go from here?" In persistently and tediously unearthing new evidences of the existence of propaganda we may be avoiding many more equally significant lines of investigation. Those who have followed Professor Lasswell's previous explorative excursions over the borderlines of the traditionally political never want for an answer. They need never fear the all too frequent boredom that comes from retracing old trails. To be sure he sometimes leads us over unfamiliar terrain where the going is difficult, but we usually return with broadened horizons, with new pictures in our heads, with new problems to challenge us.

In both dictatorships and democracies propaganda is, as it has always been, an indispensable agent of social control. Whether highly centralized in its functioning, as in so many countries of Europe today, or per-

plexingly decentralized, as in this and other democratic countries, it, in and of itself, cannot provide the prerequisites for progress. Such progress depends upon the discovery of new social principles and facts, not upon the mere dissemination of opinions. And so, both here and abroad, dictators and democratic statesmen face the question, how best can the unrestrained, objective, patient, scientific search for truth be preserved, the fruits of which will be the content of the propaganda of the future.



# I

## STATE PROPAGANDA IN GERMANY





# I

## STATE PROPAGANDA IN GERMANY

FRITZ MORSTEIN MARX

Fritz Morstein Marx, Dr. Jur. (Hamburg), of Harvard University, came to the United States in 1933, having resigned from his former position as General Commissioner for the Unemployed in the State Public Welfare Department of Hamburg, Germany. Since then he has been on the faculty of the Pennsylvania School of Social Work, of New York University, and of Princeton University. Among his publications are: *Beiträge zum Problem des parlamentarischen Minderheitenschutzes* (Hamburg, 1924) and *Civil Service in Germany* (New York and London, 1935).

“IT has frequently been remarked that it seems to have been reserved to the people of this country, by their conduct and example, to decide the important question, whether societies of men are really capable or not of establishing good government from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend for their political constitutions on accident and force.” When Hamilton thus prefaced the *Federalist's* plea for a “more perfect union,”<sup>1</sup> he revealed himself in one single sentence as a master in the subtle art of guiding public opinion. By neatly drawing a line between the former colonies and the rest of the world, between stage and audience, he made his readers conscious of a unique mission which by its very nature definitely outruled the element of selection in the alternative put to them. America's aristocratic age, which provided a natural setting for such a brilliant piece of campaign literature as the *Federalist*, has long since faded. Less so, however, has Hamilton's intriguing distinction between the promise of the “American dream” and that fateful dependence on “accident and force” which, more or less at least, darkens political life outside the United States. Is not Germany's National Revolution another clear illustration? Can one imagine a more formidable antithesis to “good government” established “from reflection and choice” than the Third Reich? If newspaper editorials may be considered indicative of popular reaction, the American public mind seems indeed firmly made up to ascribe to these questions purely rhetorical significance.

Yet, when the German voter threw in his lot with National Socialism, he did so because reflection led him to believe that the collapse of parliamentary procedure which marked the Weimar republic's final phase,

<sup>1</sup> *The Federalist*, No. 1.

unmistakably pointed to the need of complete political reorientation. More than ten years of defeat and frustration had set the stage for the prophet of a new order who, a son of the middle class himself, expounded his creed in terms easily understood by the middle class; this stratum, once instrumental in molding national ideology, found itself reduced in the post-war period to a state of acute disintegration, while organized labor and organized industry shaped economic policies. The common foundations of national homogeneity were crumbling. Class interest confronted class interest. And while the flood was rising, political factionalism paralyzed initiative in futile discussion which never climaxed in action. Once before an unparalleled catastrophe had swept aside discord and confusion: the *levée en masse* of August 1914 was as much an enthusiastic reconquest of domestic unity as it was a manifestation of the people's sense of self-defense. Weimar democracy, even in its heyday, had not witnessed an equal outburst of national solidarity. Moreover, the republican structure of government was framed to serve the needs of periods of normalcy. But from its inception on, it was condemned to test its strength in emergencies as persistent as its own shadow and more exacting than any crisis the pre-war Reich had to face. In the eyes of an electorate which had just passed through a five years' course of abandoning civic sacrifice and war discipline, the contrast between parliamentarism's emasculating compromises and the brisk effectiveness of military rule based on command and subordination was patent. Authoritarian government recommended itself through its very absence. There was plain logic in the proposition "that what are in effect war-time powers must be granted in times of peace and that their grant means simply that democracies are being efficient."<sup>2</sup> What after all was the constitutional bill of rights when the issue involved restoration or decline of a nation? Freedom of speech? "A plague of opinion! A man may wear it on both sides, like a leather jerkin."<sup>3</sup> Responsible government? "Men today are more anxious to be intelligently ordered and directed than to assert their own individuality."<sup>4</sup>

In the light of such considerations, growingly accepted as crisis psychology spread, the swing toward the one-party state was far less of an accident and much more of a choice than foreign observers appear inclined to concede. It is true, when Germany entered the Third Reich few could anticipate how far the implications of this shift would extend. But exploring the uncharted seas of National Socialism was hardly a greater

<sup>2</sup> Lindsay Rogers, *Crisis Government* (New York, 1934), p. 75.

<sup>3</sup> Shakespeare, *Troilus and Cressida*, III, 3.

<sup>4</sup> Raymond Postgate, *How to Make a Revolution* (New York, 1934), p. 195.

challenge to fate than had once been the noble experiment of American federalism. Where choice is limited by hard necessities, the road to readjustment is frequently rough and dangerous. This even the solid block of Hitler's supporters may have realized when Weimar democracy was ready to capitulate early in 1933. Yet, it was not terroristic force that whipped the German electorate into endorsing the "totalitarian" solution in the following March elections. Their outcome truthfully reflected the nation's state of mind. Indeed, just as constitutions depend for their lasting existence on their attitude-building qualities, so sheer force has abdicated as a determining factor of political strategy in countries where compulsory elementary education makes every citizen a critical judge of political reason and universal military training every voter a potential combatant in revolutionary upheavals. On the other hand, the March elections were not a plebiscite on the blueprint of the Third Reich. If the principal problem of politics is to prevent conflicts rather than to solve them,<sup>5</sup> the emergence of brand-new forms of government out of the ashes of the old order presented the National Socialist cabinet with a major task overshadowing all others: to transform the loosely knit ideology of a militant opposition party into generally accepted values.

The organization of a National Ministry of Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda immediately after the hour of triumph had struck for the Brown Shirt forces, is in itself a remarkable comment on Hitler's reluctance to rely primarily on the fists of his followers or the display of governmental authority, be it through economic discrimination, be it through the use of police clubs or army machine guns. With at worst widespread benevolent neutrality of the bourgeois vote, rapid decomposition of the once pivotal Social Democratic party, and German Communism torn between Moscow red tape and provincial dilettantism, a policy of large-scale intimidation would simply have been a waste of effort. Oswald Spengler, in spite of his deep-rooted sympathy for the cause of national resurgence, said all there was to say when he coolly remarked: "This was no victory, for the enemies were lacking."<sup>6</sup> Of course, the new régime, swiftly entrenching itself, had some reason to assume that open hostility where it had existed yesterday, might re-consolidate itself tomorrow. Cells of resistance had to be ferreted out and broken up. But secret police and concentration camps had, for obvious reasons, slight relevance in the daily life of the "law-abiding

<sup>5</sup> Harold D. Lasswell, *Psychopathology and Politics* (Chicago, 1931), p. 197.

<sup>6</sup> Oswald Spengler, *Jahre der Entscheidung*, Part I: *Deutschland und die Weltgeschichtliche Entwicklung* (Munich, 1933), p. viii.

citizen." And even in their rush days the *Konzentrationslager* actually housed but a small fraction of former partisans of "Marxism," most of whom were clearly identified as "foes of the National Revolution" through their long-established political record. The later-day historian of Germany's critical period will in all probability conclude that the establishment of these camps was as much a punitive measure as it was a precautionary one. After years of localized civil war Hitler's private army demanded a day of settlement, and they got it. That the camps were entrusted to the *Sturmabteilung* men (SA) and that, prior to Prime Minister Göring's decree of March 1934,<sup>7</sup> party agencies were allowed wide latitude in inflicting the dreaded "protective custody" according to their own discretion, is ample evidence of the storm troopers' eagerness to do some missionary work in an unsophisticated fashion. Oranienburg's commander did not mince words when he included in his account of the early history of this camp,<sup>8</sup> which enjoyed for a while almost proverbial prominence, the following trenchant observations:

To conceal that some of the arrested had experienced in the meantime a not too gentle treatment, would be foolish and also altogether inconceivable. Inconceivable insofar as such a treatment met an urgent necessity.

I have seldom seen such admirable educators as my old SA men who, partly offspring of the proletarian *milieu* themselves, attended with extraordinary devotion to these particularly provoking Communist rowdies.

Doubtless, the "myth" of the concentration camps did more than anything else to discourage counteraction in those quarters which might have played with such an idea. At the same time, it induced the timid bystander to tiptoe to safety. Even men who do not mind braving a known danger, weaken in the face of an anonymous threat. Only rumors told what was going on in concentration camps. Once confined to them the prisoner was left to guess as to the length of his internment. Nevertheless, the awe-inspiring show of strength staged in the administration of *Schutzhaft* could only supply the background to National Socialism's capture of the people's soul. Indeed, as this venture went on successfully, the background was permitted to resolve into mist. Two clippings, picked at random from the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, illustrate the trend of gradual transformation:

<sup>7</sup> For the text of this important decree which withdrew the power to impose "protective custody" from local police authorities as well as from party agencies and, at the same time, provided definitely formulated rules of procedure, cf. *Hamburger Fremdenblatt*, No. 34, March 12, 1934 (evening edition).

<sup>8</sup> *SA-Sturmabführer* Schäfer, Commander of the Concentration Camp Oranienburg: *Hamburger Nachrichten*, March 24, 1934 (evening edition).

The Official Prussian Press Service reports: The sentence of the Criminal Division of the Stettin *Landgericht* of April 6 against Dr. Hoffmann and associates concerns prison officials and police officers guilty of mistreating prisoners entrusted to their care. The trial was initiated and especially accelerated by the prosecuting attorney general at the personal request of Prime Minister Göring, who has made it the unconditional duty of all administrative agencies to treat prisoners correctly, and has provided most severe punishment in any case of mistreatment of prisoners. The sentence imposing high penitentiary and prison terms [Dr. Hoffmann received thirteen years in the penitentiary] adequately demonstrates that irregularities are not tolerated in the National Socialist state, and will be prosecuted with relentless rigor. The very fact that the trial took place, and the heavy penalties imposed clearly refute the reports, spread by foreign agitation, of atrocities allegedly committed in prisons and concentration camps and tolerated by administrative agencies.<sup>9</sup>

An employer in the Saar who had paid hourly wages from 10 to 28 *Pfennig* and worked his men from 13 to 14 hours per day, was arrested for his antisocial attitude. He will be kept in custody on his own daily wages, adequately reduced because his workers have to support families, until he asks for an interview with the Trustee of Labor in order to set up with him an appropriate wage scale.<sup>10</sup>

Today the concentration camps have largely lost their former exclusive function. In fact, there was a time when even members of *the* party, burdened by law with "increased duties toward leader, people, and state,"<sup>11</sup> frequented these camps not as custodians but as inmates. On the whole, "protective custody" is at present relegated to the rôle of lending weight to the unwritten code of National Socialist ethics, whatever the nature of the offense may be. Although Communist underground agitation has not ceased, it does not reach the masses and thus has presented for considerable time, in the words of a competent authority, "no longer a political problem, but merely a police problem." No quarter is given to those who dare to undermine the foundations of the Third Reich. The German press carries with the regularity of a Swiss watch news items like this one:

The People's Court sentenced three leading functionaries of the Communist Youth Organization of Germany who had continued their illegal activity until the spring of 1934, to long penitentiary terms for preparatory acts to high treason and partly also for forgery of documents, committed through police registration under wrong names. The twenty-nine-

<sup>9</sup> *Frankfurter Zeitung*, No. 176-7, April 8, 1934.

<sup>10</sup> *Frankfurter Zeitung, Wochenblatt*, No. 15, April 14, 1935.

<sup>11</sup> *Gesetz zur Sicherung der Einheit von Partei und Staat* of December 1, 1933 (*Reichsgesetzblatt*, I, p. 1016), sec. 3 (1).

year old former deputy to the Prussian state diet, Ewald Kaiser, of Herne i. W., who conducted his seditious agitation not only in Germany but also in Paris, received a ten-year penitentiary term. His conspirators, twenty-six-year old Willi Klinger and Karl Schirdewan, were sentenced to three years in the penitentiary. Two others got away with two years nine months and two years in prison, respectively.<sup>12</sup>

To disperse enemies, however, does not create supporters. Support springs from identification. To bring about identification is the goal of propaganda. The technique of National Socialism's permeation of the electorate is aptly described in Hitler's own words when he wrote, still at the beginning of his political career, that propaganda "must perennially address the masses alone."<sup>13</sup> Thus the famous Twenty-Five Points, issued as the "immutable" party platform in 1920,<sup>14</sup> were designed "to give primarily the rank and file of the people a rough picture of the aims of the Movement."<sup>15</sup> But many who cast their votes in March 1933 for the Government of National Concentration, had never bothered to read the party program with more than casual interest. Many others, politically adrift and still undecided, had only a faint notion of what the cabinet stood for. Immediately after the revolutionary turnover no one could expect, therefore, widespread homogeneity of political thinking. The victorious cause, consequently, resorted to political symbolism. As a first step, the solid army of civil servants, national, state, and local, was ordered to greet the public as well as superiors and subordinates with raised arm in "German salute."<sup>16</sup> Some months later Reich Minister of the Interior Dr. Frick, in a letter to the *Deutscher Industrie- und Handelstag*, enlisted the cooperation of the "roof" organization of trade and industry in order to give the "German salute" nation-wide application.<sup>17</sup> It is, he said, "a task of popular enlightenment to introduce the German salute among all sections of the German people as the expression of national solidarity." To keep the symbol untarnished, a further decree made it clear that the "salute of the free man" was not befitting for inmates of penal institutions.<sup>18</sup> Finally, when the corresponding regulation on the saluting of SA banners, although technically restricted to uniformed public officers, members of the defensive forces and storm

<sup>12</sup> *Frankfurter Zeitung*, No. 240-1, May 12, 1935.

<sup>13</sup> Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, 22nd ed. (Munich, 1933), p. 196.

<sup>14</sup> For an English translation cf. James K. Pollock and Harlow J. Heneman, *The Hitler Decrees*, 2nd ed. (Ann Arbor, 1934), pp. 1 ff.

<sup>15</sup> Hitler, *op. cit.*, p. 511.

<sup>16</sup> Decree of the Reich Minister of the Interior of July 14, 1933. Cf. also Fritz Morstein Marx, "German Bureaucracy in Transition," 28 *American Political Science Review* (1934), pp. 467 ff.

<sup>17</sup> *Frankfurter Zeitung*, *Sonntagsausgabe*, No. 1, January 7, 1934.

<sup>18</sup> *Hamburger Fremdenblatt*, No. 34, February 4, 1934 (evening edition).

troopers, was made public,<sup>19</sup> the official communiqué closed with the following sentence:

The spirit of true national community in the National Socialist state and the willing identification with it, implies that the whole population complies with this regulation.

Political indifference or even antagonism cannot always be traced easily. But whether Herr Nachbar raises his arm or not, whether he substitutes "*Heil Hitler*" for "*Guten Tag*," is distinctly perceivable. Is there any particular reason, Herr Nachbar, why you should wish to set yourself apart from "true national community"? Is not unity Germany's only weapon? And would it not complicate your life somewhat, if you do not respond to the polite "*Heil Hitler*" extended by the placement officer in the labor exchange, the social insurance agent, the relief supervisor, the policeman, the factory inspector? Would you like to be looked upon as a Communist? Why, there are other formalities in life which you observe, although some of them are surely ridiculous. And think of your family if somebody should misinterpret your strange behavior! All that Herr Nachbar had already contemplated himself. Yet, he well remembered that only a short time ago no one but ardent Hitlerites stiffened their elbow in a dramatic gesture such as he had never dreamed of exercising himself. *Nolens volens* he surrendered to prudence and Frau Nachbar, and soon every child knew that he, too, had been converted to National Socialism.

Symbolism, however, did not stop with the "German salute." During the week preceding the next national elections coupled with such a safe device as a plebiscite on Germany's withdrawal from the League of Nations (November 1933), Herr Nachbar could not fail to discover in his mail-box a neatly printed handbill signed by the local *Ortsgruppe der NSDAP* which furnished this weighty advice:

It must be the duty of each fellow-citizen who professes his allegiance to our Leader, to demonstrate his loyalty by adorning his dwelling on election day with the symbol of the New Germany, the swastika flag. There must be no house which does not display the sign of National Socialist Germany.

Here, again, the line of demarcation was subsequently drawn when "inspired" news informed the public that the

display of the national flags by Jewish business enterprises and on private dwellings has repeatedly caused disturbances of the peace. In order to avoid such incidents in the future the National Minister of the

<sup>19</sup> *ibid.*, No. 44, February 14, 1934 (evening edition).



Interior has decreed: The display of the national flags, especially of the swastika flag, by Jews must cease. In doubtful cases the local police shall take the necessary measures.<sup>20</sup>

Identical considerations are applied to the use of verbal symbols. The following frosty item is self-explanatory:

Through a decree of the Berlin Police President the name *Kulturbund Deutscher Juden* has been changed to *Jüdischer Kulturbund Berlin*.<sup>21</sup>

Identification may result from strictly rational processes, but more frequently it is superimposed on the rationalizing mechanism by the effects of psychological and somatic influences which produce the whole range of reaction patterns from sympathy to antipathy. A serious obstacle to any mass identification with a "movement" whatever its avowed purpose may be, is that such an objective offers little scope for the free play of these psychological and somatic influences. Hence the paramount importance of the leader—not as a personality whose competence is tested, but as a focusing point of unabsorbed mass impulses, as a center of emotional investment. Confidence repays, as long as it is not openly betrayed. All there is to social security, rests on this narrow basis. After the nightmare of political and economic pluralism which finally agonized Weimar democracy, the singularity of *Der Führer* is in itself one of the greatest assets of the Third Reich. The very existence of the leader operates as an assurance of guidance and action. It is not an empty phrase but reflects a popular attitude—what enigmatic Rudolf Hess, Hitler's *Stellvertreter*, emphasized in a radio appeal to the nation<sup>22</sup> a few days before the "purge":

We see with pride: one man remains always excluded from all criticism—the Leader. That is due to the fact that every one feels and knows: He was always right and will always be right.

As *Führung* is an exclusive term, so the title *Führer* has acquired symbolic quality. The party hierarchy is no longer allowed to encroach upon it. Dr. Ley, Staff Chief of the Political Organization, tore a colorful feather from many proud caps when he signed the following order:

I decree for the staff of the PO that no directing party officer, regardless of his position in the party or one of the affiliated organizations, may use the word *Führer* for himself, whether in connection with another word or not. I decree for the German Labor Front, effective at once, that the title *Führer der Deutschen Arbeitsfront* may no longer be used with respect to myself. My title is *Stabsleiter der PO*.

<sup>20</sup> *Frankfurter Zeitung, Wochenblatt*, No. 18, May 5, 1935.

<sup>21</sup> *Frankfurter Zeitung*, No. 227-8, May 5, 1935.

<sup>22</sup> *Hamburger Fremdenblatt*, No. 174, June 26, 1934 (evening edition).

The same applies to directing officers of other formations of the party and all other organizations.<sup>23</sup>

It was, therefore, anything but a surprise that Hitler, after von Hindenburg's death, declined the Presidency. The reason he gave in his letter of August 2, 1934, to the Reich Minister of the Interior, reveals more than it explains:

The greatness of the deceased has given the title of Reich President a singular significance. In the feeling of all of us, it is in its full meaning inseparably connected with the name of the great demised. I therefore request you to provide that as hitherto I shall be addressed officially and privately only as Leader and Reich Chancellor. This regulation shall apply to all future time.

The differentiation cut all the line down from title to emblems. The President's standard, product of the republic, became an historical reminiscence, while *Der Führer und Reichskanzler* was selecting a standard of his own.<sup>24</sup> "No passion, no idea can find its final and strongest expression without the great symbol."<sup>25</sup>

Symbol and idea, then, must supplement each other. Never is the symbol a lasting substitute for at least some bricks and straws from which a comprehensible ideology may be framed. At no time has National Socialism lost track of this simple truth. Early in 1933 Eugen Hadamovsky, now the Third Reich's national broadcasting director, stressed the fact that "propaganda is will to power and victorious only as the tool of an idea. When the idea is desecrated, the whole artful edifice collapses."<sup>26</sup> Ever since propaganda has "preached the faith."<sup>27</sup> To infiltrate a faith into the national mind presupposes a clear-cut nationwide program executed under centralized direction. Program and execution were entrusted to the National Ministry of Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda, headed by Dr. Goebbels, Hitler's successful campaign manager. Soon thirty-one regional agencies of the Ministry stood ready to make the wheels go 'round. The organization plan of the Department providing for seven divisions, gives a succinct picture of the scope of official opinion management in the one-party state. The work of the divisions runs along the following lines:

Division I: Legislation and Legal Problems; Budget, Finances, and Accounting; Personnel Administration; Ministerial Library; National

<sup>23</sup> *Frankfurter Zeitung, Sonntagsausgabe*, No. 42, October 21, 1934.

<sup>24</sup> *Verordnung über die Standarte des Führers und Reichskanzlers* of April 11, 1935 (*Reichsgesetzblatt*, I, p. 507).

<sup>25</sup> Eugen Hadamovsky, *Propaganda und Nationale Macht* (Oldenburg, 1933), p. 148.

<sup>26</sup> *ibid.*, p. 10.

<sup>27</sup> *ibid.*, p. 132.

Chamber of Culture; Council of Commercial Advertising (*Werberat der Deutschen Wirtschaft*); Fairs and Expositions.

Division II: Coordination of Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda (*Positive Weltanschauungspropaganda*); Regional Agencies of the Ministry; German Academy of Politics (*Deutsche Hochschule für Politik*); Official Ceremonies and Demonstrations; National Emblems; Racial Questions; Treaty of Versailles; National Literature and Publishing; Opposing Ideologies; Youth Organization; Business and Social Politics; Public Health and Athletics; Eastern and Border Questions; National Travel Committee (*Reichsausschuss für Fremdenverkehr*).

Division III: Radio; National Broadcasting Company' (*Reichsrundfunk-Gesellschaft m. b. H.*).

Division IV: National and Foreign Press; Journalism; Press Archives; News Service; National Association of the German Press (*Reichsverband der Deutschen Presse*).

Division V: Cinema; Moving Picture Industry; Cinema Censorship; Youth Literature Censorship.

Division VI: Theater, Music, and Art; Theater Management; Stage Direction; Design; Folk Art.

Division VII: Protection against Counter-Propaganda at Home and Abroad.

Whatever the criterion of judgment, no one can find the author of this organization plan guilty of an omission. The Propaganda Ministry enjoys the privilege of omnipresence. And what omnipresence means in terms of political action, is driven home to the German newspaper reader in semi-official press releases like this one:

At the request of the Reich Minister of Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda, party and official agencies have recently subjected the two Berlin cabarets "Katakomben" and "Tingeltangel" to vigilance. In the course of these observations it became obvious that the original tendency of the cabarets, namely, to ridicule such aspects of contemporary life as do not harmonize with the feeling of the people through jokes, however biting, and thus to serve the cause of reconstruction to a certain degree, has gradually swung precisely into the opposite direction under the pressure of an attendance hostile to the state. An actress impersonating a prostitute, for instance, made light of the collections for the Winter Aid Fund, and agitation took place against collections in general; military and party uniforms were calumniated, the organization of the party made a laughing stock, and the conscript system slurred. A hundred per cent Jew, who as such enjoys only the rights of a guest in Germany, dared to make disparaging comments on political events in Germany. Accordingly, the attendance consisted primarily of Jews and other state-negating elements.

Since further activities of these enterprises could no longer be tolerated in the interest of the esteem of the National Socialist state, the Reich Minister of Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda has caused their closing through the secret state police. Several main participants have been arrested and questioned by the police; in connection herewith a number of premises were searched.

When questioned some participants in the cabarets' political performances proved to be partly very superficially, partly not at all, informed about important establishments of the new state which they made the object of their sarcasm; they will have the opportunity to make up for this shortcoming in decent and solid work in a camp.

On this occasion it may be stressed again that the new state cannot allow its institutions which solely serve the people, to be abused by corroding and destructive as well as malicious criticism through a small but especially impudent and arrogant clique. National Socialism will not repeat the mistakes of pre-war Germany which was unable to put a stop to the maligning of her great essential institutions, army, school, state, etc., and hence broke down in the hour of danger. National Socialism especially deems it wholly unbearable that German affairs are ridiculed by Jews or *Vorjuden*.<sup>28</sup>

The deterioration of the cabarets "Katakombe" and "Tingeltangel" from institutions in the service of the "cause of reconstruction" to entertainment centers for the benefit of "Jews and other state-negating elements" underlines a danger of which National Socialism is wakefully aware. While identification with the Brown Shirt creed assumed the speed of an avalanche, the pure stock of Hitlerite ideology may one day be watered beyond recognition. Various measures have been enacted in order to preserve to the party what is the party's. As early as May 1933 the cabinet passed an act for the protection of "symbols of German history, the German state, and the National Revolution."<sup>29</sup> Draconic penalties prohibit the abuse of party uniforms.<sup>30</sup> And in the spring of 1934 nimble penmanship was expelled from the temple of National Socialist literature when Rudolf Hess, in his capacity as "Substitute of the Leader," issued the following decree:

Various publishing houses have to an increasing extent recently brought out books and pamphlets dealing with the character and the aims of the National Socialist Movement. Although these books are writ-

<sup>28</sup> *Frankfurter Zeitung*, No. 240-1, May 12, 1935.

<sup>29</sup> *Gesetz zum Schutz der Nationalen Symbole* of May 19, 1933 (*Reichsgesetzblatt*, I, p. 285).

<sup>30</sup> cf. *Gesetz über beimtückische Angriffe auf Staat und Partei und zum Schutz der Parteiuniformen* of December 20, 1934 (*ibid.*, p. 1269), supplemented by the ordinances of February 15, February 25, and March 16, 1935 (*ibid.*, pp. 204, 276, and 387). See also the *Bekanntmachung* of January 16, 1935 (*ibid.*, p. 70).

ten to a not inconsiderable measure without the necessary knowledge, the public regards them on account of their title and make-up without discrimination as contributions to National Socialist literature. I therefore decree: Effective today, an official Examining Commission for the Protection of National Socialist Literature is set up as chairman of which I appoint Pg. [Parteigenosse] *Reichsleiter* Ph. Bouhler. The Commission which is to operate in closest collaboration with the Reich Ministry of Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda and with those party functionaries charged with the supervision of the whole spiritual and ideological schooling program of the party, all related organizations, and the *Strength through Joy* activities of the Labor Front, has the task of examining all relevant books and pamphlets. Books of the above mentioned nature may be labelled National Socialist in title, make-up, publishers' announcements, and also in their contents only if they have been submitted to the Examining Commission and certified as unobjectionable.<sup>31</sup>

That the establishment of this vestal commission has made the lot of self-appointed *poetae laureati* considerably harder, is not a matter of conjecture. The Commission, we learn,

decides as a party agency; the public is excluded. As a result of the examination the book or pamphlet may

(1) be certified as unobjectionable, which implies that it is also included in the bibliography of National Socialist literature;

(2) not be certified as unobjectionable, but admitted to the book market;

(3) not be certified as unobjectionable, but rejected because of incorrect or unauthorized presentation of National Socialist ideas, and hence eliminated from the book market.

Only those books and pamphlets which have been certified as unobjectionable, may receive a recommendatory certificate through the *Reichsstelle* for the Promotion of German Literature, headed by *Reichsleiter* Alfred Rosenberg who has also just promulgated a decree on the functions of this agency. Its task is to scrutinize all German literature as far as it is of ideological, political, cultural, or educational character.

The recommendatory certificate reads: "This publication is recommended for purchase and promotion to the formations of the NSDAP, to the *Strength through Joy Organization*, and to all related associations." In addition, the *Reichsstelle* renders opinions which may be published if the circumstances warrant it. Finally, it is entitled to inform the formations of the National Socialist Movement of publications which run counter to the interests of the people and the Movement.

The *Reichsstelle* for the Promotion of German Literature is identical, in its scope and its personnel, with the *Hauptstelle für Schrifttumspflege*,

<sup>31</sup> *Frankfurter Zeitung, Sonntagsausgabe*, No. 16, April 22, 1934.

one of the divisions administered by Alfred Rosenberg. A special department *Libraries* exists within the *Hauptstelle* which supervises the collections of libraries, and collaborates in an advisory capacity in supplementing the collections and establishing new libraries planned within the National Socialist Movement.<sup>32</sup>

There is only one thing, however, certification cannot produce: literature. This painful dilemma presented itself in full magnitude when the German public was recently informed that there was no qualified candidate for the Schiller Prize. From authorized quarters word came as follows:

The official Schiller Prize amounting to 7000 *Reichsmark*, endowed in 1859 and awarded sexennially for the best dramatic work of a living German author, was again to be awarded at this year's anniversary of Friedrich von Schiller's death. According to a semi-official report, the Prize Commission has proposed not to award the prize as such this time, but to use the money under article 11 of the charter as assistance grants to dramatic poets, since this extraordinary official recognition can be extended only to a poet of greatest talent who works in the spirit of National Socialism, and since as yet such a decisively preponderant dramatic work or dramatic poet does not exist. Reich Minister Rust, in his capacity as Prussian Minister of Science and Education, has concurred with the Commission's proposal and recommended it to the Prime Minister who has given his approval. Accordingly, the money will be appropriated to the Emergency Fund of German Literature for distribution among destitute authors.<sup>33</sup>

Disappointing as the absence of a "poet of greatest talent who works in the spirit of National Socialism" must be, yet it may not be overlooked that eligible aspirants for the Schiller Prize are among the Propaganda Minister's least pressing worries. More perturbing is, for instance, the slow emergence of newspaper editors able to combine political "reliability" with a discharge of the "editorial function" to the satisfaction of the reading public, Hitlerite or not. It was a comparatively easy task for the new régime to eliminate press opposition in the initial phases of the National Revolution. In spite of their impressive voice newspapers, not unlike bullfrogs, can be silenced with less effort than ignorance may assume. Three months of suppression, particularly if no reasons are proffered, will push many a money-making daily into financial disaster and drive many a publisher out of business. In the turmoil of revolutionary overthrow all that is needed for such a procedure is

<sup>32</sup> *Frankfurter Zeitung*, No. 192-3, April 14, 1935.

<sup>33</sup> *Frankfurter Zeitung, Wochenblatt*, No. 19, May 12, 1935.

actual power. Under these circumstances a number of well established liberal papers surrendered to National Socialism. The press of the "Marxist" parties, both charged with conspiracy in the mysterious Reichstag fire, was swept into the Orkus forever; that disposed with one stroke of the pen of about fifty Communist and not less than one hundred-thirty Social Democratic party organs, as contrasted to about one hundred-twenty then existing Hitlerite newspapers.<sup>34</sup> The disappearance of press opposition, however, merely prepared the ground for a "monoform" expression of the "national will." In order to guarantee full political homogeneity the government seized upon the idea of state-directed syndicalism which had worked miracles in Fascist Italy. In September 1933 a National Chamber of Culture was set up<sup>35</sup> which, as an all-embracing scheme linked to the Propaganda Ministry, extended into every lane of cultural life: literary production, the press, radio, cinema,<sup>36</sup> theater, music, the plastic arts. Membership in the respective subdivision alone grants the right to professional activity. A few weeks later the Editor Act<sup>37</sup> initiated a new epoch in German newspaper work by elevating the press to a "public" institution. Henceforth no one could be employed in an editorial capacity who was rated unacceptable by the Propaganda Ministry. A subsequent ministerial ordinance explained the purport of the act in the following words:

Sense of responsibility to state and people and personal integrity shall determine the fitness for the editorial profession. No one needs to fear the application of the provisions of the act and of this ordinance who fulfills these requirements in the exercise of the editorial profession. To create a German press uniform in this respect but otherwise diversified, is the aim of the Editor Act.<sup>38</sup>

This somewhat optimistic note does not, however, quite accord with a joint *pro domo* statement published simultaneously by three leading Swiss papers at the close of 1934:

The Swiss newspapers *Der Bund*, *Nationalzeitung*, and *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, recently forbidden in Germany for an indefinite time without

<sup>34</sup> cf. Hadamovsky, *op. cit.*, p. 112.

<sup>35</sup> *Reichskulturkammergesetz* of September 22, 1933 (*Reichsgesetzblatt*, I, p. 661). Cf. also the ordinance of November 1, 1933 (*ibid.*, p. 797). The text of the act is reproduced in an English translation by Pollock and Heneman, *op. cit.*, p. 30. For a comprehensive collection of statutes, ordinances, and decrees concerning the National Chamber of Culture, cf. Karl F. Schrieber, *Das Recht der Reichskulturkammer* (Berlin, 1935).

<sup>36</sup> cf. also the act of July 14, 1933 (*Reichsgesetzblatt*, I, p. 438).

<sup>37</sup> *Schriftleitergesetz* of October 4, 1933 (*ibid.*, p. 713). For an English translation cf. Pollock and Heneman, *op. cit.*, pp. 30ff.

<sup>38</sup> Ordinance of December 19, 1933 (*Reichsgesetzblatt*, I, p. 1085).

explanation, find themselves not in a position to adapt their reporting to the unusual requirements which evidently guide the admission of the foreign German language press in Germany, since a free and independent evaluation of political affairs and events in other countries is indispensable for the desirable objective information of the Swiss public. The press policy of the German government has demonstrated in the past eighteen months that no newspaper serving the Swiss interests and opinions regardless of its sale abroad, can today count on unrestricted circulation in Germany. The three newspapers mentioned above, in view of this situation, have arrived at the conclusion that a change in their general attitude is out of the question. They also decline to publish for commercial considerations an especially adapted edition for Germany.<sup>39</sup>

But there is nothing particularly offensive about such a communication from the Free Confederacy. It merely places emphasis on a phenomenon well known to the Reich's reading public and frequently admitted even by official spokesmen, namely, that German newspaper information suffers from monotony. Paradoxical as it may sound, one reason is the very prominence of National Socialist propaganda in every sheet of printed paper. Bulks of releases and "inspired" news land each week on editorial desks throughout the country. It is obvious that they are not sent in order to be deposited in wastebaskets. Most of them, in fact, are newsworthy already through the fact that they carry the signum of well accredited agencies such as the *Deutsche Nachrichten-Bureau* (DNB) or the *Nationalsozialistische Partei-Korrespondenz*. The DNB emerged with the advent of 1934 from a fusion of the world-renowned WTB and the *Telegraphen-Union*, and hence monopolizes the province of news gathering. Its significant motto is: "Virtue is knowledge in the interest and for the benefit of the new Reich. *Heil Hitler!*" The DNB and the *Nationalsozialistische Partei-Korrespondenz* nobly contest in molding public opinion. Most of their output culminates in a moral; the "straight news" is being demoted. The following clippings tell the whole story:

Commenting on the decision of the Königsberg district court (*Amtsgericht*), just published by the *Angriff*, against the *Gauamtsleiter* of the National Socialist Teachers' Association and *Korreferent* to the East Prussian Section of the National Socialist German Workers' Party, Otto Raatz, which we reported in No. 238 of May 11, the *Nationalsozialistische Partei-Korrespondenz* mentions that the head of the *Rassenpolitisches Amt* of the NSDAP, Dr. Gross, after being informed of the Königsberg decision sent the following telegram to the National Socialist Jurists' Association: "Consider Königsberg decision complete miscarriage of justice contradicting all racial feeling. Request that whole influence be

<sup>39</sup> *Der Bund*, December 30, 1934.



used in order to avoid repetition of such inconceivable decisions." The *Nationalsozialistische Partei-Korrespondenz* then continues: "How far even today legal interpretation on the basis of the Roman law still runs counter to the *völkischer* sense of justice, is clearly indicated by the decision of the Königsberg district court according to which the use of the word *Jew* alone already represents in each case a criminal offense. The argumentation of the court distinguishes itself in no way from the practice of the Weimar system which in its day likewise aimed at silencing the Antisemitism of our movement. It is significant that the defendant's attempt to prove the Jewish descent of the plaintiff (named Seraphim) was frustrated by the court. We believe that the German people, in the light of previous experiences, has a considerable interest in the fact whether some one is of German descent or whether his ancestors have pursued their trade in Palestine or Galicia. It will meet with little approval in National Socialist Germany to regard the discussion of the presumable descent of a person as an offense."<sup>40</sup>

The President of the *Werberat der Deutschen Wirtschaft*, in agreement with the Reich Minister of Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda, points out that recently the question of special signs for German business enterprises is being raised in unauthorized quarters. He emphasizes that the arbitrary use of such signs and announcements is undesirable before a general regulation is issued.<sup>41</sup>

On the other hand, newspaper monotony is also caused by just that strict compliance which is implied in the "public" status of the press. Editorial staffs pricked up their ears, again, when the following impressive item made the round:

The *Essener Volkszeitung*, formerly an organ of the [Catholic] Center Party, was forbidden for two weeks on account of an incorrect statement. The newspaper, in its issue of April 17, reported that the sentence against the murderer Islakar had been commuted from capital punishment to a life term, while in reality no pardon had been granted, and Islakar and his accomplices had been decapitated in Essen. The Court Press Service states with reference to this case: "The report of the *Essener Volkszeitung* was caused through an incredibly careless reliance on information which the reporter of the newspaper obtained in a restaurant from a third person who neither was informed of the relevant circumstances nor could have had any knowledge of them. The necessary measures have immediately been taken against the *Essener Volkszeitung* and the persons concerned."—The Essen Police President makes the following announcement: "The responsible editors of the *Essener Volkszeitung* and their informants have been arrested at the request of the *Oberpräsident* of the

<sup>40</sup> *Frankfurter Zeitung*, No. 240-1, May 12, 1935.

<sup>41</sup> *Frankfurter Zeitung, Wochenblatt*, No. 17, April 28, 1935.

Rhine Province. The *Essener Volkszeitung* has been forbidden for two weeks."<sup>42</sup>

Fast was the course of justice. The *Sondergericht* sentenced informant (Court Clerk Schade) and reporter (Editor Multhaupt) to three months, the *Essener Volkszeitung's* editor-in-chief, Dr. Freckwinkel, to two months in prison.<sup>43</sup> Almost at the same time, Dr. Schäfer, editor-in-chief of the *Kölnische Zeitung*, found himself accused of a similar crime. Months ago this "independent" paper had been aroused by what Dr. Schäfer regarded as calumnious statements circulated in the course of a local National Socialist subscription campaign. The *Kölnische Zeitung*, assuming that its competitors had overstepped the restrictions of fairness and law and acted without the approval of central agencies, vivaciously fought back in its own pages. But the assumption on which it had parried, did not hold true in one point: actually central approval had not been lacking. This flaw brought the responsible editor-in-chief before the District Press Court organized under the Editor Act. The tribunal was willing to concede that Dr. Schäfer, "through steps in Berlin and other efforts to obtain full information, had done all that could reasonably be expected of him." That, however, did not make an incorrect editorial a correct one. And while the court refrained from imposing a professional death sentence by ordering Dr. Schäfer's name struck out from the official roster, it deemed, on the other hand, a mere reprimand too light a punishment. A fine of 500 *Reichsmark* seemed appropriate.<sup>44</sup>

Small wonder, then, that non-Hitlerite periodicals find it difficult to rise to the opportunity thrown into their lap by Minister Goebbels' decree of May 1934 in which they were assured of "wide scope" and "preference to free comments according to their own view points."<sup>45</sup> Their ears were still ringing with *Der Führer's* apodictic declaration of policy: "I shall not tolerate a press the exclusive purpose of which is to destroy what we have undertaken to build up."<sup>46</sup> The wane of the German press, inevitable as it is with the abrupt shift from the booming days of proportional representation to the ideological constrictions of the one-party state, is not confined, however, to the evaporation of intelligent differentiation. It manifests itself also in physical shrinkage. Hundreds of periodicals, voluntarily or involuntarily, have closed shop

<sup>42</sup> *ibid.*, No. 16, April 21, 1935.

<sup>43</sup> *Frankfurter Zeitung*, No. 266-7, May 26, 1935.

<sup>44</sup> *ibid.*, No. 266-7, May 26, 1935.

<sup>45</sup> For the full text, cf. Fritz Morstein Marx, "Propaganda and Dictatorship," 179 *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* (May 1935), p. 218.

<sup>46</sup> Hitler in an interview with the Berlin representative of the Associated Press, *Hamburger Fremdenblatt*, No. 92, April 4, 1934 (evening edition).

since the National Revolution broke. Hundreds of thousands of their former readers have become adjusted to no longer taking any paper at all. In the meantime, press propaganda appears to have reached its natural saturation point. In 1934 National Socialist dailies already experienced declining circulation figures. That may have been one reason for the drastic decrees issued by the President of the Press Chamber on April 24, 1935, which, if literally enforced, will extinguish the life of all but party organs. According to these decrees, "independent" papers may be eliminated whenever official agencies are satisfied that such a measure is required in order to remove "unsound competition." Moreover, publishers of "independent" papers must prove their and their wives' Aryan descent back to the year 1800, are no longer entitled to pursue their business in the form of anonymous corporations, and, at the same time, may not financially depend on profits from this enterprise.<sup>47</sup> Dr. Dietrich, National Socialism's party press chief, recently claimed that the sweeping move of the Press Chamber had not originated with the government, but with the rank and file of newspaper readers whose preference was with "the paper of firm, unperturbable political character."<sup>48</sup> At the same time, the non-Hitlerite *Frankfurter Zeitung*, at first profoundly upset by the decrees,<sup>49</sup> soon rallied and, obviously on good authority, crisply advised sympathetic condolers abroad that nothing was as remote from its mind as the thought of demise.<sup>50</sup> But in the next line *Die Frankfurter*, throughout the turbulent times anything but a parrot and still among the world's greatest newspapers, poured out a bucket of wisdom in ten words: "*Was aus der deutschen Presse werden wird, muss man abwarten.*"

If it is still doubtful what will become of the German press, the doubt rests alone on the fact that, in spite of the newspaper's "public" status, the element of competition between Hitlerite and non-Hitlerite periodicals has been preserved. That is, however, not typical of other instruments of state propaganda in Germany. Broadcasting, especially, was long before the National Revolution under the "financial absolutism of the Postal Ministry,"<sup>51</sup> which derived an annual revenue of close to one hundred million *Reichsmark* from fees for the use of radio sets. The Postal Ministry owned and operated all transmitters and, at the same time, controlled the National Broadcasting Company which, in turn, held the

<sup>47</sup> cf. the informative editorial in the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, No. 215-16, April 28, 1935.

<sup>48</sup> *ibid.*, No. 227-8, May 5, 1935.

<sup>49</sup> *ibid.*, No. 215-16, April 28, 1935.

<sup>50</sup> *Frankfurter Zeitung, Wochenblatt*, No. 18, May 5, 1935.

<sup>51</sup> Hadamovsky, *op. cit.*, p. 88.

majority of stock of the ten German broadcasting organizations, each of them providing its own program. The working agreement between these program-furnishing companies could, with the rise of National Socialism, quickly be stiffened to an effectively centralized scheme integrated in the remodelled National Broadcasting Company, which the Propaganda Ministry took under its wings. In this way, the President of the Broadcasting Chamber explains,

the German broadcasting system, by its very organization, was itself an expression of the German unitarian state as created by National Socialism. The development progressed logically: broadcasting had to become a voice, the means of expression of this united state. But organization does not mean anything unless it is imbued with a certain spirit. The spirit which infused the organization of broadcasting was the idea of National Socialism which had become the leading force of the state.<sup>52</sup>

The technical mobilization of the radio as the "voice of the nation" is a history of remarkable accomplishment. The number of transmitters grew to more than twenty-five in a country smaller than the state of Texas; the power of the main transmitters was increased to 100 kilowatt, the international limit; emphasis was laid on the production of *Volksempfänger* sets taken up as a specialty by about thirty plants, which combine low price and reliable quality; in 1934 the figure for radio sets passed the six million mark, indicating an increase of more than a million in one single year. Still more important was the organization of mass listening. An army of National Socialist radio functionaries (*Funkwarte*) took charge of this problem. Whenever the Leader had reason to appeal to the people at large, the *Funkwart* service established loudspeakers in public squares and conveniently located meeting halls, in court rooms, administrative departments, schools, and factory yards. Sirens howled, and the pulse of professional life stopped throughout the nation for the time of the "community reception." It is estimated that thus *Der Führer's* words reached an audience of not less than 56,000,000.<sup>53</sup> Indeed, National Socialism and the German radio, "its towering herald,"<sup>54</sup> have become "one insoluble unit."<sup>55</sup> All that phonetic effect can contribute to the attitude-building process, has been mustered in the combat for "one single public opinion," as Minister Goebbels has paraphrased his goal. "With the radio we have destroyed the spirit of rebel-

<sup>52</sup> Horst Dressler-Andress, "Broadcasting in Germany," 177 *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* (January 1935), p. 62.

<sup>53</sup> *ibid.*, p. 62.

<sup>54</sup> *ibid.*, p. 65.

<sup>55</sup> *ibid.*, p. 62.

lion," the national broadcasting chief asserts.<sup>56</sup> And the President of the Broadcasting Chamber proudly adds that

the Leader of Germany does not have to rule with dictatorial means. He enjoys the confidence of his people. This is abundant proof of the political and propagandistic success of the National Socialist radio activity.<sup>57</sup>

Held against the "voice of the nation," the screen is small fry, although its ticket turnover amounted in 1929 to 350,000,000. The German cinema, too, presented a less diffuse pattern than the press at the eve of the National Resurgence. The predominance of the UFA, controlled by the Hugenberg group, was unchallenged, and has not since been challenged. Here was a giant organization which lent itself readily to "permeation."<sup>58</sup> And the "big stick" in the form of prophylactic censorship had already been supplied by the republic.<sup>59</sup> That the enlistment of the cinema for official propaganda purposes has not precipitated a "consumers' strike" is shown by the recent gradual rise of attendance figures which has partly offset the impact of the depression and the ensuing record low of 250,000,000 reached in 1932. This development is the more reassuring since the Film Chamber has imposed minimum prices on all moving picture houses. Finally, outside the powerful triskelion of press, radio, and cinema, there is the domain of "inspired" art; there are the channels of communication offered by the Labor Front, the Law Front; the tight compartments of state-syndicalism from which one day Germany's *stato corporativo* may emerge, flushed by the waters of propaganda; the schools; the "state youth" of the *Führerstaat* educated "consciously in its spirit."<sup>60</sup> No stone is left unturned "in the service of the government and its aims."<sup>61</sup>

Assuming that these truly magnificent efforts will meet lasting success, the political scientist may feel impelled to check up on the representative qualities of the *Führerstaat*. Propaganda Minister Goebbels has classified it as an "ennobled democracy"

in which the people gives few men the right to command, but on the other hand reserves the right to criticize these few men on general lines. This right is exercised in the elections.<sup>62</sup>

<sup>56</sup> *Frankfurter Zeitung, Wochenblatt*, No. 17, April 28, 1935.

<sup>57</sup> Dressler-Andress, *op. cit.*, p. 64.

<sup>58</sup> Hadamovsky, *op. cit.*, p. 146.

<sup>59</sup> *Lichtspielgesetz* of May 12, 1920 (*Reichsgesetzblatt*, p. 953). Similar provisions existed in the *Gesetz zur Bewahrung der Jugend vor Schund- und Schmutzschriften* of December 18, 1926 (*ibid.*, I, p. 505), which was repealed by "cabinet act" of April 10, 1935 (*ibid.*, p. 541) as less "dependable" than the National Chamber of Culture Act.

<sup>60</sup> Otto Koellreutter, *Grundriss der Allgemeinen Staatslehre* (Tübingen, 1933), p. 257.

<sup>61</sup> Koellreutter, *op. cit.*, p. 261.

<sup>62</sup> *Hamburger Fremdenblatt*, No. 78, March 20, 1934 (evening edition).

This is, however, a somewhat evasive formulation. Doubtless the function of the electorate has changed since *compatibilità* became the civic norm. In February 1933 President von Hindenburg still called the German people to the polls to "indicate its stand toward the newly formed Government of National Concentration."<sup>63</sup> Next October it was invited not merely to express its attitude on the issue of Germany's withdrawal from the League of Nations, but also to "manifest its endorsement of the cabinet."<sup>64</sup> Finally, after the Reich's Grand Old Man had closed his eyes forever, *Der Führer* advised his Minister of the Interior as follows:

It is my will that the constitutionally valid cabinet resolution by which the powers of the former Reich President have been vested in me and hence in the office of the Reich Chancellor, receive the explicit sanction of the German people. Firmly convinced that all sovereign power must emanate from the people and be confirmed by it in free and secret elections, I request you to submit immediately the cabinet resolutions together with any necessary supplementary material to the German people for a free plebiscite.<sup>65</sup>

If "genuine leadership" springs from an "act of grace,"<sup>66</sup> it would indeed be sacrilegious to withhold from the leader what providence moves him to ask for. Thus dissent is logically outlawed, and governmental campaign posters, in solitary legitimacy, omitted only the illegitimate alternative in supplementing the text of the plebiscite question with the large-type line: "The whole people answers this question with a unanimous *Yes!*" Nor was it mere wishful thinking when Speaker Göring closed the historic Reichstag session following the "Röhm revolt" with these words:

And if abroad it is believed today that chaos threatens Germany, the German people respond with the single cry: We all approve always of what our Leader does.<sup>67</sup>

"We all approve always"—with this qualification of the people's "right to criticize," state propaganda in Germany relegates the electorate to the rôle of the national echo.

• <sup>63</sup> Decree of February 1, 1933 (*Reichsgesetzblatt*, I, p. 45).

<sup>64</sup> Decree of October 14, 1933 (*ibid.*, p. 729).

<sup>65</sup> Letter of August 2, 1934, to the Reich Minister of the Interior.

<sup>66</sup> Koellreutter, *op. cit.*, p. 66.

<sup>67</sup> *Frankfurter Zeitung*, No. 354-5, July 15, 1934.



## II

# STATE PROPAGANDA IN ITALY





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ARNOLD J. ZURCHER

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**A**MONG the propaganda systems of contemporary European dictatorships, that of Fascist Italy is generally granted the distinction of being the most monopolistic and the most ambitious. Probably in no Western nation, not even in Germany or Soviet Russia, has autonomous thought and speech been more severely repressed, nor a more elaborate governmental system for the cultivation of national ideologies, manners and morals been erected. Nor, with the possible exception of Soviet Russia, does any other Western dictatorship reveal more clearly and more vividly the effects of such a system of censorship and propaganda in terms of the prostitution of education, the warping and suppression of truth, the instillation of false and dangerous doctrines and the evocation and aggravation of emotions which lead to social violence.

Italy's propaganda régime has developed as the Fascist political dictatorship has developed, the stages in the evolution of the two having corresponded quite closely. In the period of quasi-parliamentarism between 1922 and 1924, Fascism had to be content with the propaganda issuing from its own press and party organizations; critical opinion was censored through the vigilantist tactics of the Fascist political *ras* and the Fascist squadrist. After the Matteotti affair when the parliamentary opposition had been crushed, vigilantism gave way to legal censorship and that in turn was gradually extended to include suppression of all critical opinion. At the same time, the government moved rapidly towards the goal of a complete monopoly of all propaganda apparatus, a goal which may be said to have been realized by 1929. If evidence of the intimate connection between political dictatorship and the suppression of speech and opinion were desired, none better could be adduced than this coincidental development of political and intellectual dictatorship in Italy.

In mobilizing the dictatorship over opinion, the Fascists directed their attention first of all to the daily press. The process of coordinating this institution began with the famous decree of the summer of 1924 by which prefects were authorized to confiscate issues of newspapers which contained false, tendentious or misleading information, or information calculated to inspire class hatred or bring the government into contempt.<sup>1</sup> Two years later a licensing system was formally introduced. Every daily journal in Italy was required to secure permission to publish from the royal procurator. This official could refuse any application not giving satisfactory evidence of the financial responsibility of the publisher or of the political trustworthiness of the editor. He could, moreover, recall a permit to publish at any time, his discretion being limited only by the possibility of an appeal from his decision to the Council of State. In lieu of pledging his printing equipment, a publisher was required to file a bond with the government for the discharge of any fines or judgments which might arise out of offenses against the press laws.<sup>2</sup>

These measures were in part responsible for the gradual Fascitization of the management and ownership of the press during the next decade. Realizing that even the minimum favor of the new régime could be secured only by developing a reputation for pro-Fascist leanings, journals retired editors whose political antecedents were suspect and employed others. Occasionally the ownership itself changed hands or the controlling interest was shifted in order to place the paper above political suspicion. Great liberal journals such as the *Corriere della Sera* of Milan, with four hundred thousand subscribers, and *Il Messaggero* of Rome, with half that number, dismissed distinguished editors like Senator Albertini, ceased their opposition to Signor Mussolini and became his allies instead. At the same time, new journals, under loyal Fascist auspices, were established; and the influence of the older Fascist journals such as Signor Mussolini's *Popolo d'Italia* and the *Régime Fascista* was extended by means of subsidies, governmental favor and their natural significance as organs of the dominant politicians. Finally many other newspapers, whose political affiliations during the pre-Fascist age made assimilation to the new régime impossible, were discontinued. Among these were the Communist *L'Unità*, the Unitary Socialist *La Giustizia*, the Socialist *L'Avanti*, formerly edited by the *il Duce*, and the Republican *La Voce*.

<sup>1</sup> Decree law of July 15, 1923, *Raccolta ufficiale delle leggi e dei decreti del regno* (cited hereafter as *Raccolta*) (1924), Vol. IV, no. 1055, p. 3034.

<sup>2</sup> Law of December 31, 1925, *Raccolta* (1926), Vol. II, no. 2308, p. 34. See also law of December 31, 1925, *Raccolta* (1926), Vol. II, no. 2307, p. 31.

In order still further to extend control of the press, Fascism proceeded to regiment the journalists. The free press associations of the liberal period were all dissolved by October 26, 1925. Two months later, it was decreed that journalism was henceforth to be a quasi-public profession, like medicine or law, to be practised only by those whose names appeared on registers approved by the government. The power to admit candidates to these registers was first given to the newly formed Fascist press associations; later it was committed to the National Fascist Press Syndicates organized under the Fascist Charter of Labor of April 1926. Local committees of these syndicates, chosen by the Ministers of Justice, Interior and Corporations, actually admit candidates to the registers.<sup>3</sup> Normally the privilege is extended only to those candidates who are members of a Fascist Press Syndicate; in any case, those admitted must have correct patriotic sentiments. In the early days, all the journalists who had opposed the government during the Matteotti affair were either kept out altogether or else relegated to inferior classifications of the profession. More than one parallel is to be found for the case of a former managing editor of the *Corriere della Sera* who found himself designated an apprentice in the new Fascist journalists' registers!

Controlled in this manner, the Fascist press has become the most monotonous and servile in Europe.<sup>4</sup> All vitality and independence have vanished and it has been transformed into an instrument to be used by the government for educational, moral and political purposes. From Piedmont to Calabria, it plays the tune favored at the moment by the authorities. Editors and compositors wait upon the press instructions which come at regular intervals from the Press Bureau of the head of the government at Rome. Press directions issue also from the party press bureaus and occasionally, it is rumored, from the *Palazzo Venezia* itself.

Sometimes the directions merely announce in general terms the policy of the government. In such a case, the journal may vary its style of presentation so long as prominence is given to the issues indicated in the directions. More often than not, the directions cite chapter and verse, detailing even the degree of prominence to be given the headline, the number of columns to be devoted to a news item, and the number of leads in the make-up. The directions are sent either to the journal itself or to the provincial officials who thereupon transmit them to the editors

<sup>3</sup> See article 7 of law of December 31, 1925, *Raccolta* (1926), Vol. II, no. 2308, p. 34; see also decree law of February 26, 1928, no. 384 and article 34 of law of November 21, 1929, *Raccolta* (1930), Vol. I, no. 2291, p. 306.

<sup>4</sup> *Editor and Publisher*, June 3, 1934, p. 3.

within their jurisdiction. A check to insure conformity is secured by the law passed in 1932 which requires every paper to file three perfect copies of each issue with the prefect of the province in which the paper is published.<sup>5</sup> Incidentally the Government Press Bureau, or its spokesman, is not slow to reprove in case it is displeased at even the most innocuous exercise of discretion on the part of the editor. Thus in August 1933 the newspapers were advised that an article on the economic depression, which had appeared in the *Régime Fascista* of Cremona, was "not timely." All papers were admonished to write instead about signs of recovery and allow the future historian to chronicle the depression.<sup>6</sup>

The lowly cinema is another instrument in the control of which the Fascist propagandist has become particularly interested. An institute known as *L'Unione Cinematografica Educativa*, or more familiarly, as *LUCE*, was created in 1926 to produce films and official photographs. The films serve as short topics in Italy's 3800 moving picture houses, each of which is required by law to show such a film as part of the daily program. *LUCE* also has a monopoly of all the cinema and photographic activity of the government departments. The subjects of the films produced by *LUCE* include national and international events of importance, the activities of Fascism, Italian enterprise abroad, agrarian, industrial, cultural, tourist, military and hygienic subjects.<sup>7</sup> In 1930 alone, *LUCE* produced more than a million and a quarter meters of film for the daily moving picture programs and three-quarters of a million meters of other sorts of film.<sup>8</sup>

Technically *LUCE* is a quasi-public corporation capitalized at two and one-half million lira. Its income consists of contributions from the state and from private sources, of funds realized from the sale of films and projecting apparatus and of payments from government departments for film and photographic service. Its chief source of revenue is the proceeds from the rental of films which the Italian cinemas are required to use in their daily programs. Signor Mussolini nominates *LUCE'S* governing council which consists of his personal representative and of the representatives of the Government Press Bureau, of five government departments and of the Fascist Party. Signor Mussolini also nominates the president of the council. Moreover all of the council's decisions, including those affecting its annual program of production

<sup>5</sup> Law of May 26, 1932, *Raccolta* (1932), Vol. II, no. 654, pp. 1709 ff.

<sup>6</sup> See *Nation* (New York), CXXXVII (December 27, 1933), p. 720.

<sup>7</sup> Decree law of November 5, 1925, *Raccolta* (1925), Vol. IX, no. 1985, p. 898; converted into law, March 18, 1926, *Raccolta* (1926), Vol. III, no. 562, p. 2935.

<sup>8</sup> *Annali di statistica, serie 6, vol. 15, Statistica di alcune manifestazioni culturali Italiane nel quadriennio 1926-1930*, Rome, 1933 (cited hereafter as *Annali di statistica, serie 6, vol. 15*), p. 100.

and distribution and its exchange of films with foreign countries, must be ratified by him.<sup>9</sup>

Still a third medium of communication especially favored by Fascism for propaganda is the radio. Unlike press or cinema, this medium did not have to be taken over from private owners and coordinated with the régime for it has belonged to the government from the beginning. At present, broadcasting rights have been transferred to a quasi-public corporation known as the *Ente Italiano per le Audizioni Radiofoniche* which, in 1927, secured a concession for twenty-five years from the Minister of Communications. This company, successor to an earlier concessionaire, the *Unione Radiofonica Italiana*, is authorized to issue stock up to ten million lira to Italian citizens and corporations, and is required by its charter to use principally Italian talent in its broadcasts.<sup>10</sup>

About twenty-five per cent of the *Ente's* programs are non-musical. These consist principally of speeches, conferences and short talks, news notices and special programs for children.<sup>11</sup> All programs must be submitted in advance to a National Board of Review and Supervision. The members of this board, appointed by the Minister of Communications, consist of representatives of the Fascist Confederations of industry, commerce and agriculture, and of Fascist Syndicates in the fields of the arts, belles lettres, journalism, the cinema and affiliated industries. The Fascist Council of Public Instruction is also represented and the president of the board must always be a Senator or a Deputy.<sup>12</sup>

Despite the favor shown it, radio has not been a particularly effective propaganda medium. In part this has been due to inadequate and improperly developed broadcasting and reception facilities. As late as 1929, the *Ente* had only six major broadcasting stations, the principal one being a sixty-kilowatt station at Milan. Registered receiving sets at that time numbered not more than about 63,000. The relatively small number of receiving sets is to be ascribed to the heavy tax levied upon their use, the proceeds of which constitute the principal revenue of the *Ente*. For a standard set, the annual contribution is about \$3.50. In addition, there are import and excise taxes on sets and accessories, and

<sup>9</sup> Decree law of January 24, 1929, *Raccolta* (1929), Vol. II, no. 122, pp. 1892-1901; converted into law, June 24, 1929, *Raccolta* (1929), Vol. V, no. 1048, p. 5030.

<sup>10</sup> For terms of the concession, see decree law of November 17, 1927, *Raccolta* (1927), Vol. IX, no. 2207, p. 9405; converted into law, May 17, 1928, *Raccolta* (1928), Vol. IV, no. 1350, p. 4405. A description of the terms of the concession may also be found in *Annali di statistica, serie 6, vol. 15*, pp. 101-8.

<sup>11</sup> *Annuario statistico Italiano* (cited hereafter as *Annuario*) 1933, p. 102.

<sup>12</sup> Decree law of November 17, 1927, *Raccolta* (1927), Vol. IX, no. 2207, p. 9275; and law of April 5, 1928, *Raccolta* (1928), Vol. IV, no. 1232, p. 3778.

extra contributions for reception privileges are levied upon the communes, hotels, clubs, cinemas and other public places.

In the past few years steps have been taken to overcome radio's weaknesses. The concession to the *Ente* in 1927 called for additional stations and facilities at Rome, Milan, Turin, Trieste and Palermo. These and others have since been supplied. The most important new station is one of 250 kilowatts at Santa Palomba near Rome, capable of transmitting from five hundred to three thousand miles. At the time of its erection it was said to be the most powerful station in Europe.<sup>13</sup> By 1932 licensed receiving sets had increased to more than 300,000, about five times the number in 1928.<sup>14</sup> Plans now being elaborated call for improved short-wave transmission to the African colonies and to points abroad, and for the extension of rural programs and programs which can be used in the rural elementary classroom.<sup>15</sup>

The exploitation of the communications system is not limited to the daily press, the cinema and the radio. The chief source of telegraphic dispatches from abroad, the Stefani Agency, though still legally a private organization, is controlled directly by the government.<sup>16</sup> At present it is required to post a bond for good behavior.<sup>17</sup> The periodical press is subject to the same censorship regulations as the daily press and its organs are also Fascitized. Signor Mussolini himself owns *Gerarchia*, a monthly periodical devoted to economic and political topics, edited by his biographer, Signora Margharita Sarfatti; Signor Farinacci owns another journal, and Party and government subsidize still others. Publishers of books, though legally exempt from censorship, are careful not to issue a volume which would cause offense.<sup>18</sup> In practice, they are "invited" to submit all manuscripts dealing with socio-political topics to the Fascist Publishers' Federation and to Party officials.<sup>19</sup> The theater, likewise, has recently been deprived of its remaining independence.<sup>20</sup> Even phonograph records and discs are occasionally manu-

<sup>13</sup> *New York Times*, January 18, 1930, p. 12.

<sup>14</sup> *Annuario*, 1933, p. 102.

<sup>15</sup> A. R. Burrows, "Broadcasting Outside the United States," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, CLXXVII (January 1935), p. 34.

<sup>16</sup> See decree law of June 30, 1926, *Raccolta* (1927), Vol. IX, no. 1096, p. 9087, and law of June 21, 1928, *Raccolta* (1928), Vol. V, no. 1607, p. 5117. Cf. O. W. Riegel, *Mobilizing for Chaos* (New Haven, 1934), p. 116.

<sup>17</sup> Decree of January 26, 1931, *Raccolta* (1931), Vol. I, no. 83, p. 76.

<sup>18</sup> E. W. Hullinger, *The New Fascist State* (New York, 1928), p. 226.

<sup>19</sup> Carmen Haider, *Capital and Labor Under Fascism* (New York, 1930), p. 131.

<sup>20</sup> Law of January 6, 1931, *Raccolta* (1931), Vol. III, no. 599, p. 2615.

factured by the government in order to convey the official Fascist message to the nation.<sup>21</sup>

Fascism finds even more fruitful opportunities for indoctrination by exploiting its own political and cultural organizations or those of the state. Of paramount importance in this respect are Party and Fascist Militia. While the leaders of these two organizations govern Italy, subordinates, and the rank and file, about two millions in the Party and about a fourth that number in the Militia, keep patriotic zeal at fever pitch throughout the country. Parades, fêtes and demonstrations are but a small part of the manifestations which are sponsored to that end. Both organizations maintain press bureaus and propaganda offices, and distribute books, pamphlets and newspapers. The Militia has the special duty of instructing youth organizations; since 1930 it has also provided the pre-military instruction now prescribed for all Italian youth between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one.<sup>22</sup> Hardly less valuable for indoctrinating another section of the population are the Fascist labor syndicates established by the government in 1927. These account at present for a membership of some six and one-half millions.<sup>23</sup> Fascist spokesmen have declared that the workers in these syndicates are not to be allowed to govern themselves until the last traces of Socialism have disappeared from their midst.<sup>24</sup> The government and Party accordingly appoint the more important officials. Since these syndicates are the only ones legally authorized to negotiate with the employer, they hold a weapon over their membership which can be used most effectively for disciplinary purposes.

Another active propagandist organization among Italian workers is the *Opera Nazionale Dopolavoro*, or Fascist Leisure Time Organization, established in 1925<sup>25</sup> ostensibly to dispense cultural, hygienic and material benefits to its membership. Its primary purpose is best revealed by Signor Achille Starace, Secretary of the Fascist party, who states that *Dopolavoro* was organized to "educate the individual morally and

<sup>21</sup> *New York Times*, December 16, 1934.

<sup>22</sup> Law of December 29, 1930, *Raccolta* (1931), Vol. I, no. 1759, p. 245. Cf. A. Teruzzi, "La Milizia delle Camicie Nere," *Panorami di Vita Fascista* (a collection of brief descriptions of Fascist activities by prominent Fascists, edited by A. Mondadori under direction of A. Marpicati of the National Fascist Party, 1933, cited hereafter as *Panorami di Vita Fascista*), p. 51.

<sup>23</sup> *Annuario*, 1933, p. 184.

<sup>24</sup> Carmen Haider, *op. cit.*, p. 216.

<sup>25</sup> Decree law of May 1, 1925, *Raccolta* (1925), Vol. V, no. 582, p. 4737; converted into law, March 18, 1926, *Raccolta* (1926), Vol. III, no. 562, p. 2935. See also decree law of August 10, 1927, *Raccolta* (1927), Vol. VII, no. 1559, p. 7258; converted into law, February 16, 1928, *Raccolta* (1928), Vol. II, no. 360, p. 1640.



physically always in the supreme interest of the national society."<sup>26</sup> Its various local institutes have grown from somewhat more than a thousand in 1926 to almost eighteen thousand in 1932<sup>27</sup> and its membership has increased to more than one and one-half millions.

The organizations to which the Fascist doctrinaire devotes the largest share of his attention are those which affect the education of youth. The first Fascist Minister of Education, Dr. Giovanni Gentile, proceeded to institute reforms in the public elementary schools immediately after Signor Mussolini came to power in 1922. Administration was more thoroughly centralized; subsidies from the central government were increased, compulsory attendance laws were more adequately enforced and a fairly advanced curriculum was adopted. Some of these reforms might have yielded excellent results. The increased subsidies, for instance, were badly needed to raise standards in the backward districts; and the curricular change, substituting as it did a more experiential, objective type of training for the former emphasis upon syllabus and factual drill, received high praise from educational experts the world over.<sup>28</sup>

The practical result of the changes, however, has been to facilitate the realization of the aims of those bent upon controlling the education of some five million children in the interests of Party and government. The increased dependence upon the center has brought increased direction, and the more informal curriculum has but condoned efforts of the Fascists to inculcate their doctrine. It is customary at present for school authorities to dedicate as much as a fifth of the student's time to patriotic exhortations, to the commemoration of various Fascist and national anniversaries and to Fascist drives, campaigns, assemblies, parades and fêtes of all sorts.<sup>29</sup> The regular syllabus is also distorted for patriotic ends. Matters of immediate national or civic importance obtrude upon the study of the most abstract subjects, such as arithmetic or pure science, while such subjects as history and geography become exclusively concerned with the *resorgimento*, with Italy's post-war program for military, naval and aerial strength and for economic self-sufficiency.

Naturally the degree of perversion of the curriculum depends upon the teacher. He, however, is not likely to be found wanting in zeal, for

<sup>26</sup> *Panorami di Vita Fascista*, p. 95.

<sup>27</sup> *ibid.*, p. 96; for further information, see E. Lengyel, *The New Deal in Europe* (New York, 1934), pp. 79-81.

<sup>28</sup> H. R. Marraro, "New Education in Italy," *Current History*, XXXVII (February 1933), pp. 571-6.

<sup>29</sup> See Hélène Tuzet, "Notes on Civic Education in the Schools of Fascist Italy," *Italy Today*, V. M. Crawford, ed., 2nd series, No. 10, October 1931, pp. 3ff.

his position all but depends upon his ingenuity in such matters as these and upon his success as a propagandist. Indeed the teacher is constantly checked by the superintendent of his district to whom reports of inspirational activity and political education must be regularly sent. Instances are on record where these reports have been returned because they were incomplete.<sup>30</sup>

Although not the most pernicious effect of the propagandist upon the public schools of Italy, certainly the most startling, is the Fascist revision of the Italian textbook. As early as 1928, it was decreed that textbooks in history, economics and law and the elementary readers should thenceforth accord with the "historical, juridical and economic requirements established since October 28, 1922," the date of the "March on Rome." To carry out the decree, a commission was appointed to examine existing books and issue an approved list. The commission soon reported that it could find none to approve in history and geography and that it could offer only qualified approval for other subjects. The government thereupon proceeded to appoint a commission to revise and edit textbooks for the elementary school which would be suitable. This commission was explicitly instructed to provide readers which would serve as "instruments for the spiritual development of the new Italian, for educating adolescents in the new atmosphere created by Fascism" and for teaching them the duties of the Fascist citizen.<sup>31</sup> These texts have since been prepared and their exhortations will not disappoint the most ardent Fascist theorist.<sup>32</sup>

To secure an even more direct and comprehensive control over the training of Italian youth, Fascism has supplemented its public school system with an elaborate national youth organization known as the *Opera Nazionale Balilla*. At present it consists of the *Balilla* proper for boys between the ages of eight and fourteen, the *Avanguardisti* for boys between fifteen and eighteen, the *Piccole Italiane* for girls from eight to fourteen and the *Giovani Italiane* for girls from fifteen to eighteen. From the *Avanguardisti* selected youths may progress into the ranks of the *Giovani Fascisti* where they remain for three more years. During this stage they are regarded as junior members of the Fascist Militia and

<sup>30</sup> *ibid.*, p. 13.

<sup>31</sup> *ibid.*, p. 12. The following is the more important legislation involved: Articles 203-13 of decree of February 5, 1928, *Raccolta* (1928), Vol. III, no. 577, p. 2588; decree of October 11, 1928, *Raccolta* (1928), Vol. VII, no. 2405, p. 7402; law of January 7, 1929, *Raccolta* (1929), Vol. I, no. 5, p. 252; decree law of July 28, 1929, *Raccolta* (1929), Vol. V, no. 1363, p. 5486; decree of August 22, 1930, *Gazzetta ufficiale del regno*, no. 204.

<sup>32</sup> For examples, see C. H. Abad, "Fascist Education in Italy," *Current History*, XXXVI (July 1932), pp. 433-7.

candidates for membership in the Party. According to the official statistics, there were in 1933 more than a million and a half members in the *Balilla* and *Avanguardisti* and about a million and a quarter in the two girls' divisions.<sup>33</sup>

These youth organizations, like the schools, fall within the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education, their president being one Renato Ricci, an Undersecretary of that Ministry. Elementary school teachers are usually the recruiting officers for *Balilla* and *Avanguardisti*; Fascist Militiamen serve as instructors and leaders. The ranks of the boys' organizations, have the names of units of the classical Roman army. Both girls and boys wear uniforms and observe a military discipline; and occasionally even the most youthful are trained with ordnance.

Despite their monopoly of the sources of information and of the means of instruction, the strategists of Fascist propaganda have not forgotten the arts of persuasion. Of first importance to their repertoire is the Fascist mythos, the articles of faith and doctrine to which Fascist apologists have more or less consistently adhered during the past dozen years. These have included the consummation of Italian autarchy through such policies as agrarianism, reclamation, electrification and protection for industry, the perfection of the institutional features of Fascism such as the corporate state, and the increase of national power through military preparedness, increased fecundity, decreased emigration, colonization and diplomatic prestige.

The articles of faith and doctrine are exploited in every form of pedagogical, literary and oratorical activity, and they serve for premise, proof or text as necessity may require. The autarchy campaign resolves itself into "battles of wheat" and "battles of rice," into vast drainage schemes and irrigation projects and "back-to-the-land movements." It justifies the rise in price levels and the lowering of wage scales. The corporate state and Fascist political doctrine are also popular. *Il Duce* and his colleagues constantly remind their audiences that the supremacy of the state is Fascism's primary contribution to political theory in the twentieth century. They also declare that the corporate state has solved the perennial problem of the conflict between the classes and between man and machines, thereby transforming a decaying capitalism into a socially useful institution. They even assert that it has ennobled labor by seeking to make it creative and enjoyable.

Some of the articles are obviously more mythical in character than others. The corporate state, for instance, still exists principally on paper.

<sup>33</sup> *Annuario*, 1933, p. 99.

According to its most recent expositor, only one corporation has so far actually been created; that is the Corporation of the Stage.<sup>34</sup> The same observation might be applied to the reclamation program. Despite the huge sums which the government declared in 1928 might ultimately be set aside for drainage and irrigation, actual appropriations for these purposes have never been high. Recently they have been roughly equivalent to the amounts spent for reclamation before Signor Mussolini came to power. Production of grain, moreover, has not risen appreciably under Fascism.<sup>35</sup> Fascists themselves have admitted that the reclamation program is largely a paper program designed to make more plausible their repeated assertions that Italy can support a more extensive population. They explain that the espousal of such a program is inspired by the propagandist lore which the leader of Fascism has taken over from the French Syndicalist, Sorel.<sup>36</sup>

Concerning one of these articles, however, there is no myth. This is militarism. As time progresses, this emerges as the dominant *motif* of the régime. The discipline of the barracks is held up as the ideal of the nation. Obedience, physical fitness, blind courage, sacrifice and national intolerance are taught as cardinal virtues to the schoolboy, the *Balilla*, the recruit and the *Dopolavoro* audience. The nobility of war and the debilitating effects of peace upon a people inspire many literary and oratorical efforts. War sport, sham battles and military formations are the schoolboy's chief diversion. Young girls are taught to be vigilant "guardians of the spirit of war." Textbooks are full of exhortations to perform soldierly duty. *Il Duce* is fond of telling his audiences that "words are a fine thing but that muskets are even better, right unaccompanied by might being vain." Constantly he alludes to his conviction that sometime between 1936 and 1940 Europe will again be at a turning point in its history; and that if the Italian people wish to share in directing the Continent's destiny and see their rights finally recognized, they must be armed to the teeth. In all this military appeal the nation is repeatedly reminded that the preparedness and emotional tension of the armed camp is especially necessary to Italy because it is only these conditions which can compensate for the nation's natural economic weakness in any attempt to play the competitive rôle of a great European power.

<sup>34</sup> Fausto Pitigliani, *The Italian Corporative State* (New York, 1934), pp. 110-11.

<sup>35</sup> During 1930 production of grain dropped to pre-war levels and production of olive oil dropped considerably below the 1913 figures. See *Annuario*, 1931, p. 592. In 1932, production had risen again substantially to the 1929 level, *Annuario*, 1933, p. 462.

<sup>36</sup> H. E. Jensen, "Fascism After Ten Years," *South Atlantic Quarterly*, XXXII (1933), pp. 152-3.

The more effectually to advance Fascism's articles of faith and doctrine, the propagandist has fostered certain subsidiary bodies of belief or faith which are designed primarily to create an atmosphere favorable to indoctrination. These may be called mere cults. Some of them have been established so long that they have virtually become integral parts of the parent doctrines. The more important are the cults of hero worship, of violence, of action and of Romanism.

The cult of hero worship takes many forms. It discovers and establishes the martyrs of the Party and inters their bones in the Party pantheons. It teaches school children to venerate the fallen soldier; it excites pilgrimages to war monuments; and it requires observance of the anniversaries of the births and deaths of the nation's luminaries, royal, military and political. Above all, the cult of hero worship insists upon veneration for the leader of Fascism. His words are the gospel of all Italian school children; he cannot err; his picture must hang in every schoolroom in the land beside smaller pictures of the King and of the Pope; textbooks must contain accounts of reverent pilgrimages to his birthplace near Forli and speak of the regeneration which such a visit works in the spirit and will of the pilgrim. For this veneration of *il Duce* special protection is required; the Government Press Bureau at Rome constantly prohibits news which might injure it. Newspapers may not speak of more than one supreme leader of the Fascist hierarchy; they must not speak of the dictator's motor accidents, of his gastronomic disorders, nor of his Spartan-like diet. They may not even imply that age is creeping on by mentioning the fact that he has become a grandfather.

The cult of violence is a kind of symbolism to which the tactics of the early Fascist squadrists have been reduced. This cult expresses itself in the growls and threats which pervade Fascist oratory and manifestoes. It is a rare occasion which does not contain some reference to the inflexibility of the Fascist will, comparison being made with the same quality in the blade of a sword. Fascism, its leader asserts, still has the courage to direct the lead from its muskets into the backs of its enemies. In harmony with this cult, Fascist pamphlets and newspapers must print a symbol of violence on their covers or mastheads, this being usually a fist, club or, perhaps, a provocative chin. The very pose of the Fascist must express this cult. Until recently, at any rate, most formal photographs of *il Duce* portrayed him with a scowl, head thrown back, jaw thrust out, clenched fists on his hips and legs apart as if in preparation for a spring.

The cult of action is closely related to the cult of violence. It takes form in disquisitions such as those of the dictator's deceased brother, Arnaldo, on the sterility of philosophy, or in the Fascist's contempt for popular deliberation. It is implicit in Fascism's preference for the technologist over the scientist and man of letters. Its most substantial expression is to be discovered in the unusual stimulus which the government has given to the promotion of physical education. Formerly under the direction of an autonomous organization, the *Ente Nazionale per l'Educazione Fisica*, created in 1923, the activity has since been merged with the National *Balilla* under the direction of the Minister of Education.

The fourth of these cults, that of Romanism, is one of the oldest of all and, since it has been engrafted on the Nationalist tradition of the *resorgimento* and the Italian military tradition, it might be included among the articles of faith and doctrine. As an autonomous cult, it takes such forms as a demand for Mediterranean hegemony for Italy and for colonial power, preferably in Africa, with Roman names for the colonies. The cult also calls for Roman designations for the officers and units of the Party's military organizations, closer union with the Catholic church, the Roman salute, archeological excavations and restorations, wide-scale observance of the anniversaries of classical Roman literary and political figures, and the restoration of the cultural supremacy of the city of Rome and Italy in the West.

Fascist propaganda also possesses its abominations, the "devils" which are to be exorcised. If all else should fail, the exhorter may still rely upon the social cohesion produced by exciting hatred, contempt or ridicule of Fascist "devils." These are numerous and their popularity wanes and waxes according to circumstances. Many of them have done long and valiant service. The most important ones are probably democracy and liberalism. The spokesmen of contemporary Italy never weary of invoking these two words as the butt of their scorn. Democracy is declared to be a "régime without a king but with many kings" and as a government more tyrannical than that of the frankest tyrant; occasionally it is referred to as a "corpse." Liberalism is also called a "corpse." Apparently the historic relationship to this deceased liberalism contributes greatly towards making the quite innocuous Chamber of Deputies still another "devil." This institution, Signor Mussolini keeps declaring, must soon be interred along with political liberalism.

Nations, as well as non-Fascist political systems, are placed in the Fascist pillory. The principal victims until 1935 had been France and Yugoslavia. Denunciation of France had been particularly scathing,

that nation having been blamed for blocking Italian ambitions in Africa and the Balkans. Towards Yugoslavia there had been a campaign of vituperation in the press which only the exhaustion of expletives occasionally halted. The exigencies of international policy recently required the Fascist censor to frown upon the anti-French theme; and even the trans-Adriatic neighbor has experienced some consideration at his hands. But France and vanished imperial Austria still serve as hereditary enemies whom the loyal Italian soldier wants to fight in the textbooks. Moreover, Nazi Germany, after the honeymoon period of 1933 had expired, became the heir of most of the odium and invective formerly heaped upon the anti-revisionist powers.<sup>37</sup>

Other propaganda "devils" which have done yeoman service in Fascist Italy include the "injustices of the Versailles treaty," the "League of Nations," the "Mafia," the "Freemasons," "prosperity," the "profiteers," "capitalism" and "Communism." Capitalism has been particularly prominent since the economic depression began in 1929. The leader of Fascism is fond of repeating that the moribund phase of capitalism began in 1914 and that its unregulated persistence since then has been responsible for the Insulls and the Kruegers and those other "acrobats of finance and industry" who have wrecked the world's economic system. Unregulated capitalism, it is held, destroyed prosperity in America and thereby brought the depression to Italy. "Communism" is an expletive which combines the advantages of unusual virulence and wide adaptability. At present it is used chiefly to label all, or nearly all, anti-Fascists. Practically every person, convicted by the Special Tribunal for the Defense of the State, is officially branded a Communist even though his political sympathies may be notoriously Liberal or Monarchist.

In presenting its appeal, Fascism avails itself of all the time-honored devices of the manipulators of opinion. Philosophies are boiled down to more or less meaningless slogans in order to catch and perhaps hold the attention of the masses. "All within the state, nothing outside the state, nothing against the state" is supposed to be a succinct summary of Fascist doctrine. *Il Duce* tells school children that "a book and a rifle make a perfect Fascist." "A plow makes the furrow but the sword will defend it" is good propaganda for peasants. In foreign relations, the Fascist leader demands "fewer conferences and more decisions, fewer

<sup>37</sup> Since this was written, Great Britain, because of her attempt to check *il Duce's* war with Ethiopia, has become the object of the bitterest denunciation at the hands of the controlled Italian press. British officials were so disturbed by this press campaign that they made it the subject of a diplomatic protest.

resolutions and more action." The cultivation of receptive attitudes is also attended to. Germany excepted, no nation has more parades and public fanfare than Italy; nor is any nation more interested than Italy in developing the feeling of solidarity fostered by the use of uniforms among the population. The association of the process of indoctrination with cultural and social welfare programs has a similar end. Mention of the *Opera Dopolavoro* in this connection has already been made.<sup>38</sup> Another example is the summer excursion program of the *Balilla*. Instructors of these youths testify that the most effective pedagogical expedients for instilling patriotism are trips to mountains, to the seashore and to the tomb of the Unknown Soldier at Rome.<sup>39</sup>

The propagandist in Italy relies heavily upon the censorship. Unfavorable news, undesirable intelligence of any sort, no matter what its form, is strictly prohibited. Critical opinion is tolerated only in case it is inspired by the government or relates to subjects not political in nature. A cinema film with a taint of anti-militarism never reaches the exhibitor. Even ordinary statistics are withheld. One may usually seek in vain among the judicial and penal statistics of the official year book for any record of the Special Tribunal which tries offenses against the Fascist state. If statistics are not withheld altogether, they are delayed. Discretion is also used when news is released. That about the birth of a child to the Countess Ciano, *il Duce's* daughter, was ordered reduced to an inconspicuous item in the Italian papers; in the Countess's home city, it was suppressed altogether. The doctoring of information is likely to occur most often in the case of foreign news, particularly when it relates to Italian diplomatic efforts. A peace speech by an Italian diplomat before the League of Nations or before a world disarmament conference is likely to be communicated to Italians with such elisions or insertions as to "fortify" it greatly.

A favorite tactic of the Fascist propagandist is to assert formidable and theatrical claims and imply thereby supreme confidence in himself and the régime. It is a part of that strategy of bluff which he has used so successfully on the international stage. The strategy is equally effective when used internally. There are no limits to what the pamphleteers and orators can promise. Historians, it is said, will one day regard the twentieth century as a Fascist century; all Europe will eventually adopt Fascist methods; the corporate state will find a remedy for all the social ills of the world. It is also claimed that no one will be able to halt the march of the Italian nation towards its destiny for the nation is

<sup>38</sup> See p. 41.

<sup>39</sup> *Panorami di Vita Fascista*, p. 28.



invincible. Occasionally it is asserted that the Italian people has already reached the "horizon" of its greatness and in the twenty-first century Italy will enjoy primacy among the nations. Even the economic crisis, serious as its repercussions have been in Italy, has not discouraged the prophetic power of *il Duce*. In the best American tradition, he has stated, on various occasions since 1929, precisely how many years would be required for the return of prosperity and happiness to Italy.<sup>40</sup>

The effort to propagandize abroad, although not systematic, is generally no less persistent than the efforts within Italy, particularly when the fiscal or diplomatic aspects of Italian foreign policy demand it. Fascism tries hard to curry favor with the foreign correspondents. The representatives of the more important organs, particularly from the United States, are treated with the greatest consideration. Every courtesy is extended by the government. News facilities of the administrative departments are placed at their command; invitations are extended by high officials to press conferences; free telephone and telegraph service is offered them; and occasionally some are selected for official and social honors. These measures have usually produced their desired results—a press corps which is discreet and even willing occasionally to publish what the Fascist would like to have the rest of the world believe. One or two of the correspondents of great American journals have become such philo-Fascists that their dispatches sometimes appear to have been written by the Italian Foreign Office Press Bureau.

The situation is such, to be sure, that even the most scrupulous correspondent, one with the best intentions and without a trace of subserviency, could not send objective dispatches. News sources independent of the government have completely dried up. If the correspondent does not wish to depend upon mere rumor or "grapevine" intelligence, he must rely almost exclusively upon the official and Party press bureaus, government spokesmen or the servile coordinated Italian press. His dispatches, moreover, are carefully scrutinized in the Foreign Office and, in case he should become too critical, the government has some excellent remedies. One of these, the notorious *revisioné*, is a system of informal censorship much used between 1924 and 1927. It consists of holding up dispatches at the cable offices on some specious pretense such as illegibility until the news has become "cold." Press favors are thereafter withdrawn from the offender, impairing his usefulness to his organ; if he should still prove recalcitrant, it is made quite clear that he has become *persona non grata*. His fate then is likely to be that which over-

<sup>40</sup> More recently, however, he has been advising his audiences that it may become necessary for good Fascists to face the fact of a permanently lowered standard of living in Italy.

took such correspondents as Mr. George Seldes who was obliged to leave Italy in 1927 or Mr. Albin Johnson who was not allowed to cross the frontier from Switzerland in 1930 because of some allegedly unfavorable articles which he had written for the former *New York World*.

The correspondents are but one of the instruments which can be used to influence foreign readers. Another quite as important is the Stefani Agency, Italy's government-controlled press service. The Stefani Agency has contracts for dispensing Italian news abroad with all the great press associations, including America's Associated Press.<sup>41</sup> Through these affiliations, its dispatches of Italian news can affect the major number of news readers in the United States and western Europe. Nor is the foreign language press in the United States and South America overlooked. Most of these organs maintain close contact with Italian press bureaus both in Italy and abroad and it has been rumored that direct supervision is maintained through representatives of the Italian press.<sup>42</sup> Rome has also been charged with buying papers in other states to secure favorable publicity. It is alleged that Fascist funds were recently used to purchase a Viennese daily and that they have been filtering into Switzerland in amounts generous enough to arouse the indignation of the Swiss Federal Council.<sup>43</sup>

Favorable foreign attitudes are cultivated in other ways. Famous pieces of art are freely loaned to foreign galleries; children of expatriated Italians are brought back to Italy for summer vacations; and Italian missionaries in strategic centers are aided by government subventions. The Italian government has been especially generous in granting distinctions to foreigners, particularly to important educators, influential publicists and public officials. Such distinctions were distributed with a lavish hand in the United States in 1934 for aid and courtesies extended in the successful flight of the Balbo squadron to the Century of Progress Exposition at Chicago. Ninety-nine citations, including all five grades of Grand Cordon, Grand Officer, Commander, Officer and Chevalier of the Crown of Italy, were made in a single day. The recipients included the American Secretary of War, a former Mayor of New York, and naval and army officers of varying degrees.<sup>44</sup> A recent Congressional investigation in the United States has also indicated that Italy is not above using its consular officers abroad for the dissemination of "cor-

<sup>41</sup> O. W. Riegel, *op. cit.*, p. 132; cf. also G. Seldes, "Poisoned Springs of the World's News," *Harper's Magazine*, November 1934, p. 725.

<sup>42</sup> *Editor and Publisher*, February 9, 1929, p. 24.

<sup>43</sup> *ibid.*, June 30, 1934, p. 4.

<sup>44</sup> *New York Times*, August 30, 1934, p. 19.

rective" information of a propagandist nature, and in former days she used regular propaganda instruments like the notorious Fascist League of North America for her ends.<sup>45</sup>

The objectives of the foreign propaganda and its nature have varied according to the country. In America, for example, it has been designed to win over the Italian-speaking population to Fascism, stimulate tourist trade, beget confidence in prospective investors and overcome the inherent American dislike of dictatorship. In pursuit of these ends, the propagandist has used with great effect the legend of Fascism having saved Italy from Communism, the alleged orderliness of the country, the speed and punctuality of Italian trains, the energy and efficiency of Signor Mussolini's government, dignified international peace gestures and loud protestations of admiration for American enterprise.

The cultivation of proper attitudes towards Italian Fascism in foreign states acquires added importance as Italy's foreign policy becomes more complicated and adventurous. Appreciation of this fact was apparently partly responsible for the recall in 1933 of Count Galeazzo Ciano, *il Duce's* son-in-law, from his post as consul-general at Shanghai and his appointment as head of the Government Press Bureau and of the Foreign Office Press Bureau. In September 1934, Count Ciano was promoted to the newly created office of Undersecretary of State for Press and Propaganda in which post he is expected to provide even more effective coordination of internal and foreign propaganda.<sup>46</sup>

Despite its monopoly of opinion-forming instruments, Fascism has not been able to rely upon persuasion alone to secure conformity. On the contrary, necessity has required it to erect one of the most brutal systems for suppressing counter-propaganda and opinion known to contemporary history. In part this system still suggests the vigilantist tactics of the period of the conquest of power. Surveillance of possible enemies of the régime is still carried on through private persons ostensibly employed in the most menial pursuits.<sup>47</sup> It is alleged that letters are still opened and telephone wires tapped;<sup>48</sup> and the government continues to resort to the barbaric practice of holding the friends and

<sup>45</sup> For objectives of this interesting body, see statements of its one-time president, Count Ignazio Thaon di Revel, in *New York Times*, December 23, 1929, p. 14.

<sup>46</sup> *New York Times*, September 12, 1934, p. 10. A portion of the activity of Count Ciano's office takes the form of a carefully "edited" weekly summary of comment appearing in the Italian, and the world's, press. This summary is sold at popular subscription rates. See *Rassegna Settimanale della Stampa Estera*, Istituto Poligrafico dello Stato, Rome.

<sup>47</sup> Percy Winner, "Fascism, Year VIII," *Italy Today*, V. M. Crawford, ed., 2nd series, No. 2, February 1931, p. 4.

<sup>48</sup> Bolton King, *Fascism in Italy* (London, 1931), p. 66.

relatives of its enemies abroad as hostages.<sup>49</sup> For the greater part, however, the system of repression has become a formal one, making use of regular police officers, Fascist Militiamen, the law and the courts.

To ferret out anti-Fascist activity, Signor Mussolini established as early as 1926 a special political police under the Ministry of the Interior. Detachments of this police operate under the supervision of the various Italian prefects.<sup>50</sup> Secret police are also attached to the commander of each legion of the Fascist Militia. There are, moreover, special units of the Fascist Militia serving in the postal and telegraph system or as frontier, port, railway, highway and forest police who combine political surveillance with their regular duties. It is they who prevent clandestine literature from entering the country, spy upon travellers, inspect the mails and supervise cable dispatches. Lately, to combat more active anti-Fascist propaganda, Signor Mussolini created the *Opera Vigilanza Repressione Anti-Fascista* or *OVRA* consisting of Fascist partisans and adherents, Militiamen and regular police. This organization is particularly addicted to the methods of the *agent provocateur* in securing its objectives.<sup>51</sup>

Probably the most spectacular piece of legislation directed against anti-Fascists was the law for the Defense of the State of November 25, 1926.<sup>52</sup> Besides establishing especially severe penalties for activities against the King or *il Duce*, the law prescribed prison terms for conspiracy to revive the former parties or the free associations and for attempting to propagate their doctrines. Prison sentences ranging from five to fifteen years were also prescribed for those who spread false or tendentious news abroad or injure the credit of the state. For the trial of these offenses and others, this same law established the infamous Special Tribunal for the Defense of the State. This consists of a president and five judges who are to be chosen from the royal military, naval and air forces and from the Fascist Militia. In practice the presidents have always been generals who were members of the Party; and the ordinary judges have had the degree of consul in the Fascist Militia. Like other public servants, these judges must take the oath of loyalty to Fascism's leader from whom they receive their appointment. Although its procedure is supposed to be regulated by the military code, the judges

<sup>49</sup> Case of Carlo Roselli, King, *op. cit.*, p. 66.

<sup>50</sup> Decree law of November 6, 1926, *Raccolta* (1926), Vol. VIII, no. 2211, p. 8360.

<sup>51</sup> For recent activities, see *Editor and Publisher*, January 3, 1931, p. 5.

<sup>52</sup> *Raccolta* (1925), Vol. IX, no. 2008, p. 8880. See also decree of October 3, 1929, *Raccolta* (1929), Vol. VI, no. 1759, p. 6235; and decree of October 3, 1929, *Raccolta* (1929), Vol. VI, no. 1770, p. 6247.

enjoy considerable latitude. Convictions are usually obtained on the testimony of a police official or an informer.

Between 1926 and 1931, over five thousand persons were brought before this tribunal. Of these, one was sentenced to death and about two thousand were given prison terms. In about one hundred and fifty instances the prison term was for more than ten years. Charges which led to sentence included that of inciting class war, waving the red flag and whistling counter-revolutionary tunes; other charges included the falsification of passports, disseminating anti-Fascist literature, shouting offensive remarks about Italy, trying to revive the former political parties, influencing people not to pay taxes, insulting and threatening *il Duce*, infringing the press decrees and helping the families of political prisoners. Although originally instituted for a period of five years, Fascism has found it necessary to extend the life of this tribunal for an equivalent period.<sup>53</sup> At present it is scheduled to go out of existence on December 31, 1936. If it is dissolved at that time it will not be because of a reduced docket; even isolated newspaper dispatches point to the year 1934 as one of the busiest in the tribunal's history.<sup>54</sup>

But even the Special Tribunal and its jurisdiction do not mark the most atrocious phase of Fascism's legal terror. That designation must be reserved for the regulations in the law for public security enacted in 1926. Policemen are empowered under this law to require "suspicious" persons to confine themselves to their own communes and to refrain from moving about without police passports. It permits the principal police official of any district to denounce to the prefect any one who may be pointed out "by public rumor as dangerous to the national order of the state." Such a person is first warned by a commission of local government and Militia officials; his liberty of movement is strictly curtailed and he is put under surveillance. In case he does not behave to the satisfaction of the authorities, he may be summarily removed to a concentration camp on one of the penal islands of which the dreaded Lipari off Sicily is the worst. As a matter of fact, the police, without pretense of trial, may send to these camps any person whom they think is "likely to injure the national or international interests of the state." Removal may be for a period as long as five years. The sufferings and indignities endured in these concentration camps have been vividly portrayed in Signor Francesco Nitti's story of his remarkable escape from Lipari.

<sup>53</sup> Law of June 4, 1931, *Raccolta* (1931), Vol. III, no. 674, p. 2820; also decree of March 29, 1932, *Raccolta* (1932), Vol. II, no. 461, p. 1139.

<sup>54</sup> See accounts of its recent activities under the following date lines in the *New York Times* during 1934: February 11; March 31; June 20; July 2; July 10; August 7; October 11; October 14; November 8. These random items reveal sentences upon 112 persons.

Signor Nitti was committed for being "too serious a youth" and for entertaining "violent intentions" against the régime.<sup>55</sup>

Use of force and legal terrorism is not the only evidence that the dictatorship's propaganda system does not provide adequate popular support. That inadequacy is made even more manifest by the constant expansion of the system. Within the past year control over the education of youth has been extended to a point where only ancient Sparta offers a parallel. Militia officers and school teachers were instructed early in 1934 to make every effort to recruit *Balilla* and *Avanguardisti* up to a footing of two millions and to increase the emphasis upon their military training.<sup>56</sup> Somewhat later, Signor Mussolini lowered the age limit of the *Balilla* organization so as to admit boys between the ages of six and eight.<sup>57</sup> It has even been announced that male infants will be registered for the *Balilla* organization, reared according to government instructions and admitted to suitable training as soon as they are old enough.<sup>58</sup>

Another step in the same direction was taken in August 1934, when it was officially announced that Italy must become a thoroughly militarized nation. In line with this announcement, teachers in the elementary schools were ordered to wear the uniforms of the *Balilla* or Militia while on duty. It was also decreed that youth should be brought into more frequent contact with the armed forces of the nation and taught to respect the military traditions. Finally, military training in some form was made compulsory for every Italian male from the time he reaches the age of eight until ten years after he has been dismissed from the army. At the same time it was announced that every schoolboy from the primary grades through the university would be compelled to pursue annually a course of some twenty hours dealing with military culture and tradition and with the development and prosecution of modern warfare.<sup>59</sup> These courses, conducted by army officers, began during November 1934.<sup>60</sup>

The little that remains of freedom of thought and opinion is also being rapidly encroached upon. Although harassed by the Party and occasionally by the government, Italy's twenty-five universities were not seriously interfered with until 1931. In that year, however, all members of the faculty and administration were required to take an oath of

<sup>55</sup> F. F. Nitti, *Escape* (New York, 1930), p. 51.

<sup>56</sup> *New York Times*, January 4, 1934, p. 11.

<sup>57</sup> *ibid.*, October 31, 1934, p. 6.

<sup>58</sup> *ibid.*, November 17, 1934, p. 1.

<sup>59</sup> *ibid.*, September 19, 1934, p. 2.

<sup>60</sup> *ibid.*, November 8, 1934, p. 14.

loyalty to *il Duce's* régime and it was made plain that the Party expected the professors to become mentors of Fascism. Protests from the few were answered by threats of dismissal and eventually all but eleven took the oath. Most of the protestants came from the Universities of Rome and Turin.

An even more illuminating illustration of the growing "discipline" is to be discovered in the decree of November 1934 against espionage. According to this decree, all discussion, even of the most private kind, concerning the military policies of the nation and its diplomacy, is interdicted. Under threat of the severest penalties, all persons are commanded to refrain from divulging strengths and positions of military works in time of peace or to speak of "grave incidents" such as explosions in munitions factories or accidents on strategic railway lines. They are also to refrain from making estimates of Italy's naval preparations unless the figures used have been released by the Ministry of Marine. Most remarkable of all is the prohibition of the right even to make interpretations of the "viewpoint and attitude of the government in pending international negotiations."<sup>61</sup>

Fascist apologists sometimes justify their system of repression and their propaganda monopoly with the plea that the régime has not yet passed beyond its revolutionary phase. Until the corporate state emerges in full form, and capital is as thoroughly regulated as labor, the essentials of the Fascist régime have not been realized and opinion must be controlled and fostered as an emergency measure. Generally, however, the leaders of the hierarchy are not willing to concur in such a view. They maintain that discipline in thought and understanding is but part of the greater discipline which is characteristic of the truly Fascist state. In regulating the press, for instance, they claim to have done a great service. Formerly an irresponsible fomenter of social and class strife, the press, under Fascist guidance, has become a national organ for the creation of goodwill.

Most of this savors of Fascism's familiar articles of faith and doctrine. Dogma aside, there remains merely the system of force and public persuasion. If this differs from similar systems in other dictatorships, it is because Italy finds it necessary to apply the system on a more intensive scale. This necessity is partly explained by the fact that the Italian, unlike most dictatorships, is not content with merely holding power. Occasionally, at least, it goes through the form of consulting the people; and since it claims to be the sole representative of the national will, it dare not suffer reverses at the polls. Moreover, Fascism's predilections

<sup>61</sup> *New York Times*, November 25, 1934, p. 27.

for regulating every form of social relation and for budgeting huge sums for military equipment, national preparedness and imperial development, places an extraordinary strain upon the economic order. In the circumstances, only hysterical enthusiasm or abject fear insures the necessary taxes and loans.

Despite these unusual requirements, the Italian propaganda system has so far produced surprisingly satisfactory results. Fascism's morale is high. Its enemies abroad and at home, though persistent, have been singularly ineffective. For the greater part, despite the sacrifices imposed upon it, the rank and file are still loyal to *il Duce*. Difficulties, nevertheless, are mounting, particularly in the economic sphere. The crushing tax burden, the truly appalling number of bankruptcies, the increasingly adverse trade balance and the budget difficulties, are economic facts which inevitably point to still further sacrifices in Italian living standards. Added to the already dangerous political tension produced by a decade of artificially stimulated hates and hopes, these economic difficulties must shortly subject the existing arrangements to serious threats. Increased propaganda pressure and the greater use of force may contribute towards redressing the political balance; but that equilibrium can be secured over any appreciable period without some great emotional diversion such as a foreign war or a colonial adventure appears doubtful.<sup>62</sup> A diversion of this nature, however, as the Fascists themselves must realize, has its own potentially hazardous consequences for the stability of their régime.

<sup>62</sup> The manuscript for this chapter was completed in March 1935, before Fascism's Ethiopian adventure had developed serious proportions. Events since that time have tended to substantiate the author's opinion. Incidentally, in developing popular support for this adventure, the coordinated propaganda system, described in the preceding pages, has been used with telling effect. An attitude of relative indifference towards *il Duce's* policy in May 1935 has been transformed into one of frenzied enthusiasm and an extraordinarily militant spirit is being manifested by all classes in Italy towards persons and nations who indicate a desire, however indirect, of blocking the attainment of this most recent international objective of Fascism.





### III

## POLITICAL PROPAGANDA IN SOVIET RUSSIA



### III

## POLITICAL PROPAGANDA IN SOVIET RUSSIA

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IN November 1917 the Bolsheviks took over the government of the Russian Empire. The Soviet leaders were aware that it was far easier to assume political power than to transform an illiterate and backward agricultural country, inhabited by many races of diverse tongues, into a socialist state. They may well have been appalled by this task in view of the cultural backwardness of the country. Only 105,000 common schools were serving a population of 170,000,000 people.<sup>1</sup> In the year preceding the Revolution the Tsaristic government had not deemed it necessary to spend more than 211,000,000 rubles on popular education for the entire territory now comprising Russia proper. They may also have thought of the scarcity of newspapers in urban centers and the total lack of them in the rural districts. The rural population, however, was for the most part illiterate, so that newspapers and periodicals were of no use to the peasants unless for the practical purpose of "rolling their own."

Although the Bolsheviks rode into power with the battle cry of "land and freedom" for the peasant, and "bread and peace" for the proletariat, they realized soon enough that neither bread nor peace would be forthcoming for a considerable time. There was, however, a determination to build a new social order. But how was the new government to persuade an illiterate, backward, and hungry people that it intended to create a new world which would be not only a great improvement over the old but would surpass anything in the capitalistic world? This was the gigantic task the Bolshevik government faced and, dictatorship though it was, it nevertheless had to have a degree of support from the masses. With this in mind the Soviet rulers, not without terrific effort, erected an

<sup>1</sup> There were, of course, some common private schools maintained by philanthropic and confessional organizations.

amazing network of propaganda. Lenin attempted to start the machinery by issuing a decree on December 10, 1918, entitled "Concerning the mobilization of literates and organization of propaganda of the Soviet régime" by which all literates were called to render service in this task of transforming a nation's thinking.

A few months later, that is, in March 1919, a program adopted by the Seventh Party Congress emphasized the necessity of inducing the toiling masses to participate actively in the work of education, the development of councils of popular education, and the mobilization of literates. In spite of the fact that these were stirring years of civil war and counter-revolutionary activity, the Bolsheviks, even in the worst year of the civil turmoil, did not neglect the work of political education and propaganda among the civilian population, although the work was unsystematized and sporadic. Lenin's thorough understanding of the difficult problem may be gathered from his speech at the All-Russian Conference of Provincial and District Education Departments, meeting from November 1 to November 8, 1920, in which he stated, "We [the Bolsheviks] are not accepting the Utopian point of view that the toiling masses are ready for a socialist order. The fundamental problem for the educational workers and the Communist Party is to assist in the training and education of the toiling masses so that they may overcome old habits and old practices which have remained as an inheritance from the old order. Our main policy at the present moment must be an economic reconstruction of the state . . . and on this basis must be built all agitation and propaganda."<sup>2</sup>

Four days after the adjournment of the Conference of Educational Departments, namely on November 12, 1920, a decree was issued for the creation of the "Main Political Education Committee of the Republic" (*Glavpolitprosvet*) which was to give direction to the entire work of political propaganda and education. Since then every possible agency has been employed by the Bolshevik authorities for the deliberate purpose of reshaping the thought patterns of millions. The press, educational and social institutions, art and science were and are mobilized to that end. Whenever it was deemed necessary, force was used without hesitation, not merely for punitive purposes but also as a warning to recalcitrant individuals and groups who failed to make their peace with the existing order. The work of political propaganda was complicated by the fact that in the early years of the Bolshevik régime the teachers of Russia were not at all reconciled to the ideas of Communism. It was, therefore,

<sup>2</sup> N. K. Krupskaya, *Lenin i Kultura*, pp. 130, 131.

necessary to carry on propaganda among that important group before the schools could be made effective agencies for political education.

The Bolsheviks have realized the importance of the schools themselves in general matters of political propaganda, and, therefore, since 1930 the government has made every effort to introduce compulsory education for all children. To discuss the rôle that the general school (labor school) plays in the matter of propaganda, however, would lead us too far afield. Since this paper is particularly concerned with political education, or propaganda per se, suffice it to say that the Bolsheviks are not neglecting this fruitful field and every effort is made to train the children in the Communist ideology.<sup>3</sup> Especially is this true in social science studies.

The expression *Politprosvet* is a term generally used in the Soviet Union to designate a board of political education which conducts the work of internal propaganda of a variety of institutions which previously directed political education and to which a unified administration has been given. While this term was used soon after the Bolshevik Revolution to describe various educational activities of the Soviet government, in 1920 the *Politprosvet* assumed greater significance. In that year, by a decree issued November 12 by the Council of People's Commissars, the entire work of the politico-educational and agitational-propagandist activity was concentrated in the hands of the Main Politico-Educational Committee of the Republic (*Glavpolitprosvet*). This committee unified the work of the People's Commissar of Education, the Political Administration of the Republic (*Pur*),<sup>4</sup> the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, the All-Russian Union of Professional Unions, the Central Committee of the Party, and other organizations which conducted permanent and temporary political-educational work. Since, from the very beginning, all possible agencies were used by the dominant group for propaganda purposes, the government did not hesitate to include all cultural and artistic organizations in the scheme of political education.<sup>5</sup> The work of political propaganda in the early years of the Soviet government naturally reflected the uneasiness and the confusion of civil war and turmoil.

<sup>3</sup> Nor should such important organizations as the Pioneers and Octobrists be forgotten, since these organizations are the primary institutions for Communist training. For a good description of general education see Thomas Woody, *New Minds: New Men?*

<sup>4</sup> A department of the Commissariat of Military and Naval affairs which included a section for political propaganda and agitation in the ranks of the armed forces.

<sup>5</sup> The *Glavpolitprosvet* was composed of a chairman, two vice-chairmen, and two members, all of whom were appointed by the Council of People's Commissars on the recommendation of the Commissariat of Education.

The year 1921 was one of the most horrible in the wretched annals of Russia. While the civil war was coming to an end, famine was stalking the land. In addition there were sporadic outbreaks, such as the Kronstadt mutiny and the strikes in Petrograd factories. The work of political propaganda had to be carried on in the face of such stern realities as hunger, cold, and general misery of the masses. The Congress of Committees of Political Education meeting that year decided that political education must assume new forms and new content. It was declared that it was not sufficient to conduct great campaigns merely to teach the masses to read and write, but it had become necessary to instruct the masses in everything that the Party stood for. It was deplored that this work had to be done in an atmosphere of red tape and bureaucracy which the new officials carried over from the old régime. Furthermore, the Congress insisted that political propagandists show the masses that the evils which they saw in public life from day to day were merely transitional and would eventually disappear. The inauguration of the New Economic Policy added to the difficulties of political education, since the new policy seemed to contradict the various theories enunciated by the Bolsheviks and to vitiate promises made by them. In spite of these drawbacks, however, an amazing machine of political propaganda was erected, which overcame what appeared to outsiders to be insurmountable impediments, and succeeded, not without an occasional use of force, in converting millions, at least outwardly, to the point of view of the government.

When the machinery for political propaganda was established, two agencies were designated to collaborate in the work of supervising political education, namely the Politico-Educational Section of the Commissariat of Education,<sup>6</sup> which succeeded the older Outside School Section of the Commissariat of Education, and the Agitational-Propaganda Section of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (*Agitprop*). As the work gradually spread over the length and breadth of Russia, branches of the *Politprosvet* or political educational sections were attached to the various political divisions of the several republics, such as regions, districts, villages, and towns. The Party, ever watchful over the activities of government officials, ordered the *Agitprop*, or the Agitational Propaganda Section of the Central Committee of the Party, to form sections in connection with regional, district, municipal, and cell divisions of the Party for the purpose of carrying on political propaganda. The cultural-educational committees of regional, district, municipal,

<sup>6</sup> While there is no Union Commissariat of Education, the various commissariats of education of the constituent republics are constituted on the same lines as that of the R.S.F.S.R.

and village soviets were ordered to make provisions for subcommittees on political education. With characteristic thoroughness the Bolsheviks also induced the cultural committees of the professional unions to form subcommittees for political education. In addition the Social Training Division of the Commissariat of Education and its local agencies were directed to participate in this work. It was taken for granted that the Young Communists and Pioneers would cooperate with the *Politprosvet* in the various territorial divisions.

The work of political education or propaganda may be best observed actually operating in local areas. The *Politprosvet* there is composed of various elements such as the village or town soviet, the local committee of the professional union, the local cooperative, the Party and Young Communist cells, and the representatives of the local intellectual workers, such as school teachers, agricultural experts, and physicians, who serve in an advisory capacity.

The foreigner whose acquaintance with Russia is limited to a few large cities, cannot realize the physical and intellectual poverty of the Russian village. Although conditions in some parts of the land have improved, in the rural districts, the extent of wretchedness remaining amazes the outsider when he observes it. Under such unfavorable circumstances as these, the Bolsheviks proceeded to establish centers of intellectual activity. The fundamental unit of political education in the village is the peasant reading hut. A Russian peasant hut, however, should not be thought of in terms of an English rural cottage or an American farmhouse, but literally as a hut with an earthen floor and frequently a leaky roof. To be sure in the urban communes the government often took over club houses of the former aristocracy and middle class, but in the villages there was very little to be taken over.

While the smallest unit of political propaganda in the village is the peasant reading hut, in the town it is the club. Before the Revolution there were several hundred so-called "people's houses" in Russia, many of which were sponsored by temperance organizations. During the war some of the rural governmental organizations (*zemstvos*) organized reading rooms in rented peasant huts where newspaper reports on the course of the war were read to assembled peasants. Within two years after the Revolution, however, the Bolsheviks succeeded in increasing the number to nearly five thousand workers' clubs and twenty-eight thousand rural establishments. During the period when the New Economic Policy was operative, because of financial stringency, the number of these organizations was reduced. But the Bolshevik leaders realized the immense importance of these agencies in reaching the masses, especially in the



more backward regions, the so-called "deaf" villages, which led an isolated existence oblivious to the change of times. Successive Party congresses insisted that "a broad politico-educational activity in the village must become the most urgent problem in the immediate future, and that the task of improving hut reading rooms should take foremost place in this activity," and that "the clubs must be transformed into real centers for mass propaganda and the development of the creative possibilities of the working class."<sup>7</sup>

The year 1921 marked the beginning of an unusually intensive propaganda campaign. At that time the so-called cult-commissions were organized in all factories and in connection with provincial and republican committees. These cult-commissions were made responsible for carrying out educational work among employees of selected factories or political units.<sup>8</sup> In the course of their activity they found that they could perform their task of education more efficiently through clubs and "red corners." These latter were, for the most part, formed in industrial establishments, dormitories, and in some of the isolated hamlets too poor to have a reading hut. The "red corners" serve frequently as nuclei for the formation of "reading huts" and clubs. No exact information is available as to the number of such "red corners," but it is estimated that they greatly outnumber the clubs and reading huts.<sup>9</sup> Newspapers and a variety of reading matter were distributed to the "red corners," which frequently were only rough tables with some printed matter on them.<sup>10</sup>

Since 1923 there has been a consistent increase in the number of reading rooms and clubs. By 1933 the total reached 54,623; 35,986 of which were located in urban communes.<sup>11</sup> The hut reading room is considered by party leaders of great importance and they insist that it is indispensable not only as a cultural center, but also in the work of socialist reconstruction. Although previously the village reading hut was more or less a detached institution, in recent years central cultural organizations, such as "houses of social culture," have been established for the purpose

<sup>7</sup> *Massovoye Prosveshcheniye v SSSR k 15-letiyu Otyabrya*, p. 94.

<sup>8</sup> While these cult-commissions have certain other functions, this study, however, concerns itself primarily with political education.

<sup>9</sup> *Massovoye Prosveshcheniye v SSSR k 15-letiyu Otyabrya*. The introduction of the New Economic Policy made it imperative that the government find some means of explaining to the working class and peasants its aims, and of keeping ever before their eyes the principles of Marxism for which some of the workers fought.

<sup>10</sup> In addition to clubs and reading huts there are also to be found in urban centers the so-called "peasant homes" organized especially for visiting peasants and there they are exposed to political propaganda.

<sup>11</sup> *Vseobshcheye Obucheniye i Politprosveshcheniye Rabota v SSSR*.

of organizing systematically the work of clubs and reading huts throughout a district. Because of the high percentage of illiteracy among the peasants, most of the printed material is read aloud by some one in the community who had the advantages of literacy. These "readings" are as a rule poorly patronized. With the passage of time, however, the reading hut, under the leadership of an enthusiastic youth organization, the *Komsomol*, was infused with new life and importance and has become the social center of the village and an indispensable agent in the political education of the rural population.

While membership in the variety of clubs to be found throughout the industrial sections of the Soviet Union is voluntary, the Soviet citizen nevertheless finds it very convenient to belong to one, because crowded and unattractive living conditions make the winter evenings at home unpleasant. The club work aims to reach its members by two methods, the mass and the circle activities. In the former the entire membership is called upon to participate in some political or vocational campaign. This is usually preceded by lecture and discussion, a method admirably adapted for mass propaganda. Motion pictures are exhibited and "question and answer" evenings are arranged. Subjects of a political and professional character are discussed. No opportunity is neglected for introducing the subject of political education. Excursions to museums and other places of interest are arranged, but always with a view to political propaganda.<sup>12</sup> The guides in museums, former imperial palaces, art galleries, and on the specially preserved estates of the former nobility never fail to point out the contrast between the mode of living of the Tsar, nobility, and merchants and that of the workers and peasants. The guides are specially trained persons who know how to awaken curiosity and induce questioning by workmen, peasants, and school children. Visitors are made to feel that the accomplishments of the Bolshevik Revolution have been of the greatest benefit to the peasants and the working class.

In addition to mass activities the clubs also engage in circle activities. These activities are not of a formal educational nature, but consist of specific tasks under the leadership of students of an institution of higher education who thus fulfil their obligation to engage in some social work in return for the special stipends which they receive. The circles select permanent leaders (*starosta*) who collectively form a council of leaders. It is through this council that the work of the circles is coordinated with the work of the main body of the club. Whatever particular subject of study the circles may consider, its relation to "political grammar" or

<sup>12</sup> This, however, applies not only to clubs, but also to schools.

political education must be shown. Not infrequently workers have complained of too much "politics" and the attendance at the clubs slackened. The authorities, alarmed at this show of resentment, made various attempts to diversify the interests of the circles. The circles nevertheless remain important agencies for political education, where the Marxian attitude toward all social and political events is emphasized. This is true of the circles whose study is elementary and those of advanced categories engaged in the study of "dialectical materialism."<sup>13</sup>

In the early years of the Bolshevistic régime, when it was necessary to educate a large number of party members, the *Agitprop* was designated for that purpose. Special political education workers were appointed who were called together in congresses embracing various territorial divisions such as districts, provinces, and republics. Occasionally these workers met in All-Union congresses and laid down rules for the unification of their work. Both in the work of political education and liquidation of illiteracy, the party members and the Young Communists are expected to assume leadership.

Although the village reading rooms are the primary centers for political education in the rural districts, there are certain agencies for political education, such as the Conferences of Delegates of Workwomen and Peasant Women Delegates, which also serve as schools for political education. These conferences usually consist of about forty to one hundred women and because of this large number the lecture method is used in preference to discussion.

There are, however, special schools and circles for political grammar (*Politgramota*), in which instruction is conducted systematically in accordance with a fixed schedule. While these schools are primarily intended for party members and Young Communists, a small number of non-party members are admitted. The best schools of this type are naturally found in Moscow and Leningrad and in other important urban centers. These schools are well attended since all candidates to party membership must cover a brief course of political grammar and all members of the party must pass the entire course offered by the school within a given period after admission to the party.

The programs of the school vary. Thus the so-called rural travelling school, which moves from center to center, holds fifteen meetings of two hours each. The permanent rural school holds twenty-two sessions and naturally discusses more subjects. In the urban centers there are to be found two types of schools for political grammar; namely, the shorter,

<sup>13</sup> There are also workmen's faculties, factory schools for young peasants, etc., but they belong to the general educational system.

functioning for fifteen sessions, and the normal school for political grammar.<sup>14</sup>

There are also such institutions as Soviet Party Schools, the Communist University, and the Communist Institute for Political Education which were created to train instructors of political education. The Communist University of the Orient and the Communist University for National Minorities of the West date back to the days when Bolshevism considered the world as its "missionary" field.

In addition there are schools for party workers, such as secretaries, members of cell bureaus, and agitators. The courses offered in these schools are of a special nature to fit the Party active elements. The Marx-Lenin circles are the most important schools of this type. They meet once a week for one year. For the directing personnel of the higher organs of the Party, seminars are provided which discuss Party life and policy.

Text-books for the guidance of instructors and pupils and also "Collections of Readings" are published by the *Agitprop* of the Central Committee of the Party in cooperation with the Political Education section of the Commissariat of Education.<sup>15</sup>

One of the most fertile centers for political education is the Red Army. The recruits are drawn from the "elite" of the country and every effort is made to educate them politically, because the red soldiers are a group of young vigorous men who will have considerable influence upon their return to their respective communities. The work of education is carried out by the Political Administration and is conducted in a systematic manner in accordance with definite curricula. It is estimated that sixty per cent of the men, after completing the service, join the Party. It is safe to say that a great majority of those leaving, if not members of the Party, are communistic in their sympathies.<sup>16</sup>

In discussing propaganda or political education in Soviet Russia one must bear in mind that, unlike Germany, Russia was and still is under the handicap of widespread illiteracy. Thus in 1928 there were eighteen million people in European Russia who were illiterate.<sup>17</sup> To be sure most of these were to be found in rural districts, especially among women.

<sup>14</sup> In recent years there has developed a system of correspondence courses. While these courses are not primarily for political education, yet, as all education in the Soviet Union, they are "political." A. B. Vedernikov and A. T. Konov, *Organisatsia i Metodika Zaocnovo Obucheniye*.

<sup>15</sup> S. N. Harper, *Civic Training in Soviet Russia*, Chap. XIII.

<sup>16</sup> For a journalistic account, see Walter Duranty, "Eyes Turned to the Vast Red Army," *N. Y. Times Magazine*, April 28, 1935.

<sup>17</sup> This situation was even more serious in Asiatic Russia. *Ezhegodnik Sovetskovo Stroitelstva in Prava na 1931 god*.

In addition about forty per cent of the children of school age had no opportunity to attend school and thus augmented the army of illiterates. Since then, however, the government has made a terrific effort to decrease illiteracy and to create more facilities for the education of children. The Soviet Union, nevertheless, is still unable to provide general educational facilities for all its population of school age. Therefore temporary special schools have been established to decrease illiteracy among young people who for some reason or other have not been able to enter regular schools. These institutions offer courses of one year's duration and political education is emphasized in the curricula.

Various Party and professional organizations have been called upon to render assistance to adult illiterates, who come from the rural districts to work in the industrial centers. The Bolsheviks were not satisfied with merely teaching reading and writing, however, but took the opportunity in the various groups and schools for illiterates to emphasize political education, using specially prepared materials for that purpose. The State Publishing Organization was instructed to issue large editions of text-books and manuals adopted for the double purpose of instructing illiterates in reading and in political grammar. There have been attempts even to publish a special newspaper written in language simple enough to be understood by the partially literate (*malogramatnyya*). In the more important urban centers may be found schools for the partially literate, more advanced schools, and workmen's universities meeting evenings and on rest days. While these schools are primarily intended for general education, political grammar is emphasized. There is hardly a direction issued to local authorities in which cultural-political education for young and old is not mentioned.

Another institution which serves as an instrumentality for political education is the library. From the very beginning of Bolshevik rule attempts were made to develop a library system. The old régime left behind a pitifully small number of public libraries and a deficiency of book printing facilities. The demands of the Civil War and the general dislocation of the country held back the development of the library movement. While, of course, the cities were more fortunate in library facilities, the rural communities were poverty-stricken. Especially was this true in areas inhabited by the many non-Russian minorities. Several years were to pass before any improvement in library service was to become apparent. One of the difficulties was that the Soviet government prohibited the circulation of a great many works which they considered contrary to their ideology, and thus depleted the stock of available books. It is to be noted that in 1930 forty-eight per cent of all the books

taken from circulation were removed upon ideological grounds. Books supplied to rural libraries are carefully examined, and fiction and non-fiction placed in libraries must be written from the standpoint of Communist ideology.

There has been, however, a consistent increase in library units. While in 1925 the library units counted up to 22,163, by January 1, 1933, they had increased to 32,456 units, 12,982 of which were located in urban communes, and 19,474 in rural localities.<sup>18</sup> It has been estimated that in 1932, 15,000,000 have availed themselves of library and reading room facilities and the number of volumes in public libraries has increased from 9,000,000 in 1911 to 124,000,000 in 1934. The urban population is making considerable use of its library facilities and the demand for books on a variety of subjects is constantly increasing. The rural sections, however, are far from being library-conscious and lag very much behind the town in the matter of reading.<sup>19</sup>

During the year of 1934 large appropriations were made for the erection of new libraries and improvement of old establishments; 1,362 libraries were opened of which number 1,132 were established in rural sections. In the same year seven thousand new library workers were trained.

The Bolshevik authorities are constantly urging the various local organizations, "to reconstruct the library activity . . . and transform the libraries into cultural centers, which would actively collaborate in the mobilization of the masses for the execution of the Five Year Plan." The Central Committee of the Party is tirelessly urging the development of children's departments, but warns the local authorities to be on the alert to remove books which are ideologically harmful. The importance of the library as an agency of political propaganda has increased notably with the consistent decrease of illiteracy among the masses throughout the Union.

As indicated above, all possible means are used by the *Politprosvet* to educate politically the Soviet masses, and even the field of amusement is being utilized for purposes of propaganda. Machinery has been created such as *repertkom*, a special committee under the supervision of the *Glavlit*, for the control of spectacles and amusement activities. This committee has the authority to issue or to withhold permits for dramatic, musical, and motion picture performances. It also has the right to cancel performances if they do not conform to Communist standards, even

<sup>18</sup> *Vseobshcheye Obucheniye i Politprosvettrabota v SSSR*, pp. 72-3. These libraries are frequently an integral part of the reading hut.

<sup>19</sup> For a detailed statistical account see *Massovoye Prosveshcheniye USSR k 15-letiyu Otkriyaya*.

after a performance has been approved by the appropriate authorities. Places of public amusement must reserve the best seats possible for the representatives of the censoring committee.

While Soviet Russia is not the only country where the motion picture is employed as a means of propaganda, it is there that the cinema has been used to the greatest extent as an agent for political education. The Thirteenth Congress of the Communist Party, meeting in 1924, passed a special resolution to the effect that motion pictures must become in the hands of the Party "a powerful means for Communist education and agitation." The Congress noted, furthermore, that the Party had not succeeded in making full use of the motion pictures.

No wonder then that strenuous attempts were made to increase the number of motion picture facilities. Thus while there were 7,251 motion picture machines of all kinds in the Soviet Union on October 1, 1927, the number increased to 29,163 by January 1, 1933. Of this number 10,923 were available in urban centers and 18,240 in rural communes. 936 machines assigned to urban centers and 13,203 in the rural communes belonged to the category of travelling motion picture apparatus.<sup>20</sup> The cinema section of the Political Education Division, organized in 1924 for the purpose of bringing motion pictures to the villages, was confronted with the task of creating a special machine, since electricity is rarely available in Soviet villages.<sup>21</sup> Provisions were made, however, to establish one hundred and fifty stationary cinemas in the collectivized villages of the Ukraina. Between the years 1931-1933, over forty-nine million rubles were expended on motion pictures and the capital investment in 1934 amounted to thirty million rubles, a modest sum from an American standpoint, but a huge amount under Soviet conditions. The All Union Motion Picture Trust (*Soyuzkino*) had in its possession during that time two hundred and twelve film titles which were exclusively political in subject matter.

A so-called Political Editing Department was designated as a censoring board for the purpose of adapting foreign films to Soviet requirements. In addition the Repertory Section of the Commissariat of Education was given the authority to censor not only films but also dramatic productions. Great efforts are made to safeguard the Soviet public from "harmful" ideological content and for that reason a special Art Council

<sup>20</sup> *Vseobshcheye Obucheniiye i Politprosvettrabota v SSSR*, p. 83.

<sup>21</sup> One of the drawbacks for political propaganda by means of motion pictures was the absence of a sufficient number of Russian films. In 1924 only slightly over twenty-eight per cent of the films shown in the Soviet Union were Soviet made. The Soviet film industry, however, produced over 32,000,000 meters in 1933.

for Motion Pictures was attached to the Political Education Section of the Commissariat of Education. Bolshevik leaders point out time and time again that the Soviet motion picture must not permit itself to become merely a form of amusement, but must help the spectators to understand the ideas of the revolutionary struggle.<sup>22</sup> In spite of the phenomenal growth of the motion picture, there are, nevertheless, thousands of villages which only rarely have the opportunity to witness a performance.

The censorship exercised in connection with performances in the village, if anything, is even stricter than in the city. Special revisionary commissions have been established in connection with district and regional politico-educational organs (*Politprosvet*). These commissions censor all works intended for public performances in the village by theatrical organizations, whether they be professional and amateur groups, dramatic clubs coming from headquarters or elsewhere, or local provincial talent. One exception is made when a group of performers have a special endorsement from the Main Commission of Political Education (*Glavpolitprosvet*). This censorship, however, did not prove to be sufficient since, in addition, there are revisionary commissions in connection with cultural-political committees of lower territorial units. In practice these commissions do not censor theatrical exhibitions from an ideological standpoint, for this is quite unnecessary since spectacles which fail to come up to the Communist standard would not be allowed to reach the stage of performance. Their duties, therefore, relate to the supervision of local talent. It is for these commissions to decide whether the content of plays is suitable for the village audience, and pass judgment on their artistic value and clearness. The representatives of the censorship board (*Glavlit*) must be consulted, however, at all events, for even after a presentation has passed the local censor, it may still be prohibited by the representatives of the central organization. The local authorities are admonished to examine carefully all artistic organizations coming into the village, and not to permit any performance without the sanction of the appropriate authorities. Thus the entire amusement field is made to serve the work of propaganda.

The radio has had a very slow growth in Soviet Russia. The Bolsheviks, however, realized the importance of all means of communication in reaching the masses with political propaganda. The Soviet government upon assuming power seized all available wireless equipment. The important broadcasting stations were used for governmental announce-

<sup>22</sup> It is to be noted, however, that so-called commercial motion-picture houses in the cities show foreign films which are not tinged with political propaganda.



ments in Russia and for sending messages abroad. Wireless was very important for a country such as Russia whose lines of communication were limited to important centers only. During the civil war communication would have been practically impossible without the wireless. When Soviet Russia reached comparatively peaceful times, the government turned its attention to systematic political education and found the wireless of great help. In view of the illiteracy among the masses of people the Bolsheviks figured that the wireless would serve as the greatest instrument for propaganda, and in their enthusiasm estimated that by 1927 every village in the Union would have receiving sets. But in this, as in other expectations, disappointment was awaiting the government; for by 1927 there were only 213,000 receiving points in the entire Union and of this number only ten per cent were to be found in rural communities. By January 1, 1933, however, the number of receiving points had increased to 1,360,000<sup>23</sup> and in 1934 to 2,160,000. The Soviet Union at present has sixty-six broadcasting stations with a total capacity of 1,700 KW. and the station at Noginsk, near Moscow, is one of the largest in the world, having a capacity of 500 KW. In the first half of 1933 there had been 540 broadcasts which may be designated as purely political propaganda. Although conditions have improved in the villages since 1927, because of absence of electric power, reception is still problematic. With improvement in the manufacturing of equipment the villages are gradually obtaining more efficient transmission.

It is to be noted that neither in urban nor in rural communities are radio receiving sets to be found, generally speaking, in private homes. In most instances radios are placed in clubs, dormitories, and other public institutions in urban communes. In the villages the receiving points are installed in the reading huts, collective organizations, and similar establishments. In addition to the central station a large number of local amateur stations are set up at large industrial plants and collective farms, which broadcast their own programs and relay programs from the central stations. It is estimated that in 1932 there were over three thousand such stations. There are some five hundred radio studios throughout the Union and in 1934 the construction of a radio center in Moscow was begun, which will have twenty-nine broadcasting studios.<sup>24</sup> Since about thirty to forty per cent of the broadcasting is given over to news items and educational topics, it is safe to state that a large part of this phase of broadcasting may be considered political education. Then when it is taken into consideration that very little in the educa-

<sup>23</sup> *Vseobshcheye Obucheniye i Politprosvetrabota v SSSR*, Part V.

<sup>24</sup> *Economic Review of the Soviet Union*, April 1935.

tional and amusement field does not have some element of political propaganda, the estimate may be even higher. In addition radio-telephone connections are to be found between Moscow and the more important centers of the Union. It is possible now for speakers to address audiences by radio over a large part of the Union.<sup>25</sup>

The Bolshevik press from its very inception was propagandist, and its main function is not so much to supply news as to present the doctrines of Communism in various degrees of intellectual simplicity or complexity. Before the Revolution newspapers did not reach the broad masses of people; especially was this true of the rural population. The contrary is true of the Soviet newspapers which are written with a view to influencing particular groups.<sup>26</sup> While the *Izvestia*, the official organ of the Soviet government, and the *Pravda*, the organ of the Communist Party, serve as the directing organs and set forth the "true" Party Line for the entire periodical press, a variety of newspapers and periodicals are published for special groups. Thus the Communist Party publishes newspapers especially for workmen and peasants as exemplified by the *Workman's and Peasant's Newspaper*. There are also newspapers sponsored by the trade unions, and other professional newspapers published by various organizations. Weeklies and monthlies of a humorous type are also to be found. A few other classes of newspapers exist, such as organs published by cooperatives and army papers. The "Godless" movement is likewise represented by publications. Adolescents and children are not forgotten, and publications are provided for them by the Party.

The agencies or groups who publish the papers are subject to strict supervision. In every instance the ideology of the publication is Bolshevik, and editors are for the most part members of the Party. The highly publicized "wall papers," which are found in almost every institution in the Soviet Union, are not under formal censorship, but the communist element exercises a predominant influence over them. The newspaper, as any other educational and cultural agency, exists first of all for the purpose of making Bolsheviks and putting across the program outlined by the government and Party. The information that the newspaper gives is interpreted in the light of Communism and must serve as a foundation for political education or propaganda among the masses of readers assuring them that the dominance of the Communist Party is

<sup>25</sup> In the Second Five Year Plan provisions are made for considerable expansion of the radio network.

<sup>26</sup> There are now in the Soviet Union 9,700 newspapers with a circulation of about 36,000,000 copies. To be sure, the government frequently classifies small sheets issued by political departments as newspapers; in fact there are some 3,000 of these so-called newspapers which are included in the total number.

for their welfare. The Soviet government is realizing the advantages of a monopoly of all news agencies. The entire machinery of publication, scientific, technical, and literary, is controlled by the State Publishing Corporation (*Gosizdat*). Since the publishing of any work is dependent on the *Gosizdat*, it is clear that "non-conformist" literature has a slight chance. This is the more important since *Gosizdat* controls not only the publication but also the printing machinery and paper supply. In addition to the control of the *Gosizdat*, a censorship board called *Glavlit* examines all manuscripts intended for periodicals, books, scenarios for films, and even drawings, music, and maps, in short, everything that is to be published in the Soviet Union or imported from abroad. This efficient censoring board has local branches which supervise various cultural and other activities in localities.

Not only are newspapers and periodicals made to serve the purpose of political propaganda but also all printed matter, such as text-books, collections of readings, maps, etc. A rigid supervision is exercised over all undertakings connected directly or indirectly with printing and publishing. All establishments in any way connected with the manufacture and distribution of printed matter are registered with appropriate authorities in the areas in which they are located, but the entire printing and publishing activity, in addition to local supervision, is subject to federal control. In order to safeguard Soviet citizens from influences coming from abroad an index of prohibited works is kept at the receiving bureau of the post office, to which new titles are added from time to time.<sup>27</sup>

In any discussion of the use of the printed word in political propaganda, the poster should not be forgotten. It is in this work that the Soviet artist permits his imagination to run wild. Posters have been used from the very beginning of the Bolshevik régime, and they are still used effectively in various phases of propaganda, whether it be in the field of temperance, collectivization, bureaucracy, industrial achievement or military preparedness. In every instance the poster has a message which conveys to the vision the superiority of the Soviet régime. The same may be said of art in general, whether it be painting, literature, sculpture, or music. In recent years the Five Year Plan has been an important theme for glorification in paint and sound.

In spite of organization, the political education of the masses has not proved as successful as was expected, and the dissatisfaction of the leaders is shown by the fact that lately the Central Committee of the

<sup>27</sup> B. W. Maxwell, *The Soviet State*, pp. 223-9. *Sobraniye Uzakonenii* (1928), No. 2, Secs. 16 and 17.

Party has given the question considerable thought. Time after time resolutions have been passed calling the attention of appropriate authorities to the fact that political education is indispensable for the socialist development of the masses. Furthermore it has been emphasized that political education is the only means whereby the masses may be prepared to take an active part in state administration. Political education must make clear to the masses the objectives of party policy and the problems involved in proletarian dictatorship. It must facilitate the struggle of the Bolshevik régime against adverse tendencies which penetrate the working masses such as "petit bourgeois hesitation in the face of difficulties incidental to the upbuilding of a Communist State."

Leaders are urged by the Central Committee to go outside of the confines of clubs and "red corners" and transfer their activities to factories and plants, to professional unions, workers' dormitories, and industrial settlements. It is urged that in the rural districts the activity of political education be carried on in the fields and wherever peasants may be found at work.

Not infrequently workers, gathered in clubs on the days of rest and after working hours, grumble at the insistent propaganda carried on, and often the question is heard, "Why don't they leave us alone on our day of rest?" In consequence of this, propaganda in recent years has been carried on indirectly in connection with entertainments, by the use of radio, motion pictures, and athletic tournaments. The difficulties which the government has encountered in connection with the collectivization of the peasants brought home to the authorities the bitter truth that political agitation in the village has been far from successful. The Central Committee of the Party has made it clear that voluntary collectivization is unthinkable without further political education of the rural population. It has recommended that special attention should be paid to the installation of radio and motion pictures and the development of other means of communication. It has urged that the general and special press should pay more attention to rural problems.

Unfortunately propaganda alone could not accomplish the task undertaken by the Bolshevik régime, and force had to be resorted to. In the early years when the country was faced with civil war and counter-revolution, force frequently was used to crush opposition. In recent years, when the government found itself opposed by some part of the peasantry in the work of collectivization, the authorities did not hesitate to use force to the limit. The same is true in questions of sabotage in industry. The G.P.U. certainly did not shrink during the height of its power from using force upon suspected and guilty opponents. It must

be remembered, however, that some of the unnecessary cruelties incident to the crushing of opposition is not so much Bolshevik as it is Russian, a fact easily seen even in a perfunctory study of Russian history. Great injustice has been perpetrated as it always is when governments use coercion to crush opposition, and when an organ within the state, such as the G.P.U., is given absolute authority over guilty or suspected individuals. It is not likely in these troublous times, when governments in most of Europe disregard the rights of individuals, that the government of Soviet Russia will abandon the use of force when it thinks itself endangered by hostile groups. "Liquidations," deportations, and executions for political crimes and for opposition to governmental policies will continue to be exercised when "necessary." Force is used not only as punishment for acts committed but as warning to individuals and groups who may be contemplating opposition to the régime in power.

The use of force will probably cease when a new generation arises, wholly a product of communist education. The situation at present is complicated by the spy hysteria which has gripped Europe in general and the Soviet Union in particular. For years the Bolsheviks have proclaimed that the capitalistic world is getting ready to invade it. Now, with the rise of Hitler in Germany, the Soviet government has good reason for fearing invasion. This apprehension is reflected in merciless treatment of all individuals or groups who are even slightly suspected of disloyalty to the régime.

The evaluation of the accomplishment of Bolshevik political education or propaganda must be carried out in the light of Russia's past. Whatever the shortcomings and the failure of this activity may be, there is no denying that the mind of the Russian masses is being made over in accordance with Bolshevik patterns, and dictatorship is accepted as existing for the benefit of the rank and file. Whatever the doubts of the older generation may be, a militant young generation is growing up ready to fight for Bolshevik ideals as defined by the ruling group. The new education is producing a new mind which believes in the eradication of all classes until there emerges a "classless society" based on the aristocracy of labor, on materialism, and on atheism. On the other hand an almost childish faith in science is being developed—a science which will eventually solve all the riddles and problems of life. Everything is practical; all education is political, and all enterprise must be collective. Attempts are being made to break down the racial and national prejudices among the Soviet Union's some two hundred racial groups. While from the very beginning of their existence the Bolsheviks have taught internationalism and the brotherhood of the working classes of all

nations, present world conditions seem to have put a stop to any attempts at world revolution.<sup>28</sup> Thus far the masses have been willing to make terrific sacrifices for the realization of a better future. How long they will continue to do so even if intimidated by force or how long propaganda will prove effective are questions which the Communist Party will have to face and answer. It is possible that some promises will become realities. Be that as it may, for the present political propaganda, with all its shortcomings, has succeeded in persuading millions in Russia that the ideals of Bolshevism are the only way of life.

<sup>28</sup> Morp, the International Society for Assistance of Revolutionaries, has branches in schools and other institutions, but very little of practical use has been accomplished.



## IV

# THE IDEOLOGIC FOUNDATIONS OF THE DANUBIAN DICTATORSHIPS





## IV

# THE IDEOLOGIC FOUNDATIONS OF THE DANUBIAN DICTATORSHIPS\*

OSCAR JÁSZI

Oscar Jászi, Professor of Political Science at Oberlin College since 1925, has recently made an extended study of social and political developments in Danubian countries. For many years he was editor of the *Twentieth Century*, the outstanding sociological review of Hungary. Following the collapse of the Dual Monarchy in 1918 he was invited to serve as Minister of National Minorities in the Cabinet of Count Károlyi. In addition to several other books, he is the author of *The Nationality Problem and the Evolution of the Nation States* (Budapest, 1912, in Hungarian) and *The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy* (Chicago, 1929).

**I**N a study on Propaganda and Dictatorship the Danubian States can play only a secondary rôle, as they have developed no new types or methods of dictatorial propaganda. What they have done, both in quantity and in quality, is a pale copy of the accomplishments of the Russian, the Italian, and the German practices. This much smaller development of dictatorial propaganda is the result both of the weaker financial means of these states, and also of special social and political conditions prevailing in these countries. These conditions, however, may throw some light on the nature of post-war dictatorships, and the rôle of propaganda therein. One must always keep in mind that propaganda is a secondary cause of dictatorial transformations, which gives a kind of symbolic synthesis of some deeper social tendencies in a given society. Studying the ideologic background of the Danubian governments we shall come nearer perhaps to understanding the nature of Fascist rules, because it may be doubted whether any one of the four dictatorships which we shall analyze can be called predominantly Fascist in character, and surely two of them—the Yugoslav and the Rumanian—belong to an entirely different category.

In order to comprehend the present Austrian, Hungarian, Yugoslav and Rumanian dictatorships (more or less hidden behind constitutional frameworks), and their ideological foundation, we must recall their historic antecedents. The division of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy into six parts after the War created new states geographically, and also

\*The author is indebted to the *Social Science Research Council* for an opportunity to spend several months in the Danubian countries studying there recent social and political developments.

changed their moral and social composition. Two of them, Austria and Hungary, retained their old sovereignty on a small part of their former territory, whereas the Rumanian and the southern Slav parts of the Monarchy were annexed respectively to the kingdom of Rumania, and the kingdom of Serbia, which became thereby comparatively large states. The Czechoslovak parts of the Dual Monarchy were unified for the first time into an independent state, and the Polish territory under the Habsburgs was integrated with the Polish lands held formerly by Russia and Prussia. In the present discussion I omit Poland entirely, because it is outside of the Danubian problems, and I have no personal contact with its developments.

All these newly created states, allegedly constituted according to the principle of national self-determination, embarked in a boisterous and enthusiastic mood upon the road to parliamentary democracy, following the English and French models with some attempts at improvement, but in a short time they began to assume more and more anti-democratic features, and ultimately, they turned to dictatorships. There is only one significant exception, and that is Czechoslovakia. I have tried to explain this exception elsewhere, emphasizing the deep historic roots of Czech democracy, the thoroughly peasant and *petit bourgeois* character of the new state, the lack of a national feudal aristocracy, the popular distrust towards ultramontanism, the strong American, French, and English influences in the foundation of the new state, the exuberant Czech nationalism which was victorious over the extreme tendencies of Marxian Socialism, and the necessity of unity in the face of a renitent Hungarian and German minority.<sup>1</sup>

The four other states, which changed into dictatorships, have some common characteristics. All four were without a democratic tradition, or a leading conscious bourgeois class. Though a strong capitalistic structure grew up in the old Austria, the bourgeois class and the intellectuals were never really a leading element in the state, and the short history of Austrian liberalism was a series of failures, a growth without deep popular foundation, which, in the lack of a comprehensive economic and social program, exhausted itself in rhetorical anti-clericalism, and in the maintenance of German hegemony at a time when the dominant court and bureaucratic influences favored the safeguarding of Austria as

<sup>1</sup> See for details my article on "Czechoslovakia's First Years," *The Yale Review*, Summer, 1935.

a German state.<sup>2</sup> Austrian constitutionalism, a present to the liberals for the *Ausgleich* with Hungary (1867), with its anachronistic suffrage, was grossly tempered by Paragraph 14 which gave legislative power to the Monarch in cases of emergency. At the same time, the preponderance of Jewish influences in the press and financial capitalism made the social tension more acute and more embittered. Therefore, the real bulwarks of the state were the imperial army, the bureaucracy, and the powerful Roman Catholic church which assumed the spiritual leadership of both the peasants and the small bourgeoisie of the towns. Though later an active socialism of the Marxist pattern developed, it had no contact either with the rural population, or with the broad masses of the intelligentsia.

The second country of our survey, Hungary, remained almost entirely under the domination of her large estates, with a parasitic industrial and financial class, and with a great mass of wretched peasantry. The big land owners, allied with the Habsburgs, had an almost dictatorial rule over the landless masses, and over the national minorities, which constituted one-half of the population. The Catholic clergy, led by an extremely wealthy group of prelates, gave a spiritual foundation to the feudal system, whereas the weak and subservient intelligentsia was a tool of the ruling classes.<sup>3</sup>

In the various territories which have become Jugoslavia, there was always a deep democratic sentiment rooted in a proud and independent peasantry, which, in the lack of a native feudalism, felt itself as the foundation of the state. The great majority of the clergy (especially in the Greek Orthodox church) were united with the people in a popular nationalistic outlook. But this natural peasant democracy could not produce an efficient political and economic organization, while industrial capitalism was only beginning, and the small intellectual middle class was without political training or deeper general culture. Under these conditions, the popular King, the symbol of national unification, surrounded by an extremely well disciplined army, became the only active and conscious political force after the establishment of the new state.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Until the belated experiment with universal suffrage (1907) Austrian constitutionalism remained what a keen observer of the period called "Provincial (feudal) assemblies strengthened by a few lawyers and manufacturers." The antiquated system of Curia-representation made the rising of a genuine liberal spirit impossible. Compare Victor Bibl, *Der Zerfall Österreichs* (Wien, 1924), Vol. II, pp. 269-70.

<sup>3</sup> Concerning the class structure of former Hungary, detailed studies were made in *La Hongrie Contemporaine et le Suffrage Universel*, which I edited (Paris, 1909).

<sup>4</sup> A good analysis of the social-economic structure of Jugoslavia is given by Mitro M. Kosić in "Die soziale Differenzierung der Jugoslawen," *Kölner Vierteljahrschrift für Soziologie*, II. Jahrgang.

In Rumania also, in spite of a popular, democratic sentiment, there was neither a conscious bourgeois class, a solid intelligentsia, nor a constitutional life in a real sense.<sup>5</sup> The whole economic and political life of the country was dominated by Hungarian feudalism in Transylvania, and by the Boiar latifundists in the old kingdom, mostly of Phanariote (Greek bureaucrats under Turkish rule) or Armenian origin, felt as an alien force in the country. A powerful Jewish financial capitalism in Transylvania, and a native one in the old kingdom, checked the solidification of a peasantry and of an independent intellectual class.

It is manifest that to build democratic states on these bases was an economic and psychological impossibility, and the decay of the short-lived democracies was a natural and inevitable consequence, assuming different forms in the four states.

## I

The present dictatorship in Austria is a curious mixture of Fascist elements with some ancient characteristics of the former Habsburg state. After the defeat of the Central Powers, the German-Austrian Republic was created, including all the former Habsburg provinces with a compact German population. The former world empire became a comparatively small, mostly mountainous country, unable to carry on an independent economic existence without seeking adhesion either to Germany or to the new Danubian countries. Whereas the process of dismemberment in Hungary has created a vehement nationalistic movement for the reconquest of the lost frontiers, nothing similar happened in Austria, though her losses in territory and population were even greater. Her only ideologic reaction was the program for a union with Germany which the overwhelming majority of the country desired, and which was formulated both by the Christian Socialists and by the Socialists. However logical and natural this claim may have been, it was frustrated by the Peace Treaties and later also by the veto of the former Allies and of the Little Entente. The structural instability of the new republic was further aggravated by an acute class struggle between the Socialist and the Christian Socialist parties. At the beginning, Marxist Socialism was the stronger factor with its revolutionary ardor and international connections. At the last elections, forty per cent of the country, and sixty-six per cent of Vienna voted for the Socialist ticket. The so-called Austro-Marxism became the most radical wing of western so-

<sup>5</sup> "Professor Jorga's remark that between 1866 and 1917 Rumania was really without a constitution applies with equal truth until the end of 1928," says David Mitrany in his *The Land and the Peasant in Rumania* (London, 1930), p. 553.

cialism, forming almost a bridge between it and Bolshevism.<sup>6</sup> This supremacy of the Marxists soon began to decay. The causes of the gradual decline of the Socialist power, which also explain certain features of the present dictatorship were the following: (1) In Vienna the Socialist administration developed the most advanced social policy of the world, which it financed by overtaxing both large and small capitalists, thus provoking a widely spread exasperation of the whole middle class.<sup>7</sup> (2) The Marxist revolutionary ideology hurt the traditional religious and conservative feeling of the peasantry and the small bourgeoisie. (3) This aggressive policy did not find sufficient support in either the bureaucratic or the military apparatus of the country. On the contrary, the Socialists became aware too late that the old régime had successfully restituted its power in all key positions. The private army of the Socialists (the *Republikanischer Schutzbund*) was more and more repressed and finally outlawed, while the various formations of the counter-revolutionary forces were not only tolerated, but encouraged. (4) The influence of the Fascist dictatorship in Italy also worked against the Socialists. Finally Mussolini charged Chancellor Dollfuss to make an end to the Socialist régime, which hindered his clandestine transportation of war material to Hungary.

When the coup d'état came, in February 1934, the Socialists could only offer an heroic but chaotic resistance, yet it required the combined forces of the army and of the private counter-revolutionary formations, utilizing all the methods of ordinary warfare, to crush the Socialists in their big, fortified apartment houses. The three military leaders of the counter-revolutionary forces (Messrs. Dollfuss, Fey, and Prince Starhemberg) became the *triumviri* of the new situation, and occupied, with their most influential underlings, the important positions in the new state, which, under mitigated forms, and without a rigid philosophy, exercised the same methods in inner policy as the Nazis do in Germany. But whereas the German counter-revolution has rebuilt the state to a considerable extent, and has maintained its leadership against the former rulers, in Austria the old structure reappeared very soon. Clericalism, with the remnants of the old imperial bureaucracy and army became a powerful force in the new state, which under a "corporative" façade shows more resemblance to the authoritarian absolutism of

<sup>6</sup> A more detailed analysis of Austro-Marxism will be found in my article "The Breakdown of Austro-Marxism," *World Unity*, Vol. XV, No. 6, March 1935.

<sup>7</sup> Otto Bauer, the exiled leader of Austro-Marxism, wrote in a recent article in *Der Kampf*, that the catastrophe of the proletarian movement in Austria was due to the fact that the impoverished Austria could not support the relatively high standard of life enjoyed by the urban proletariat resulting from its privileges conquered in 1918.

Metternich than to the rigid dictatorships of Mussolini or Hitler. In the lack of an outstanding personality, there was, so to speak, a codictatorship of rival leaders, each supported by his special military organization. Even now, when Prince Starhemberg has been successful in the amalgamation of all the private military organizations, it may be doubted whether the armed force of the régime possesses a unity in its spirit and aspirations.

After the crushing of the Socialist organizations, and a sufficient amount of terroristic executions, imprisonments, and wide application of concentration camps, it was easy to extinguish the antagonistic press, and to establish a readily manageable and loyal propaganda service. The two main efforts of this propaganda are to create an Austrian patriotism against Germany, emphasizing the independence of the state, and to support the new structure by the traditional force of Roman Catholicism. The first is a very difficult task, because there was never a genuine patriotism in the Austrian Empire other than a kind of dynastic loyalty towards the emperor.<sup>8</sup> The second is more effective, because Catholicism is still a vivid force. The first item of the new constitution declares: "In the name of God, the Almighty, from whom all right emanates, the Austrian people receive for their Christian German Bundesstaat this Constitution." The strength of this religious force should not be overrated, and it is rather doubtful whether this Mount Sinai legislation will be able to counterbalance the growing Nazi tendencies and the very strong Socialist minority, especially if economic conditions continue to be as bad as before. As the German propaganda is adamant in backing the Austrian Nazis, the only hope of the régime would be to gain the support of the former Marxist Socialists. Therefore, the only serious propaganda is directed to this purpose. Posters continuously appear which try to show the proletariat the "treason" of its former leaders, and how advantageous it would be for them to take a part in the corporative state. Dr. Winter, a vice-mayor of Vienna, a noted Platonic scholar, and a sincere friend of the working classes, tried in a long series of articles, lectures, and debates to conciliate the workers.<sup>9</sup> These meetings, however, the only ones which were tolerated among the opposition, were soon used by the workers for revolutionary propaganda, and were suppressed. The more serious leaders of Catholicism face the same

<sup>8</sup> When on one occasion a man was recommended to Emperor Francis II (1792-1835) with the explanation that he was a clever and ardent patriot, the sovereign replied distrustfully: "I hear he is a patriot for Austria, but the question is whether he is a *patriot for me?*" Quoted in my *The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy* (Chicago, 1929), p. 83.

<sup>9</sup> For the elaboration of his ideology see *Wiener Politische Blätter*, edited by him (Wien, 1934), Vol. II.

problem, and recently the necessity of an *Arbeiterseelsorge* ("taking care of the souls of the workers") has been strongly emphasized. A member of this movement, Dr. Pfliegler, stated very clearly that the Marxist ideology should be replaced by a new one, otherwise no cooperation from the working classes can be expected by the present state. Hatred must be conquered by love, and the fear of the working class that they will lose all their previous privileges should be eradicated. It is interesting to note that this very enthusiastic activity of able and gifted men was totally unsuccessful, which shows that no propaganda can be effective in contradiction to the real needs of a situation. Just the opposite happened; a new private army was created by certain groups of Christian Socialist workers, called the *Freiheitsbund* (the third private army in the country), with the declared purpose of defending the rights of the working class. Many former Socialists participated in the new army, whose members greeted each other with the word "Freiheit." Though this last private army was also coordinated under the dictatorship of Prince Starhemberg (who represents the outspoken Fascist tendencies subservient to Mussolini in contrast with the old-fashioned Habsburg clericalism of Chancellor Dr. Schuschnigg), it is manifest that the organized opposition to the régime among the working class is growing.

Under such circumstances, Austrian Fascism could not create a solid ideologic basis. Even the majority of the peasant population is too critical to accept a Fascism by God's grace, and as German nationalism is manifestly stronger than Austrian patriotism of a new brand, Nazis and Socialists together constitute decidedly the great majority of the population. The lack of a real popular foundation makes the propaganda of the system awkward and naïve.<sup>10</sup> The more critical supporters of the government feel acutely, therefore, the necessity for a new moral guide. The only possibility for this would be the restoration of the Habsburgs, which is more and more clamorously demanded, both by the clergy, and by the embarrassed Fascist leaders. It is their last hope that the old prestige and glamour of the Habsburgs may give a bulwark to their tottering Fascist state. A clerical Fascism under the scepter of the Habsburgs seems to be the only solution—a solution, of course, which would last as long as the diplomatic game would support it. For a durable ideologic synthesis it is manifestly as anachronistic as the newly manufactured Austrian patriotism. The extreme weakness of this structure was

<sup>10</sup> In the spring of 1934, we saw a public square of Vienna carefully guarded by police forces. Upon asking for the cause of this measure, we were told by an officer: "At eleven o'clock we shall have here a spontaneous patriotic demonstration."



clearly shown by the fact that the beginning difficulties of Mussolini in Abyssinia and with the League were enough to give a new orientation to the régime, which now allows the press to give voice to the sufferings of the German minority in South Tyrol and makes some friendly overtures toward Czechoslovakia. Danubian Fascism has not an independent existence; it is rather a repercussion of the larger dictatorships.

## II

The existence of a dictatorship in Hungary would be flatly denied by the present ruling elements. The "thousand-year-old constitution" is an object of patriotic worship, and analogies to the English constitution abound in the official literature. It cannot be doubted that there was a remarkable continuity in the resistance of the feudal estates against the growing power of the centralizing kingdom, and in this one can find some analogies with the English constitutional development. England, however, was successful in building a more and more democratic political structure, whereas Hungary remained a feudal country, like England before the constitutional reform of 1832. In Hungary no conscious middle class arose which could have counterbalanced the feudal forces, both temporal and spiritual. The almost despotic rule of the *latifundia* (some of them covering territories larger than a former German principality), since the half of the population consists of a landless proletariat or of peasants with dwarfish holdings, has remained unaltered. It was checked only slightly by the middle class nobility, the so-called gentry, itself a land-owning class, which found some popular support in its fight against the Habsburgs and the aristocracy connected with them. In the lack of an important industry, Social Democracy was an artificial plant, and was unable to exercise any influence either in legislation or in administration, aside from arranging occasional noisy meetings in the capital of the country, and in a few larger towns. Even more impotent was a group of radical intellectuals who, imitating the Fabian Socialists, tried to support the causes of the proletariat and of an utterly unorganized peasantry. In this way, pre-war Hungary under the dualistic constitution was the dictatorship of the feudal classes, tempered by the absolutism of the Habsburgs, who occasionally tried to mitigate the Magyar rule, towards both the landless masses and the non-Magyar half of the population. The Hungarian so-called parliamentary system was based on the domination of a single party supported by Vienna. This party, with the aid of a very restricted suffrage, of the open ballot, of a complicated procedure of electoral corruption, and with a wide use of the police, the gendarmerie, and the Habsburg army itself, had an absolute political

monopoly which was shaken only once, and then for a very short period.<sup>11</sup>

This system of feudal rule under the protection of the Habsburg bayonets collapsed in 1918 on the battlefields, and the starving country, the disorganized and partly bolshevized army returning home, tried to make an end to the thousand-year-old system of economic and political exploitation. After a bloodless revolution, supported by the police, the soldiers, and a great part of the bureaucracy, a coalition between the Socialists, the anti-Habsburgist Independents, and the Bourgeois Radicals formed a government with the program of national independence, expropriation of the *latifundia*, universal suffrage with the secret ballot, and a system of national autonomies for the non-Magyar minorities of the country. In November 1918, King Charles, feeling the growing hostility of all the nations of the monarchy, resigned, and a few days later Hungary became a republic. In the absence of organized popular forces this experiment did not work, the less so because even before the peace treaties, the dismemberment of the country by armed force was carried on by the Czechs, the Rumanians, and the Jugoslavs, with the consent of the Allies. The feeling of national humiliation, combined with unsurmountable difficulties in feeding the country (due to the economic blockade and the chaos in the system of transportation), and in supporting hundreds of thousands of officials and other middle-class people who poured back to Hungary from the occupied territories, undermined the moral prestige of the government and gave a first impetus to the reorganization of the counter-revolutionary groups. The only organized faction in this chaos was the Socialist party, which had strong units in the leading towns. Under the revolutionary pressure of a hungry proletariat, and of the landless peasantry, the Bolshevik tendencies gained the upper hand, and in March 1919, a Soviet republic was proclaimed.

Though this effort was manifestly hopeless in an overwhelmingly agrarian country, without a serious and well trained revolutionary leadership, and surrounded by hostile capitalistic states, and though it did not last six full months, yet it created a moral and sentimental atmosphere which must be understood in order to grasp the meaning of the present dictatorship. The ruling classes lost for a time their thousand-year-old political monopoly. They were at the verge of economic expropriation, were treated with all the brutalities of the Russian Bolshevik pattern, and were denounced in their patriotism and religion. The old rulers, antagonized mostly by immature young revolutionaries, without the

<sup>11</sup> See the private memorandum addressed to the King: *Die Lage in Ungarn*, ein Mahnruf von einer der Tagespolitik fernstehenden Gruppe besorgter Patrioten, Budapest, October 1918.

slightest knowledge of administration or of practical economics, felt this system to be a Marxist, Russian, Jewish plot against all their cherished values. And when the Soviet dictators began also an insipid fight with the peasantry, their régime lost all support with the exception of the radical wing of the Socialist, now Communist party, and a fraction of the entirely landless peasantry. At the same time, the hyper-nationalistic intelligentsia who had lost their traditional positions and sinecures in the non-Magyar parts of the former state, when returned to the old country, felt as the chief cause of their disaster the democratic transformation, followed by the Communist upheaval.<sup>12</sup>

The old ruling class, grown inactive and inert due to its traditional privileges, was utterly unable to fight the communistic intrusion. The opposition came from far more energetic elements. And here we see the emergence of a new Fascist structure in the bulwarks of Magyar feudalism. It was the lower middle class of front and reserve officers, of intellectuals, professionals, bureaucrats, who had lost their positions because of the war, of clergymen, exasperated by the anti-religious propaganda of the Bolsheviks, together with some members of the industrial bourgeoisie, who became the leaders of the anti-Bolshevik movement. And when its chief exponent, Admiral Horthy, a symbol of the Magyar gentry, and a typical Habsburg career officer, entered the capital after the defeat of the Red army by the Rumanians, this "new élite" assumed the leadership of the country. The old aristocracy was compelled to accept this change as a defense against the danger of an upheaval of the landless proletariat. As a keen English observer wrote recently: "It is clear that there is here fuel for a formidable conflagration if the dispossessed agricultural population ever finds itself in a position to combine."<sup>13</sup> This Fascist movement has produced an ideology which has most remarkable similarities to the Hitler philosophy. And what is still more remarkable is that the whole conception was already elaborated in 1918-1919, that is, in a time when the Nazi movement in Germany did not yet constitute an organized force. This shows very convincingly that new political currents are not created by a conscious propaganda, but propaganda only shapes patterns which emanate from the depths of an historic situation.

Let us consider the main points of the Magyar anti-Bolshevik movement, whose principal spearhead was the armed association of the *Awakening Magyars*, an organization which can be regarded as a prede-

<sup>12</sup> See my *Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Hungary* (London, 1924), pp. 110 ff.

<sup>13</sup> See A. Macartney, *Hungary* (London, 1934), p. 249.

cessor of the Hitler *Storm Troops*. I quote here a description given by a Hungarian conservative Catholic encyclopedia:

The association of the Awakening Magyars was formed in November 1918 after the outbreak of the Károlyi Revolution. Its founders were mostly members of the younger intelligentsia, and young officers returning from the front. Their triple purpose was the safeguarding of the territorial integrity of the country, the awakening of Christian Hungary, and the crushing of the Revolutionary Republic. A register of 1920 shows a membership of 50,000 men. . . . The association represents the points of view of the anti-Semitic and Christian conception in all the manifestations of social life. It develops a propaganda in foreign countries in the interest of an anti-Semitic world front, and of the dissemination of Hungarian national truths. . . .

Other organizations of a military-patriotic character joined the movement, among them some of secret character with mystic symbols and ceremonies. A new knighthood of feudal character, the *Vitézek* (Heroes), was organized under the command of Regent Horthy. Its members received landed property for their past services during the war, and for their expected services in the case of future dangers from either foreign or interior enemies. At an initiation ceremony, when the knights were dubbed in the name of *Hadur*, the pagan Magyar god of war, the Governor said: "If necessary, be the entrusted guardians of the social order, and of the peace of society."<sup>14</sup>

The Awakening Magyars, like the Nazis later, after having gained power began their activity by a long series of terroristic acts, from individual onslaught to wholesale massacre of dozens of people accused of participation in the communistic régime. Some cases of brutality were characterized by sexual tortures. Reading over these cases again as reported by the British Labor Delegation to Hungary after a very careful investigation, one can scarcely believe the facts showing such a completely abnormal chapter of social psychology in the middle classes.<sup>15</sup> (It is interesting to note that the peasantry of the country could not be induced to any excesses by the counter-revolutionary officers. The great mass of the population remained absolutely quiet.) Again, as later in Germany, vast concentration camps were established which, at the peak of the terror, contained more than 25,000 suspected persons. About 14,000 so-called communistic cases were investigated, the overwhelming majority of which were soon quashed.

<sup>14</sup> *Vitézek Évkönyve*, edited by Julius Pekár (Budapest, 1928), p. 158.

<sup>15</sup> *The White Terror in Hungary*. Report of the British Joint Labor Delegation to Hungary (London, May 1920).

The ideology of the movement was as uncritical, exasperated and romantic as the later Nazi ideology. It was a mixture of the following elements: (1) Agitation for revenge in order to regain the lost territories of the country. (2) The "stabbing-in-the-back" legend, an elaborated doctrine according to which Hungary was victorious in the World War, but her never-conquered armies were disintegrated by the common propaganda of the Allies, Jews, and Communists. (3) The fight against the Jewish danger. It was asserted that "the working masses of England are led by Jews; the Jewish hand is at work in the seceding parts of the British Empire; Gandhi is only the visible national exponent of this process of disintegration; the same hand is at work in the Peace Treaty of Trianon, and in other nation-killing peace settlements, and in the hypocritic League of Nations."<sup>16</sup> (4) The slogan was coined of the *Third Hungary*, which would bring unity and national restoration to the country. (5) A vehement anti-Marxist campaign was carried on, which led to extensive burning of copies of the hated literature. (6) Instead of Socialism or Communism, a Christian National Social course was advocated, which would give landed property to the peasants, and support to the small artisans. (7) Propaganda was carried on for the restitution of the old national religion of the country; figures of the old Magyar mythology were regvanized and cherished.<sup>17</sup> (8) A doctrine of racial purity was emphasized, based on so-called biologic researches; one of its chief protagonists asserted that the main cause of the Hungarian dismemberment was the intrusion of alien blood in the second half of the nineteenth century, especially by the emancipation of the Jews.<sup>18</sup> (9) The necessity for a new educational system was urged: "Magyars can be educated only by Magyars." (10) The doctrine of *Turanism* proclaimed the unity of all peoples of Turan origin, including the Finns, the Ests, the Bulgarians, the Turks, the Chinese, the Koreans, and the Japanese, not mentioning several other relatives, which would constitute a solid block of six hundred million people.<sup>19</sup>

Here, however, the analogy with the later Nazi movement ceases. The awakening Magyar movement never became an elaborate "scientific

<sup>16</sup> Characteristic products of this type of literature are, among others, Béla Dánér, *A magyarországi zsidókérdés megoldása* (Budapest, 1919); and István Lendvai, *A barmadik Magyarország* (Budapest, 1921).

<sup>17</sup> The devastating influence of the foreign religion on the ancient virtues of the nation was stressed.

<sup>18</sup> The doctrine was the most loudly developed in the many writings of Professor Lajos Méhely.

<sup>19</sup> One of the most popular products of this literature is Alajos Paikert, *A turáni eszme* (Budapest, 1923).

doctrine," and the feeling of hatred and exasperation which animated it soon evaporated. And though the first Parliament elected immediately after the defeat of Communism truly reflected this ideology, and the chief representatives of the movement had a strong influence, yet Count Bethlen, during his ten years of administration, was successful in eliminating slowly, by persuasion, violence, and corruption, the loudest and most menacing elements of Magyar Fascism, especially the wealthier peasants, contemptuously called *Csizmások* ("those who wear boots"). As a consequence, the old feudal and plutocratic character of the Hungarian state returned step by step; a new reliable police force and army were created; universal suffrage, the gift of the October Revolution, was discarded, and the open ballot reintroduced in the great majority of the constituencies. The old feudal House of Lords was replaced by a corporative chamber which, however, left the privileges of the *latifundia* untouched; the agrarian reform of the Revolution was emasculated, and the landless peasantry again subjugated to the estates. Yet the Fascist counter-revolution left deep imprints in the feudal structure. The aristocracy founded by the Habsburgs govern less and less, and are being replaced by more active forces of the counter-revolution, especially by the gentry. The fall of Count Bethlen, and the coming to power of General Gömbös, a former leader of the Fascist terroristic groups, symbolizes the transformation, which found expression in a slogan concerning the personnel of the new régime: "No counts, no Jews, no peasants."<sup>20</sup> The former almighty aristocracy tolerates this change grudgingly, because it needs the Fascist spearhead of the state in order to be protected against the landless peasantry.

A very strong central government has been established in which a few men (allegedly belonging to a secret organization which was born in the hot days of the counter-revolution) exercise dictatorial power. As in Austria, in lack of an outstanding personality, and due to the traditional structure of the country, dictatorial power does not lie with an individual, but with a very small group, which represents the right wing of the former Fascist organizations.<sup>21</sup> Here again something analogous to the German movement happened, but whereas Hitler needed the Bloody Purge of June 1934 for getting rid of the left wing of his National Socialists, the same thing was accomplished by Count Bethlen through

<sup>20</sup> Quoted by Robert Braun in his "Herrenklasse, Vermögen und Beruf in den agrarischen Donauländern," Sonderbeilage des *Österreichischen Volkswirt* (Wien, 1933).

<sup>21</sup> The pluralistic and feudal character of the Hungarian dictatorship found a curious demonstration in a recent event when the acknowledged dictator, General Gömbös, was challenged to a duel by the leader of the "opposition" (June 1935), a performance thoroughly unimaginable in Italy and Germany.

a semi-legal process. In the absence of an organized peasantry, a conscious middle class, and a revolutionary proletariat, the Hungarian system does not need an elaborate propagandistic organization. The press is easily muzzled, and the continuous foray against true or suspected Communists crushes more energetic personalities.

The little ideologic support which the system needs is furnished by the repudiation of the Treaty of Trianon, which dismembered the country, and "robbed" it of two-thirds of its territory and more than half of its population. This disaster has never been forgotten, and the official philosophy strengthens it intentionally. The slogan "*Nem, nem, soha*" (No, no, never) became almost a religious symbol announcing the resolution of the country never to accept the new frontiers. The official maps, used in all the schools, show the lost territories, as *de jure* belonging to Hungary, but now under "foreign occupation." A social and economic doctrine was fostered (the opposition to which is regarded as treason, and involves an excommunication from the national community) which attributes all the misery and backwardness of the people exclusively to the peace treaty, and by endless repetition, inculcates into the public mind that without the revision of the frontiers, there is no possibility of curing the bleeding wounds of the country. In this way, the *Trianon complex* means not only the expression of protest against an unjust treaty, but at the same time, a defense mechanism against the proletariat and the landless peasantry, who are told that their hopeless misery has nothing to do with their economic and political exploitation, but originates exclusively in the violence of the victorious countries. It is perhaps interesting to mention that a similar ideologic defense mechanism was used in pre-war Hungary, when the feudal backwardness of the country was blamed on the "Austrian exploitation" and the effective political slogan of "the cursed Austria-Vienna" was invented.

Since the victory of Hitler, strong endeavors have been made to create a National Socialist party on the German pattern, supported by the left wing of the former Fascist group, and masses of the German minority.<sup>22</sup> These efforts have to date been unsuccessful, and will remain so in all probability. The causes of this failure are: (1) The country is, so to speak, inculcated with the virus of a counter-revolutionary Fascism. After the convulsions of the post-communist period, and its sour experiences, the Nazi slogans of anti-capitalism, and anti-Semitism have lost their impressiveness. (2) The present hidden Fascism, protect-

<sup>22</sup> The leaders of the movement are Count Stephan Festetich, Zoltán Meskó and Zoltán Böszörményi whose weekly *The National Socialist* was suppressed by the government in August 1934.

ing the old feudal state, and having a constitutional show window, is, for the Hungarian use, more appropriate than the Nazi pattern. (3) The Magyar variety of dictatorship gives a greater flexibility to the rulers in their international policy. They can play a triple game: they can enjoy the support of Mussolini; they can hope for German protection in the case of a new European conflagration; and their pseudo-constitutionalism opens for them a welcome approach towards the League of Nations with the hope of new loans. Thus, Hungary has fashioned a modified and mitigated Fascist dictatorship, under the protection of its "thousand-year-old" constitution, quite in harmony with its historical evolution and its present social and economic structure.

### III

Whereas in the case of Austria and Hungary the Fascist character is marked (that is, middle-class elements have conquered the political power, and have made a compromise with the former rulers in order to subdue the revolutionary proletariat), in the Yugoslav dictatorship, established in January 1929, there is nothing of a Fascist nature. It was simply the military dictatorship of the King, a return to the old type of absolute monarchy which, with the exception of the transitory period under the Constitution of 1921, was always the real power in the country, sometimes slightly veiled by an inefficient constitutional set-up.

The dictatorship of King Alexander, and the present dictatorship of the regents, now somewhat mitigated by an electoral mechanism, entirely controlled by the government, both legally and illegally, rose from the unsolved regional problems of the country. The democratic constitution of the post-war period did not work because its extreme unification and centralization were resented by the various groups of the new kingdom, especially by the Croats, and by the Slovenes, who are both economically and culturally the most advanced groups. To coalesce these nationalities of an entirely western character, imbued with the idea of a *Rechtstaat*, and educated in the Roman Catholic religion, with the other far more backward regions, infected by the memories of a long Turkish domination and the continual bloody plots of their various throne pretenders, and trained under the influence of the Byzantine church and culture, proved to be an impossible task. One should not forget that until the collapse of the Habsburg monarchy the Yugoslavs lived under six different governments (Serbia, Austria, Hungary, Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Bulgaria) and their representatives sat in fourteen different assemblies, national and provincial. In spite of the community of blood and language, the local particularisms, with their local patriotisms, be-



came very turbulent, and were not willing to yield to the new Serbian leaders, who regarded themselves as the liberators and unifiers of the new kingdom. No workable compromise was imaginable under these conditions, because the Serbs overstressed their claims for unification, whereas the other regional units exaggerated their demands for a loose confederation which would even have upset the unity of the army, the bulwark and symbol of the state, of the kingdom, and of Serb patriotism. As a consequence of all these factors, the democratic parliamentary government was continually deadlocked by the resistance of various groups, but especially by that of the Croats. And when a rabid Serb deputy mortally wounded the leader of the Croat Peasant party in Parliament (June 20, 1928), everyone, the dying Radić included, felt that the dictatorship of the King had become inevitable. It was hopefully accepted by the bulk of the population, because the conviction was that the King would give a new, more appropriate, and more decentralized constitution to his country. The King, however, with his loyal general staff, believed that the people were not yet mature enough for a constitution, and resolved to carry on a real unification before giving further constitutional rights. The dangerous international situation, the continual intrigues of the Italian and Hungarian dictators, made the determination of the King even firmer. He thought that the unity of the army was jeopardized, and without this absolutely centralized and loyal army, his monarchy would fall to pieces.

For the dictatorship, a new political philosophy was needed and was elaborated by the King and a small group of officers and intellectuals. The *Jugoslav Idea* became the chief moral force of the régime, and was propagated in official life, in the schools, in athletic associations, and by the whole press put under a rigorous censorship. The *Jugoslav Idea* means the final unity of all the southern Slav tribes. It means their complete subordination, both politically and culturally, to the authority of a thoroughly centralized state. Nothing is tolerated in any field of public, cultural, economic, or administrative activity which would remind one of the historical and cultural differences of the various parts of the country. Only one activity remains untouched; that is religion. And it is interesting to observe how, in some parts of the country, especially in Croatia, religious sentiment has become fervent, and the Roman Catholic church is cherished by the population as the ultimate guardian of their former national independence. The Virgin Mary is not only the Mother of the Saviour, but has become the "Mother of Croatia."

In the absence of a conscious bourgeois class, and with a weak intelligentsia, inexperienced in political democracy, the resistance against the

autocratic rule is mostly passive, with occasional outbursts of plots and violence. With a loyal army, and a subservient bureaucracy, the régime remained entirely the personal dictatorship of the King. He is reported as having said upon assuming power: "Whether I succeed or fail in my task, it is my own person that is at stake."<sup>23</sup> The tragic event at Marseilles (October, 1934), has shown how right he was. After his death the system was compelled to assume a pluralistic form of a regency. It is only during the dictatorship that some Fascist elements have appeared in public life. As there is a growing intellectual class on the verge of misery, the younger elements of the country are dissatisfied, both with the new system and with the old parties. Their program is the participation of the "young élite" in the supreme power, supporting the King and the *Yugoslav Idea*. These elements have received some encouragement from above because of the fact that great masses of intellectuals have adopted a different course in the form of a growing Bolshevik ideology. Among the Regents, the Western-minded Prince Paul, under English influence, tries to return to the parliamentary democratic system of the previous constitution (and the rigidity of the dictatorship has been considerably relaxed in Croatia), still a fundamental change has not yet occurred, due to the resistance of the former dictatorial régime on the one side, and to the dogmatic stubbornness of the Croatian peasant leader, Dr. Macek, on the other.

#### IV

Recently more and more observers call the government of Rumania a dictatorship, whereas before the War it was ranked as a constitutional monarchy. As no real change has taken place in the essence of the Rumanian political system, it must be explained why it is now regarded as a type of autocracy. After the emancipation from the Turkish rule, Rumania was always controlled by the personal régime of the King and his camarilla. The weak constitutional framework was easily managed by the monarch. The King appointed his Prime Minister, who tampered with the elections, if necessary, by corruption, terror, and fraud, and the Prime Minister could always be sure of his parliamentary majority. Sometimes the King was strongly influenced by one or another leader of the parliamentarian factions, but in the long run, he himself was always the decisive factor. This system of the personal rule of the King, controlling the elections through his favorites, is also the main feature of the present so-called dictatorial régime. The wealth, the prestige, the

<sup>23</sup> Quoted by Hermann Wendel, "Dictatorship in Yugo-Slavia," in *Dictatorship on Trial*, edited by Otto Forst de Battaglia (New York, 1931), p. 348.

loyal army and bureaucracy of the King make all resistance impossible, in spite of the fact that Rumania has a much freer press than any other Danubian dictatorship. The difference between the old situation and the new is that in 1917 universal suffrage was introduced, and an agrarian reform on a vast scale was initiated in order to counterbalance the menacing Bolshevik propaganda. At this time, the foundations of a peasant democracy were laid, but it is still unorganized and inarticulate, without the necessary strength to impose its will. Only once, in March 1928, did the popular forces of the country assert themselves, when the leader of the peasantry, Dr. Maniu, made his famous march on Bucharest, concentrating nearly 100,000 peasants in the capital in order to show the regency that it is impossible to rule the country without regard for its overwhelming peasant majority. This entirely peaceful and bloodless demonstration put Maniu and his adherents into power. The new government tried for two years to make democracy real, but the odds were too heavy against the experiment, due to the economic crisis, an incompetent bureaucracy, and the deeply rooted system of corruption. A general dissatisfaction arose, which the old military, plutocratic, and bureaucratic coterie utilized for the restitution of the old system, and when Prince Carol returned from his involuntary exile and became King, discarding the regency (June 1930), he was soon successful in assuming the former personal dictatorship. The new in the situation is that whereas his predecessors, maintaining the same system, were not regarded as dictators in a country where all elements of a real democracy were lacking, now, after the experiment with honest elections, and with the growing consciousness of the peasantry under a very able intellectual leadership, the same system is keenly resented by increasing masses of the population. Another important element in the change is that the annexation of Transylvania to the old Regat has introduced fresh western blood into the circulation of the old body politic, dominated by Turkish, Byzantine, and Phanariote traditions.

The antagonism between the dictatorial head and the democratic body of the country accounts for certain Fascist phenomena which, though weak at the present time, give a certain new color to the ruling system. Between an organized bank capitalism, controlling the Liberal party, and a more conscious peasantry, controlling the National Peasant party, the lower middle classes feel themselves weak and exploited. The younger elements of the intelligentsia, very often on a starvation level, embraced passionately the anti-Semitic propaganda of Professor Cuza. Later on a military organization of a Fascist type, the so-called "Iron Guard" was recruited by a young, emotional, and romantic lawyer, Cor-

nelius Codreanu, developing terroristic propaganda, with a vague and obscure program, the only articulate demand of which is the expulsion of the Jews, and the confiscation of their property. The German minority of the country has shown a special inclination for the Nazi methods. Later, both Cuza and Codreanu adopted the Swastika as a symbol, and their contacts with Berlin are very noticeable. When anti-Semitic agitation became too wild, and disturbed the financial interests of the government, the Iron Guard was dissolved. This led to the assassination of Premier Duca by a fanatic student (December 1933) who was only the tool of a widely spread organization with which high officers of the army were in intimate contact. The leniency with which the chief promoters of the crime were handled has shown that the movement enjoys high protection. The Green House of the Iron Guard, in one of the suburbs of Bucharest, was constructed with the moral and financial help of high society.<sup>24</sup> There are signs which seem to indicate that in the inevitable future struggle between democracy and dictatorship Fascist organizations may be used against the old parties.

This growing Fascist movement has both social-economic and national causes. It is directed not only against the Jews but also against national minorities, especially the Hungarians. A former Prime Minister and an influential member of the Peasant party, Dr. Vaida-Voevod, in opposition to the majority of his own party, plays the rôle of a pacemaker of Fascist tendencies combining his efforts with the anti-Semitic group of Octavian Goga. Dr. Vaida coined the catchword of the *numerus clausus valachicus*, a measure which would exclude, as far as possible, all foreign elements, from both the public service and the economic organizations. The irredentistic propaganda of Hungary, and the culturally very advanced Magyar minority in Transylvania, with which the Rumanian middle class would have a sharp competition under a system of equal opportunities, will probably give additional stimulation to the Fascist movement.<sup>25</sup>

## V

Looking over the ideologic foundations of the Danubian dictatorships, we can draw some general conclusions concerning the strength and durability of these structures. The weakness of the Austrian dictatorship is manifest between an irreconcilable Socialism and a growing Naziism. The Yugoslav dictatorship also has no real foundation in the social-

<sup>24</sup> Interesting details in M., "La Propagande Hitlerienne en Roumanie," *L'Europe Nouvelle*, May 5, 1934.

<sup>25</sup> Concerning the nationality struggles see my article, "The Nationality Problem," *The Nation*, Vol. CXXXIX, No. 3623, December 12, 1934.

economic structure of the country, and only international tension and war danger can maintain it. Analogous is the situation in Rumania, but the dictatorship here is even less solidly founded, because regional differences are not so acute as in Jugoslavia, and therefore, democratic forces could be more easily combined on a national basis against the rule of the camarilla. The Hungarian dictatorship seems to be the strongest in the autocratic family, because it gave only a new spearhead to a thousand-year-old historical process, which did not produce organized forces of opposition, and even the weak resistance which exists can easily be silenced by the spirit of a hyper-developed nationalism, a result partly of the feudal traditions, partly of the dismemberment of the country. It is hardly probable that in any of these countries the interior forces of democracy could ever overthrow the dictatorial régimes. This is the result, however, not of any successful propagandistic activity, but of the overwhelming military force at the disposal of the autocratic rulers, and of the growing international tension in the European state system. The overthrow of the dictatorship of Mussolini or its substantial weakening, through a conspicuous failure in Abyssinia, would have undoubtedly a powerful repercussion on the Danubian dictatorships.

V

THE SCOPE OF RESEARCH ON PROPAGANDA AND  
DICTATORSHIP



## V

# THE SCOPE OF RESEARCH ON PROPAGANDA AND DICTATORSHIP

HAROLD D. LASSWELL

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THE study of propaganda goes to the heart of the most compelling popular, practical and scholarly issue of our time, which is the nature of the connection between what men think and how men live. What can be done by propaganda? What are the limits of propaganda? How can a method be devised for analyzing the extent to which political attitudes may be modified by manipulating symbols, without altering the "material" aspects of the environment?

It is no longer fruitful to debate about the "ideological" *versus* the "material." Modern analysis proceeds by taking it for granted that for some purposes at least change can be regarded as the expression of inter-related variables. Research on propaganda can be concerned with the volume, the modalities and the functions of the propaganda variable. This would be *equilibrium* analysis. In addition, we may attempt to appraise the net effect of propaganda in the major political transformations of our time. This would be *developmental* analysis. Since the appearance of a new pattern of world revolution in 1917, propaganda has been active in spreading, and in restricting, the scope of revolution. In this connection the meaning of propaganda in Japan, China, Italy, Turkey, Germany, and many other countries would repay careful comparative investigation. Those countries which are called dictatorships, like the Soviet Union, Italy, and Germany, are particularly conspicuous in the use of propaganda.

It need not be assumed, if we choose a list of dictatorships for research purposes, that necessary relations will be discovered between "propaganda" in general and "dictatorship" in general. By the word propa-



ganda we refer to acts which are constantly fluctuating in direction and intensity. Acts of symbol manipulation can be distinguished from acts of violence and boycott, and they can be described in terms of staff employed, money spent, symbols and channels used, and persons reached.

The word dictatorship, however, refers to a constant structure rather than a changing magnitude. States are *either* dictatorships *or* something else, according to the usage now common among publicists. Theoretically it is possible to identify structure as a frequency distribution of certain changing magnitudes. Acts above a certain frequency will indicate the presence of one structure, and acts below a certain frequency will indicate another one, or none at all.<sup>1</sup> This "operational"<sup>2</sup> definition of dictatorship has not yet been agreed upon among specialists, and hence "bourgeois dictatorships" in the language of Moscow become "democracies" in the language of New York.

Some day, perhaps, our words about structure will be less ambiguous than they are today. One eligible index of dictatorship is a high proportion of coercive acts directed against the members of a state by officials of the state. But this does not exhaust the matter. Another criterion is whether such acts are held to be abuses of constituted authority by those affected, and this involves the analysis of collective attitudes.

As matters now stand, there is not much hope of relating the "more or less" of propaganda with the "either-or" of dictatorship. Nonetheless, we cannot fail to learn a great deal about the connection between propaganda and many significant aspects of social development by studying the states which in American speech are called dictatorships.

### *The Volume of Propaganda*

In any selected community the volume of propaganda varies through any chosen period of time as a result of several factors:

- The number of acts performed
- The number of people performing acts
- The novelty of the acts performed
- The novelty of the symbols used
- The frequency of overt dissent

Propaganda probably increases when there is increasing activity on the part of more people who try new ways of life in the name of new

<sup>1</sup> On the problem of clarifying vocabulary about "structure" and "function," see J. H. Woodger, *Biological Principles* (New York, 1929), Chap. vii.

<sup>2</sup> Consult P. W. Bridgman, *The Logic of Modern Physics* (New York, 1927), Chap. i.

symbols about which they differ profoundly. The prominence of propaganda in the Soviet Union is presumably bound up with the number of people who are stimulated by novel words to do new things. A vast peasant population is in process of transforming itself into workers on collective, mechanized farms, and in factories, power plants, and communication services. Peasant folk-ways have been assailed in matters ranging from the care of expectant mothers to the destruction of common house flies. Peasant timidity in the presence of machines, and peasant stubbornness in the face of change, have been partly overcome by means of vast propagandas which were intended to develop self-assurance in the presence of machinery, and pride in its proper use.

Such transformations are not necessarily connected with "dictatorship." There is no Magnitogorsk in fact or in plan in Hungary, Roumania or Jugoslavia. And it may be remembered that millions of European peasants were adapted to machines in the United States and in other democracies.

The new governments of Italy and Germany rank somewhere between the U.S.S.R. and the Danubian dictatorships in tempo of novel change. They have used propaganda rather more to change speech habits than to induce new overt acts.

It is notorious that propaganda thrives where overt dissent flourishes. Effective contradiction is a matter of intensity of impulse and access to means of communication. The possibility of such contradiction varies enormously from time to time and place to place under both democratic and dictatorial conditions. Only factions within the Communist Party may voice dissent in the U.S.S.R. but several parties remain active in Hungary or Roumania.

The possibility of exact comparison depends upon such data as the per capita distribution of propagandists, the proportion of the national income devoted to propaganda, and the hours per capita of exposure to propaganda.<sup>3</sup>

### *The Instruments of Propaganda*

Since several dictatorships have tried to centralize propaganda in the hands of the government, the problems connected with central agencies have been acute. We may expect to learn of several ingenious methods whereby originality has been conciliated with discipline.

The Soviet Union has been particularly aware of the dangers of "bureaucratism." The importance of inviting criticism has been repeatedly

<sup>3</sup> See my "Research on the Distribution of Symbol Specialists," *Journalism Quarterly*, XII, 146-56 (June, 1935).

stated. The key symbols of the new régime are sacrosanct, and party decisions may not be disputed by organized factions. But within these uncertain and varying limits, there has been a rather broad field for the exercise of criticism by the rank and file. The responsible heads of radio, cinema and other agencies are peppered with complaints and suggestions which emanate from party, factory, and peasant group.

It has proved to be no simple task to interpret the explicit criticisms aimed against particular media. A new idea first grows stale to the intellectuals of the main urban centers. They have the widest range of comparison, the most cultivated taste, and the greatest pride in original forms of expression. Long before the factory workers lost interest in the "battle of the tractors," the intellectuals were sick and tired of the moving pictures on the subject. The workers in the lesser centers, and ultimately the peasants, joined the wave of discontent.

The obsolescence rates of symbols and styles vary greatly throughout the length and breadth of any nation. In the Soviet Union the population includes many primitive people whose reactions are very hard to understand. One illuminating, though highly exceptional, incident will make this plain. The cinema department lost track of a film which had been sent to a Siberian address. It was finally discovered that the film was in a remote village, inhabited by people of a very primitive culture, who had made a practice of attending the same film every evening for three successive years. The "civilized mentality" finds it difficult to see why the film should appeal to this particular "primitive mentality"; the Soviet government solicited the cooperation of ethnologists in the hope of solving such apparent aberrations.<sup>4</sup> Even among the peasants, as distinguished from the tribesmen, mistakes are made. One poster which was part of a campaign against rich peasants showed a *kulak* who was being swept away with a broom. The upper half of the background was white, and the peasants in some villages thought this poster meant that whitewashing time had come.

The judgment of any central agency can be guided to some extent by the systematic analysis of indirect, as well as direct, expressions of attitude. Campaigns can be conducted in comparable factories, and the slogans, channels and staff rotated in order to appraise their net effect on output. Films can be shown to experimental subjects whose physiological changes are accurately recorded. By recording involuntary mus-

<sup>4</sup> Students of Bogoras have been particularly important. The observations contained in this chapter are based on inquiries made in Moscow and Leningrad. Thanks are hereby tendered to the Social Science Research Committee of the University of Chicago which gave material aid to my investigations abroad.

cular contractions it is possible to estimate the amount of excitement which is induced by the pictures.<sup>5</sup>

The problem of handling centralized agencies of propaganda, then, is one which can be studied to special advantage in dictatorships. The investigator may be less richly rewarded by his study of the use of symbols and channels. There will, of course, be many admirable instances of the adaptation of new styles to old forms, such as the poster art of the Russian revolution (which was heavily influenced in composition, design, and color-choice by the older ikon art), or the papier-mâché grotesques, so effectively employed in public places to caricature the drunken priest, the leering capitalist, the militant Japanese, the irresponsible worker, the scheming kulak (the technique stems from the carnival art of prerevolutionary times).

Whether novel use can be made of media depends in large part upon the fundamental novelty of the guiding conceptions of the ruling few. This is convincingly shown in the contrast between the museums of Italy and Germany, and the museums of the new Russia. In Germany the galleries have been purged of many examples of "cultural bolshevism," and prominence has been given to paintings which depict the lives of approved "leaders" during the "heroic" epochs of German history. In Russia the transformation is a profound rearrangement and no simple substitution. Galleries of modern art are intended to depict the basic theory of social change, a theory which has been dogmatized for political purposes. Exhibits are arranged, labelled, and discussed in terms of the materialistic interpretation of history. Hence the art of the nobility in the middle of the nineteenth century is presented as the art of a declining social formation. There is much sympathy with the unhappy lot of the peasant. Children are depicted in the act of drawing heavy loads through the snow. Priests are held up to derision and scorn as sodden oppressors of the peasant. Such art is not abstract, but realistic, and the composition is not mathematical, but approximate. While this feudal art was being painted, the rising bourgeoisie preferred to imitate the grand style of the feudal monarchy. A collection of such work shows sentimental blues, "classical" allusions, and idyllic versions of peasant life. The later art of the bourgeoisie passes through impressionism to abstractionism, and these developments are shown in relation

<sup>5</sup> The procedure was devised by A. R. Luria. For literature in the field of measurement see Part VI of *Propaganda and Promotional Activities: An Annotated Bibliography* (University of Minnesota Press, 1935), by Lasswell, Casey and Smith. A recent discussion is Herman C. Beyle, "Determining the Effect of Propaganda Campaigns," *Annals* (May 1935), in the special issue on "Pressure Groups and Propaganda" edited by Harwood L. Childs.

to the shifting correlation of power relationships in Russian and world society.

All this is rich in intellectual ingenuity, and is far removed from the simple transpositionism of the Italian and German galleries. Such creativeness has not been evenly spread among the several media of expression in the Soviet Union; nor has it been wholly absent from all media elsewhere. It is worth trying to understand which factors have stimulated, and which have retarded, such localized bursts of inventiveness. In the Soviet Union the museums were happy hunting grounds for the intellectuals who carried most of the new ideology. Elsewhere they ran afoul of the ideological legacies of the old régime. The masses gave up the galleries without a struggle because they didn't care much about them. But in the realm of music and architecture public taste had long idealized the romantic Italian operas and the flamboyant pre-revolutionary edifices. With great reluctance the intellectuals receded before the conservatism of the masses, consoling themselves with the thought that the fustian of today will be superseded by the authentic proletarian art of tomorrow, when the altered material basis of life will have prepared the seedbed for creative growth.

Symbols and channels have been adapted with varying success to the changing requirements of the preparation for power, the seizure of power, and the retention of power. During crises connected with the seizure of power the media utilized are those which are least subject to interference by authority, and best adapted to the agitational expediences of the moment. Posters, speeches, demonstrations, leaflets, pamphlets and newspapers are typical modern channels. After the seizure of power comes control of schools, radio and related agencies. The slogans which were used to exploit the active moods of the mass give way to slogans emphasizing obedience, discipline, responsibility, moderation, and loyalty to the state. Professional systematizers organize the catchwords of agitational days into rational schemes. Sometimes, as in Italy and Germany, this proves to be rationality in defense of the importance of the non-rational. Hairs begin to be split to end hair-splitting.

Where the preparations for seizing power have matured through many decades, the output of systematic symbols may be high. The intellectual texture of the socialist movement led Lenin, at the very crest of the revolutionary wave, to compose *State and Revolution*. In July he wrote confidentially to Kamenev asking him to see to it that his little blue notebook was published, "if they bump me off."<sup>6</sup>

<sup>6</sup> Leon Trotsky, *History of the Russian Revolution*, III, 126 (New York, 1932).

The more successful propagandas will show how it is possible to obtain the neat coordination of censorship, information, violence and policy. Hitler is now generally credited with great skill in coordinating word and deed. Often this relationship has been inverse rather than direct. Thus he has been adept in the art of reassuring public speech while devastating acts were being directed against his rivals (parties, unions, publishing houses, youth organizations). His enemies often fell out among themselves because they were lulled into underestimating his influence.

One of the most interesting problems connected with propaganda and policy, not only under dictatorship, is the direct or inverse connection between words and deeds. Substantial concessions to the "right" are often couched in the rhetoric of the "left," and the policy of a minority may be adopted in the wrappings of a new vocabulary.

### *Catharsis and Readjustment*

The functions of propaganda may be divided into catharsis and readjustment. By *catharsis* is meant the discharge of tension with a minimum of change in overt relationships. By *readjustment* is meant the removal of the symbolic or material sources of insecurity. Since politics derives its vitality from the displacement of private affects upon public symbols, political life at all times and places offers some catharsis for private insecurities.<sup>7</sup> It is notorious that electoral and reform agitations have often cast hundreds of laws onto the legislative beach, there to languish as the tide of popular interest recedes. Where dictatorships have arisen in some crisis of external humiliation and economic adversity, propaganda may provide symbolic substitutes for bread in collective gestures of defiance and self-adulation.

When the collective energies of the community have been kept in strict control, repressed impulses may find harmless release in propaganda. After the colossal strain of the first Five Year Plan, Mickey Mouse invaded the Soviet Union, cinema directors got busy in pursuit of proletarian comedies, and more candid concessions were made to surviving desires for the "fripperies" of the feudal-bourgeois world. The task of propaganda was to distract and divert rather than to incite the proletariat.

When steaming insecurities are too much for the spout of catharsis, propaganda intensifies rather than relieves the situation. Propaganda answers propaganda; frustration begets insecurity; insecurity seeks

<sup>7</sup>The formulation used in my *Psychopathology and Politics* (Chicago, 1930).

release in propaganda plus violence; and the dialectic of social development moves from one form of encounter to another. Modern social development has nurtured insecurity by undermining ancient loyalties, and possibly the chief meaning of the present epoch in world affairs is the struggle to relieve crises of insecurity by means of symbolic fundamentalism imposed by violence. Hence the truculence of proletarian socialism in the presence of surviving vestiges of monarchism, clericalism and capitalism; hence the urge to dissolve all lesser loyalties on behalf of one overmastering loyalty.

The symbolic contradictions which contribute to insecurity are deeply grounded in the fact of contrasting human experiences. An expanding division of labor, by creating new life situations, multiplies the foci of attention and the targets of sentiment. Objective differences nurture symbolic differences. Hence the problem of insecurity is not met by the simple prescription of psychic unity. The task is to find the symbols which, in point of fact, elicit the overt acts capable of widening and deepening popular faith in a common body of symbols.

The materialistic and capitalistic way of life, with its emphasis upon material income as a value, was more firmly entrenched in Italy and Germany than in Russia. In bourgeois societies the ideology of service and the practice of profit-seeking generate much psychic conflict. Youths are reared with a double standard of morality, with one set of words emphasizing service, and another success. The standards of service are left vague, but the standard of profits as the way to success is evident.

The leaders of the Soviet Union expect to abolish much psychic distress by the abolition of profit-seeking in private business. Success now means service in the hierarchy of the socialist state in the building of a socialist society. The problem here is whether new contradictions will supersede the old. Will the margins of difference, though absolutely less, become relatively more significant? Will the surviving differences in material situations generate ineradicable obstacles to the attainment of the program?

Whatever the answer may be in the long run for the Soviet Union, the inner difficulties of some of the non-socialized states are visibly acute. In Germany and Italy where the aristocracy and the upper bourgeoisie have been permitted to survive, it is hoped that it will be possible to minimize the importance of "material" values by enhancing "collective" values. The most accessible values are patriotism and fighting. Hence Italy and Germany are peculiarly dependent upon indoctrination and drill.

Will it be possible by bellicose propaganda to distract the attention of the young and of the less advantaged from the special privileges of the aristocracy and the major industrialists? Or will it be necessary to liquidate these objective material differences? There is no mystery about the technique of annihilating enemies piecemeal. It would be possible to discover "Jewish" and other taints in individual manufacturing plants and in specific companies. Thus without the risk of head-on collision with industry as an embattled whole, the objective could be reached. It is evident that the chief limitation upon this program is the close connection between the officers' corps and the older social formations. Japan, however, has given some evidence of the impetuous vigor with which younger officers may use patriotic propaganda against the bourgeoisie; although their aggressions have thus far been diverted outward against China.

In the light of the foregoing analysis we may propose the hypothesis that the obsolescence rate of slogans is particularly great in partly socialized states. Such states would be more reluctant to encourage mass criticism than more completely socialized states. Such states would tend to diminish the intellectual quality of their propaganda, and to substitute drill, ceremony and ritual for diversity and initiative. Among such states would appear the greatest urge to go beyond propaganda and crude violence to the perfecting of physiological and other devices of control which modern science has made available; as witness the German sterilization campaign.

### *World Political Development*

Propaganda has been treated thus far as a variable among social variables. This equilibrium pattern of thought may be supplemented by the developmental mode of analysis, which construes the rôle of particular events in facilitating or retarding changes in significant political relationships. What was the specific function of propaganda in spreading, and in restricting, the revolutionary movement which succeeded in Russia in 1917?

Little more can be done in the limitations of a few pages than to show what is involved in such research. If we are to bring into high relief the facts about the fate of the revolutionary initiative of 1917, it is first necessary to characterize the symbols and the practices which were part of



the pattern. Some of the positively sentimentalized words (plus words) were:

|           |                  |
|-----------|------------------|
| republic  | proletariat      |
| soviet    | world revolution |
| socialist | communism        |

Some of the negatively sentimentalized words (minus words) were:

|             |                          |
|-------------|--------------------------|
| monarchy    | imperialism              |
| religion    | parliamentarism          |
| bourgeoisie | bourgeois liberalism and |
| capitalism  | democracy                |

A few of the practices, not all of which were inaugurated at the start, were:

governmentalization  
 equalization of money income  
 monopolization of legality by a single party

Total diffusion of the original pattern would unite the world within the U.S.S.R. But previous revolutionary patterns have not attained world hegemony. It will be remembered that the men of France who seized the power in the name of all humanity (liberty, fraternity, equality) were not accepted by all mankind. They were blocked through the play of the world balance of power. In one sense of the word, however, the world revolution did succeed, for many of its characteristic symbols and practices were adopted elsewhere during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Evidently we have to do with a complicated double process of restriction and diffusion. If we are to locate ourselves in the United States with reference to the total movement, we must collect the data necessary to obtain the proper perspective. If we are to appraise the rôle of propaganda, and especially the propaganda in dictatorships, with reference to the march of time, we must devise ways and means of rendering these processes visible.

By intersecting the stream of events at periodic intervals, and noticing the geographical distribution of the selected pattern, we may clear our minds of many vague impressions, and guide our attention to significant situations.

By adopting fairly wide intervals of time, we may keep perspective over the total context, and prevent ourselves from being swamped by the sheer bulk of available knowledge. Perhaps it would prove useful to experiment with cross-sections made every five years in the hope of maintaining a nice balance between context and detail. Hence we can choose 1917, 1922, 1927, 1932. Were we to trace the vicissitudes of the

French revolutionary pattern, the historical sources are sufficiently rich during the past century and a half to justify the extension backward of the five-year scheme. In more remote epochs it would be necessary to use much longer intervals. There is nothing hard and fast about the five-year cross-section, and many purposes can be furthered by longer or shorter sections. The concurrent application by many scholars of this method of arranging data would provide us with political atlases more explicitly adapted to the requirements of analysis than those which are now available.

At any given cross-section the data will show the existing state of diffusion and restriction. Such relationships may be classified as follows:<sup>8</sup>

Total diffusion

Restriction by geographical differentiation

Restriction by partial incorporation

Restriction by functional differentiation

Subject to a reservation to be made presently, incorporation within the U.S.S.R. indicates the successful diffusion of the world revolutionary pattern. It is clear that the Soviet Union has made little territorial progress since the end of the period of civil war and intervention. This means that the processes of restriction are particularly important, and that much of the responsibility for this can probably be traced to successful combinations of propaganda with violence. The symbolic defense against the bearers of the revolutionary pattern proceeded, in part, by stressing the local, that is to say, the Russian, character of the revolution. This was accompanied by fervent appeals to local patriotism, nationalism, and nationality, designed to incite the masses against the foreign foe. Wherever communist revolutions failed, or were indefinitely postponed, the symbols connected with the communism of the Third International tended to lose prestige. As a rule they were supplanted by nationalistic symbols.

The success of those who spoke in the name of the proletariat in Russia was no unmixed pleasure to those who spoke in the name of the proletariat in other countries. Germany, for example, lost the distinction which it had so long enjoyed as the heir of Marx. In all countries those who were connected with socialist parties, trade unions, and other working class organizations were put in very exposed positions. If they associated themselves with an avowed enemy of their own state, the resentment of the middle classes would be stirred against them by the upper

<sup>8</sup> These distinctions were drawn in my *World Politics and Personal Insecurity* (New York, 1935), Chap. 1.

bourgeoisie and by the aristocracy. If they failed to adopt militant revolutionary action in explicit support of the first proletarian state, they would become discredited by impatient groups who would ambush them from the rear. Under these circumstances the bearers of the following symbol formations fought bitterly with one another:<sup>9</sup>

Communist (Third International affiliations)

Socialist (Second International)

National Socialist (no foreign affiliations)

National Communist (no foreign affiliations)

Labor (with foreign affiliations)

National Labor (no foreign affiliations)

It was in Germany, of course, that these contradictions have been expressed in the most acrid propaganda, and culminated in the most massive movement of readjustment beyond the boundaries of the Soviet Union. But the same processes can be followed over the world.

Another restrictive process incorporated some of the symbols and practices of the latest revolutionary model. Sometimes this involved the sentimentalizing of a symbol which was already present, as in the use of words like "socialism," "working class" or "proletariat" in the agitational vocabulary of movements of the type led by Adolf Hitler. Differentiation was secured by the use of "German," "National," "Non-Marxist," "Non-Jewish," and similar expressions.

The details of the revolutionary pattern which were most quickly paralleled abroad were the least novel ones. The overthrow of the Tsar was in the tradition of the bourgeois revolutions. The comparative fate of "monarchies" and "republics" is depicted in the following tabulation. The data for 1917 show the situation prior to the revolutionary innovations of that year. Otherwise the situation is shown as it was by the end of the year in question.

| <i>Year</i> | <i>Monarchies</i> | <i>%</i> | <i>Republics</i> | <i>%</i> |
|-------------|-------------------|----------|------------------|----------|
| 1917        | 30                | 52       | 26               | 48       |
| 1922        | 26                | 42       | 36               | 58       |
| 1927        | 25                | 40       | 38               | 60       |
| 1932        | 27                | 42       | 38               | 58       |

<sup>9</sup> Excellent background material is in Lewis L. Lorwin, *Labor and Internationalism* (New York, 1929).

The spread of "republics" is emphasized when "monarchies" and "republics" are classified according to population:

| <i>Year</i> | <i>Population of<br/>Monarchies<br/>(in millions)</i> | <i>%</i> | <i>Population of<br/>Republics<br/>(in millions)</i> | <i>%</i>         |
|-------------|---|----------|--|------------------|
| 1917        | 910   | 62       | 563  | 38               |
| 1922        | 631   | 40       | 945  | 60               |
| 1927        | 631   | 39       | 996  | 61               |
| 1932        | 671   | 39       | 1,061  | 61 <sup>10</sup> |

Present data are not sufficiently dependable to chart the exact spread of important items in the pattern of 1917. No doubt the facts will, when properly assembled, confirm the interpretation that the "governmentalization" of human affairs has waxed rather than waned (if some allowance is made for the emergency measures which were invoked during the World War). Even in the United States civil emergencies are met by vast expansions of governmental authority. Through the Reconstruction Finance Corporation the government has extended its control over financial, commercial and industrial institutions. Through the Tennessee Valley Authority the government has entered into competition with the private utility companies.

In all probability the data ultimately to be assembled will disclose a general, though unsteady, movement toward the "equalization" of money income. This was obvious enough when large estates were broken up in several eastern European countries at the end of the World War. Higher income and inheritance taxes have fostered the same tendency, although this is offset by higher levies on articles of general consumption. At present, "Share the Wealth" programs have become practical politics even in the United States.

By 1932 the "monopolization" of legality by a single party was found beyond the corners of the Soviet Union in such countries as Italy, and in less evolved form in China, Turkey, and Yugoslavia. By 1933 the pattern had broken through in Germany.

These forms of geographical differentiation and of partial incorporation are supplemented by a functional form of differentiation. A turning point in the history of world politics was reached when it became common to refer to the French Revolution as the "bourgeois" revolution.

<sup>10</sup> Data compiled from such standard sources as *The Statesman's Yearbook* and the *Political Handbook of the World*. Population figures are for the year nearest the year mentioned. With the exception of China, the largest figure was chosen when data conflicted. Arabi Saudi and Iraq are included for the first time in 1932. In general, colonial countries were excluded.

The language which had been used by the original revolutionary élite of France was universalist in scope. It was now implied, and positively asserted, that a special class had used the name of the many to profit the few. A symbolic differentiation of this character strikes at the basic claim of the revolutionary order, challenging the dominant myth, and seeking to expose its fraudulent pretensions. Such functional distinctions are not bound to one spot. They are communicable across parochial barriers and are used to organize hostility against the revolutionary ideology wherever it is found. The alternative to the "bourgeois" was clearly the "proletariat," in the terminology of the nineteenth century. A new formative myth had been set loose in the world, gathering loyalty from successive pulsations of discontent, and culminating finally when the bearers of its phraseology made their appearance in the seats of power.

But was this a true "proletarian" revolution? Did the class consequences of the revolution benefit the whole proletariat as much as it contributed to the rise of certain other class formations? Perhaps, as some anarcho-syndicalists have suggested, the lower layers of the manual workers, especially the unemployed, can have their hostilities directed against the "intellectuals" and the "bureaucrats" who run the socialist state.<sup>11</sup> Perhaps the revolution of 1917 was the "Second Bourgeois Revolution," marking the rise to power of the "intellectuals," who successfully allied themselves with the manual toilers in their common struggle against the aristocracy and the plutocracy. Once established in power, they give special privileges to special skill,<sup>12</sup> and manage the key posts in the party and the administration. Deference, and higher money incomes, are thus acquired by those who perform no manual work. Indeed, it may be possible to interpret the whole of recent history in such terms, and to suggest that Russian communism, Italian fascism, and German national socialism are common and seemingly incompatible expressions of the same basic process by which all power goes to the lesser bourgeoisie. In this perspective American "New Dealism" would become intelligible.

It is too early to be sure that propagandas which are directed against "bureaucracy" in the name of the toiling masses will gain resonance with the passage of the years. But it is worth noting that the struggle of Trotsky against Stalin may have this historical significance. The anti-intellectualism and the anti-governmentalism of the anarcho-syndicalists are already organized carriers of this line of attack.

<sup>11</sup> Consult Max Nomad, *Rebels and Renegades* (New York, 1932).

<sup>12</sup> See my discussion of "The Moral Vocation of the Middle-Income Skill Group," *International Journal of Ethics*, XLV, 127-37.

In this connection it is also relevant to observe that world revolutionary movements are liquidated from within, as well as from without. Restrictive processes are constantly at work in the home of the revolution. When the bearers of the new pattern seize the power, they are surrounded by hostile élites throughout the world. Their own survival depends upon their relationship to the external as well as the internal balance of power. A favorable position in the world-balancing process depends upon the division of one's rivals into hostile camps, which involves tacit or overt cooperation with states of alien social structure. Hence it becomes expedient to discourage revolutionary propaganda on the territory of a power from whom loans or diplomatic support is required.

Thus do objective necessities connected with the balance of power contend with the impetuous demands of the original ideology. "It seems clear," wrote Michael T. Florinsky, commenting on some recent developments, "that in spite of all the revolutionary phraseology of its Program and Resolutions the Comintern had itself largely degenerated, or grown, from the militant and uncompromising general staff of a world revolution into an international organization for the defense of the U.S.S.R."<sup>13</sup>

Hence it appears that one of the chief functions of propaganda in the hands of revolutionary dictatorships is to conceal the renunciation of its revolutionary rôle from those who would be disaffected by this discovery. It is still convenient for the Soviet Union to maintain the appearance of revolution, in order to organize backfires of discontent against diplomatic enemies. When there is trouble with Great Britain, agitation can increase in India, as the "colonial and half-colonial peoples" are incited to rise against their "imperialistic masters." When economic and diplomatic aid is sought, the faucet of propaganda can be turned off on order from the Moscow headquarters of the Third International. But this is, in the long run, a precarious game, and exposes the Soviet régime to constant criticism for "hypocritical" evasions and the abandonment of its professed function as the militant vanguard of the oppressed.

Such are the darts which are thrown against the new edifice through the propaganda of dissenting fundamentalists who feel unable to relinquish the thesis of "permanent revolution" and who believe that the interests of the world proletariat are being betrayed for the sake of patriotism to the Russian state. The "left wingers" of one revolution may once more prove to be the advance guard of the next revolutionary surge.

<sup>13</sup> *World Revolution and the U.S.S.R.* (New York, 1933), p. 208.

But new symbols of differentiation may be successfully implanted by modern propaganda, in proper coordination with other methods of control. Can it be possible to divide men on "physiological" lines by sentimentalizing symbols whose ostensible reference is biological? Can imperialistic syndicates of "Aryans" (divorced to some extent from "geographical" connotations) maintain their internal cohesiveness at the expense of the "Non-Aryans"?

The several processes of spread and limitation which have been passed in summary pre-view in this chapter can be most easily appraised when the march of time is kept in mind. The data can be arranged at periodic intervals, and the spatial distributions carefully shown. By keeping an image of the total context at hand, it will be possible to avoid exaggerated impressions of the relative significance of individual details. There is, of course, some exaggeration implied in the very act of choosing any given year as an important turning point in history. To some extent this overemphasis must be corrected without sinking in a bog of minutiae, where all sense of direction is lost.

The cross-sectional mode of arranging data keeps the individual episode in proper relationship to the whole, and guides the attention of the investigator to the choice of important problems. Sound analysis consists not only in the working of technical tricks but in the choice of meaningful problems. The areas of rapid diffusion and restriction of the traits which are singled out for attention can be exposed by the method which has just been outlined. The data will be directly relevant to certain theories of political equilibrium. The centers of greatest change, for instance, may prove to be those whose dominant symbols and practices were discredited by defeat in war (Russia), by defeat in diplomacy (Italy), or by economic adversity (Germany). We may also propose the hypothesis that the centers of greatest change will be found in countries whose social structure bears the closest resemblance to the social structure which was superseded by the newest revolutionary élite. It would be consistent with this hypothesis to observe that the post-1917 crises were more acute in states like Hungary than in states like France, for in France estates were already subdivided, and the monarchical system was liquidated.

For the sake of discovering more refined orders of connection between symbol and condition, research energy can advantageously be directed to specific situations, whose importance is evident on the basis of developmental and equilibrium conceptions. Through this configurative method<sup>14</sup> of thinking, we may hope to discern more clearly the factors

<sup>14</sup> Stated in *World Politics and Personal Insecurity*, Chap. 1.

which affect the volume, the instruments, and the functions of propaganda, including the place of propaganda in furthering, or in retarding, the succession of forms of political dominance.<sup>15</sup>

<sup>15</sup> See Georg Lukács, *Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein: Studien über Marxistische Dialektik* (Berlin, 1923), concluding chapter, which provides a dialectical analysis of the problem of propaganda. For a nondialectical examination of tactical questions, see Charles E. Merriam, *Political Power* (New York, 1934).





## VI

# PROPAGANDA AS A FUNCTION OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT



## VI

# PROPAGANDA AS A FUNCTION OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT

GEORGE E. GORDON CATLIN

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## I

SINCE the beginning of the twentieth century, in most of the countries of Europe, an entirely new conception of government has come to prevail, such as would have appeared inconceivable to Jefferson or to Gladstone. This change is not merely that from the police state to the welfare state, upon which Dr. Delisle Burns lays stress, although it is not unconnected with this alteration of outlook. It is a change from the view of the state as an instrument, but a limited instrument, to the view of the state as a treasury of values and as the vindicator of a faith.

To say that this conception is new is not to say that it has no history. The executive clause of Plato's *Republic* deals with the Platonic myth—"the genuine lie"—and its inculcation. The Catholic Church, which is still (apart from Soviet Russia) the greatest Platonic institution in history, has always regarded itself as the guardian of absolute values which it is its duty to induce secular princes and republics to aid in realizing. That persuasion, during a millennium of history, was singularly cogent. More recently Leo XIII declared, in the encyclical *Immortale Dei*: "that liberty is truly genuine which, in regard to the individual, does not allow men to be the slaves of error [for Catholics] or of passion." The same philosophy inspired the criticism of liberalism in the Syllabus of Pius IX. Its negation appeared to be the negation of values themselves—an indifferentism propaedeutic to moral nihilism. It is relevant to note that one of the earliest official institutions of propaganda is the Propaganda Fidei, at Rome. The propagandist is a missionary.

When the Pope at Rome was replaced, during the Protestant Reformation, by pinchbeck popes on the thrones of northern Europe, the responsibility, not only for aiding in the enforcement, but for judging and establishing the criterion of good morals and sound living came to rest with these Davids, godly princes, the Lord's anointed. In the words of Hobbes these men were "God's lieutenants." As King James I said: "As it is atheism and blasphemy to dispute what God can do . . . so it is presumption and high contempt in a subject to dispute what a King can do, or to say a King cannot do this or that."

By a readily understandable transition of thought, the states, ruled by God's lieutenants, made the invisible Almighty *causa remota* of their actions, and became themselves "thy mortal god on earth, Leviathan." The propagandist became the royal official, armed with the coercive powers of government and charged with the mundane supervision of the affairs of the church and state.

The progressive benevolent despots of the eighteenth century may have been great intellectual sceptics, but they were also great autocrats. They entertained the opinion of Voltaire that it is "better to be ruled by one lion of a royal house than tripped up by a hundred subaltern tigers." They proposed to be the lions. Because they believed in "free thought" for themselves, emphatically it did not follow that they believed in freedom of practice, in morality and the ways of living, for others. They proposed to regulate the manner of life of their subjects for their good—none more than the most progressive of them, Joseph II and Frederick II. Their ideal was that of a society, orderly, disciplined, Prussian. The prince benevolently instructed his massed subjects in their good. If they resisted, then, in the words of Halifax, they learned that often "men, to be well governed, must be scurvily used."

The epoch, then, from Jefferson to the Great War constitutes a strange interlude in the unfolding history of authoritarianism. The "new conception" of Government, as called upon to inculcate a specific philosophy of life in the subject of the state, is indeed new only from a limited historical point of view. It is an old conception; what are new are the instruments for its fulfilment.

The state universities and state-controlled schools have largely replaced the old clerical universities and church schools. The two-century-old fight for the freedom of the press has ended in the control of the radio in most countries being handed over, without serious discussion, either to the government or to monopoly companies whose directors are government nominees.

Restraint is placed on the cinema by the policy, customary in Europe, of national quotas, as well as by direct censorship. It will be noted that, whether for the awakening of emotion or for the distribution of news, the spoken and visual message of the radio and cinema are, in times of national crisis, far more effective than the press. In the general strike in England of 1926, the press, but not the radio, almost entirely ceased to function. In Russia the molding of opinion is largely by radio, broadcasting through loud-speakers in the public squares. In Turkey a genius—Mustapha Kemal—has hit upon the ingenious and highly successful device, for eliminating class, religious and racial divisions, of insisting under penalty of heavy fine, upon uniformity of dress—as it were, to Mr. Charles Evans Hughes, in the daytime, a cap, and to Mr. Eugene Debs, at night, a compulsory “Tuxedo.”

In the light of the past, it is not surprising that, in the case of four out of the seven Great Powers of the modern world, censorship has been re-established and the freedom of the press has itself been abandoned. Specious reasons for this course are not difficult to find. Signor Mussolini, discussing the censorship of foreign press dispatches, has used the argument: “Find me an editor who allows his staff to write what they like and my censorship will cease to edit the dispatches sent out for that paper.” There is, however, a substantial reason. A state that considers itself the authoritative guardian of an absolute morality has, not only a right, but a duty negatively to exercise a censorship and positively to forward a propaganda designed to control opinion.

## II

“Propaganda” is a word that may have a large gamut of meaning. By propaganda is here meant the mental instillation by any appropriate means, emotional or intellectual, of certain views. As a matter of political practice propaganda assumes various forms that admit of sufficiently precise distinction.

The instillation of views may be animated by no strong sense of moral or political urgency. It may amount to little more than the distribution of information, public acquaintance with which is advantageous to the institution concerned. Departmental information, distributed through press bureaux, comes under this heading. It seems to be obnoxious to no reasonable objection and, if advantageous to the departments that maintain these bureaux, it nevertheless seems to be entirely in the public interest. It increases publicity in affairs of government. Such propaganda is a legitimate function of any government, although the confines of delicacy may appear to be reached when, in Great Britain, a year before

a General election, the party organizations interested are encouraged to advertise, on the billboards, the advantages conferred by the National Government.

The interested motive behind propaganda becomes more clear when we reach the case of propaganda bureaux designed to push trade. However, the work, for example, of the late British Empire Marketing Board must presumably be held to be in accordance with British public policy. Advertising is propaganda, and there is no clear reason why states may not indulge in forms of collective advertisement. All advertisements of "Tourismo" are of this nature.

The commodity "pushed" by propaganda need not necessarily be a mere "low concern," "of pepper and coffee, calico or tobacco." It may be found to be politically advantageous to push certain cultural notions, as for example in French schools abroad. This latter meaning reaches its most complete expression where the agency is one for the dissemination of a faith, as in the classic instance of the Catholic Propaganda Fidei. Propaganda here begins to assume its full form as the deliberate spread of an ideology rendered persuasive, not only by reason but by emotion. The emotional element becomes more emphatic when one passes over to the less disinterested manifestations of propaganda such as party propaganda and nationalist propaganda, domestic and especially foreign, particularly in war time.

Finally, the intellectual and doctrinal element falls into the background where it is proposed to inculcate the particular myth, not only by means of rational persuasion, but to supplement appeals to positive emotion by appeals to fear and by the threat of coercion. That threat is, above all, effective where the state is the agency that exercises, with its immense resources, this coercion.

Propaganda in the sense of the pushing of the views of a party, has, for a century, been recognized as legitimate in a democracy. Despite condemnations that stretch from the days of Halifax and Bolingbroke to those of Washington and John Marshall, and which include Oliver Goldsmith's censure of Burke as a party man, the avowed party system has come to be recognized as appropriate, and indeed indispensable, in the working of parliamentary or congressional democratic government. The utilitarian interpretation of democracy is frankly that of an adjustment of interests, in which everyone is entitled to present, as forcibly as he morally and legitimately may, his own view and policy. "Lobbies" and "pressure groups" may merit study, as among the most dangerous elements in the working of democracy. This is, however, not by reason

of the fact of their propaganda, but because of the corrupt and illicit method of it.

The position is, on principle, entirely different where the government itself, through some Ministry of Culture and Propaganda, inculcates its own authoritative point of view, using the instruments of compulsory education and of police coercion. Thus the National Socialist Reichstatthalter of Thuringia, in June, 1931, declared: "In the future, in Thuringia, there must be one political faith only. . . . The Nazis claim the right to be intolerant in view of the necessity for uniform thinking and acting in the nation as a whole."

The most formidable of all "pressure groups" is a single party, in possession of the coercive instruments of government and ruling to the exclusion of any other party. The objectionable element here, it will be noted, is not propaganda but the conjunction of propaganda with the governmental attributes of force and monopoly. It may, however, be urged that there is nothing inherently objectionable in compulsory education in state schools or in the inculcation there of specific views on history and civics. It is clear that we are here approaching what is, from the liberal point of view, the marginal case.

The propaganda work of a missionary society, provided that the state ensures that all types of opinion are heard, is one matter. Propaganda work, where the missionary society is the government (and a government determined to inculcate its own propaganda first), is a very different matter. The distinction between the functions appropriate to a voluntary society, resting on choice and not armed with coercive powers, and those appropriate to a state, armed with coercive powers and whose subjects are automatically such by birth, is one of the cardinal distinctions in political theory.

The issue whether propaganda ought to be a function of government is clearly not one that can be divorced from that of ultimate political philosophy. From the liberal standpoint, education in civics is tolerable if it is so taught as to arouse the critical and independent judgment—apart from the exceedingly few cases where there is universal consensus. From the authoritarian standpoint, such hesitant teaching is ineffective and needs to be replaced by a more robust affirmation of settled values.

In the one case, training in civic values will not exceed the point of explaining the experience of humanity; stressing the desire of honest men to push forward in those directions most likely to be successful in promoting human happiness; and training the judgment to judge values by an acquaintance with admitted masters of thought.



In the other case, judgment and initiative may be trained, but only so far as they can be brought to accord with values, established and known to the government and to the better people. The authoritarians agree with those whom Algernon Sidney castigated (in pages now seldom read) as holding that "the whole fabric of popular sedition would fall to the ground, if the principle of natural liberty were removed"—as it has been, Sidney continues, among "the base, effeminate Asiatics."

Even here, in the authoritarian view of propaganda, a distinction may be drawn between two views. It is possible to affirm that a specific philosophy—Islamic, Thomist, Marxist—is, for all relevant purposes, final. The government is not interested in empty intellectual speculation, and itself accepts from conviction a particular philosophy of life as absolute and final. Its acceptance is bound up with the continuation of the actual political system and constitution. All available instruments of propaganda will, without hesitation, be used for inculcating orthodoxy and eradicating suspect ideas—what, in Japan, are called "dangerous thoughts." Like the Jesuits one will especially demand the entire molding of the mind of the child in the earliest years. Hence the conflicts, in Germany and Italy, with the Catholic Church. Hence the organization, by Signor Mussolini, of the *Figlii dei Lupi*; and the production of the Russian Comsomol who is prepared, as an act of fanatical sacrifice, to report his own nearest relatives to the police.

There is, however, another attitude which, with a different philosophy, attains the same practical results. I do not accuse Dr. Goebbels of regarding the Nazi "blood-thinking" philosophy as one rounded and final. Rather I presume that Dr. Goebbels, as a practical politician in charge of propaganda, proposes to act as if it were final. Since no position is metaphysically final, the government of the day will treat that system as final which is bound up with the continuation in power of the government of the day. In Signor Mussolini's words: "When a group or party is in power, it is under an obligation to fortify itself and to defend itself against all." In Lenin's words, "he who gives up something voluntarily is 'worthy' of being deprived not only of his influence, but also of his right to exist." Every means of propaganda will, accordingly, be bent to this end under a system which has, as H. D. Lasswell has admirably termed it, "the expectation of violence."

This second attitude clearly makes propaganda an auxiliary of the politics of force. We do not, indeed, impose a despotism on men by force; but we compulsorily prepare their minds to accept the rule as benevolent. Other forms of rule also might be benevolent; but they will not be given the opportunity to be tried out. What matters, here, is

organization, not freedom. The experiment in process excludes all other experiments.

### III

The question obviously arises how far the use of the methods of propaganda is consistent with the principles of a democratic government. Their desirability, granted the principles of the authoritarian state, is obvious enough. How far are democratic methods and authoritarian methods inconsistent? That the two are not entirely inconsistent is apparent if we do but reflect that the post-war authoritarian state is the child, however monstrous, of nationalism and of democratic trust in democratic government. The maxims of Paine and the dictum of Robespierre that governments must always be supposed corruptible, have been rejected by the democratic movement itself.

Democracy is the system of government under which the executive and the majority of the legislature are, at regular intervals, elected by the majority of the citizens, or by the largest single group, and are accountable to it. In a politically free state, as understood in Anglo-Saxon countries, the body of the citizens is coincident with the body of the adult inhabitants—a thesis still rejected in France. Briefly, democracy is government by the majority of the people. All political power is, under this system, popularly accountable.

Democratic government is, then, distinct from the republican form of government, which may be government of the people by a section of the people. It is also distinct from popular government, which may be government of the people for the people, but is not necessarily by the people's majority, directly or indirectly.

Much contemporary government, including the Fascist and Communist forms, may be popular government (Communism makes a peculiar claim to be this), but it is not, in its present phase, democratic government. It is of the highest importance that this distinction should be clearly appreciated. Whether popular dictatorial government is a necessary stage in the realization of a democracy more adequate than bourgeois democracy, in an economically unequal society, is a different issue. Whether monarchical government, however popular, is consistent with adequate democracy is also a distinct issue. What is relevant to our subject is that there is no inherent reason, in government by the majority, why it should not use propaganda methods save so far as this in fact subverts governmental accountability, by preventing access by the electorate to those facts upon which alone an intelligent electoral judgment can be based. Herbert Spencer was logical enough in fearing

the authoritarian tendencies of a majority conscious of its power. The democratic objection, however, to the use of propaganda methods lies rather in another quarter.

Democracy has also, secondarily, been understood, since the days of the Greeks who invented the term, not only as a form of constitution but also as a form of the social structure, and hence of social life and common thought, appropriate to that constitution. Plato describes, with irony, democracy as an order of society where there is a marvelous free manner of living. In effect, Plato identifies the democratic way of life with that of the man who would be sceptical and disrespectful of the Platonic absolute ideas, values and standards. This Platonic discussion goes deeper than the formal Aristotelian division between the government of the many for the many and that of the many for the whole—however relevant this division may be to modern problems of class government and to the theory that government should be by the proletariat for the proletariat, a “rule unrestricted by law, based upon force, enjoying the sympathy and the support of the laboring and exploited masses” (Stalin). From the Platonic discussion it emerges that the democrat in spirit is a relativist.

This characterization of the democrat is borne out by any survey of history and especially of the history of political thought. Democracy meant for Pericles that “we have no black looks or angry words for our neighbor if he enjoys himself in his own way, and we abstain from the little acts of churlishness which, though they leave no mark, yet cause annoyance to whoso notes them.”

Democratic theory, also, in the lands where representative democracy has been most firmly established in modern times, has been, not accidentally but essentially, a theory of toleration. Only in France, which has followed the enthusiastic tradition of Rousseau, among the great democratic lands, can a significant exception be found to this rule. Even the Puritans, when most bigoted, deceived themselves into the belief that they were vindicating the freedom of the spirit, and talked the language of individual freedom.

The character of this democratic tradition is abundantly apparent in that excellent expression of the pure gospel of liberal democracy, John Stuart Mill's essay, *On Liberty*. It is apparent in the whole mood of Thomas Jefferson, and especially in his labor for religious toleration, which was one of the three works by which, “as testimonials that I have lived, I wish most to be remembered.”

The importance, nevertheless, of a mere essay, or even of the *obiter dicta* of a statesman, in determining the fundamental character of a

great and challenging philosophy of life and politics, may easily be exaggerated. It is, therefore, important to turn back to the systematic treatment of John Locke, who links his defense of Whiggery and representative government, at the very watershed of modern democracy, with an environmentalist theory of human character, tempered by a belief in the permanence of human nature, and with an elaborated theory of toleration. "You may say," writes Locke, "the magistrate is obliged by the law of nature to use force to promote the true religion; must he stand still and do nothing until he certainly knows which is the true religion? If so, the commission is lost, and he can never do his duty; for to the certain knowledge of the true religion he can, in this world, never arrive." The temper of the Lockians is the temper of the modern orthodox pragmatists in so far as they demand "an open world."

It is a temper very different from Hegelianism, with its return to pre-Kantian dogmatism. It is a temper very different from Marxism, which made Hegelianism turn a somersault into dialectical materialism, and from the mood of Lenin in his attack upon "Empirio-Criticism."

It is a temper very different from that of Dr. Goebbels, who declares that "National Socialism cannot be judged right in this and wrong in that respect. . . . As we, the National Socialists, are convinced that we are right, we cannot tolerate any other in our neighborhood who claims also to be right." It is even detectably different from the mood of Leon Trotsky, when he writes: "Our truth, of course, is not absolute. . . . But as in its name we are, at the present moment, shedding our blood, we have neither cause nor possibility to carry on a literary discussion as to the relativity of truth with those who 'criticize' us with the help of all forms of arms." Trotsky is, indeed, here writing of a revolution in progress, not of revolution under discussion or (as Locke and Jefferson) of a revolution experienced and lived through. Were he, however, to follow the mulatto pragmatism, advocated by Professor Sidney Hook, Trotsky would presumably reach the conclusion that Marxist truth was to be treated "as if" it were absolute, i.e. as a myth to be held *de fide*, until, and unless, by practical revolution it had been found to be unsuccessful. Many Catholic theologians have claimed no more for Catholic truth. It is not clear where such a Marxist as Professor Laski stands on this issue.

The attitude appropriate to these two different manners of life and climates of opinion, democratic and absolutist where issues of propaganda arise, must necessarily be sharply different. The use made of propaganda provides a sound practical test of which attitude is, in fact, adopted. It should be added that war—whether due to the anachronistic

continuation of sovereign states, or revolutionary war of an internecine order—is inconsistent with the democratic attitude. The declaration of war is invariably followed by the unrestricted use of the methods of governmental propaganda.

The fight between democracy and dictatorship is, briefly, a fight between the Lockian and the Hegelian philosophies; it is a fight between the pragmatic politics of experiment and political theologies, i.e., civil, religious and bureaucratic bigotries.

This anti-democratic thesis, that there is or must be one set of values, which the state is entitled to inculcate by any efficient means, is affirmed by Signor Gentile, in Italy. "Both Fascism and Nationalism regard the state as the foundation of all rights and the sources of all values for the individuals composing it." Even in Britain, the late Dr. Bosanquet came near to affirming a similar position, in his doctrine that the state, which provided the stuff of moral values for its citizens, is itself no part of any larger moral whole. Dr. Bosanquet merely omitted to make his doctrine effective by displaying the instruments by which the state could drive in the impress of common values. Approaching the issue from a refreshingly experimental standpoint, Stalin yet says: "We start from the premises that the party, the Communist Party, is the basic instrument of the dictatorship of the proletariat, that the leadership of *one* party, which does not share and cannot share this leadership with other parties, constitutes that fundamental condition without which a more or less lasting and developed dictatorship of the proletariat is inconceivable."

It will be observed that the adherents of National Socialism, of Fascism and of Marxist Communism quoted above are, in each instance, exponents of the one party system, i.e. of the system of the party as a "true Church," ruling the whole population. They hold that there are certain values, which either are absolute or are so urgent of acceptance that, for purposes of action, they may be treated as absolute.

The dilemma of democracy is that the democrat, as tolerant, must concede to these people the right to their own convictions. This issue arose in connection with Catholic emancipation and was settled in the affirmative. Even although the Catholic on principle, in accordance with doctrine affirmed as late as the Syllabus of Pius IX, did not tolerate, he must yet be tolerated. Further, the democrat must, in logic, concede that the man who believes himself to have been vouchsafed an acquaintance with absolute values is not only impelled, but has a duty, to attempt to bring others to accept those right and infallible standards. As Bentham says, "The fairest and openest of them all is that sort of man who speaks out and says, I am of the number of the Elect. . . . If,

therefore, a man wants to know what is right, and what is wrong, he has nothing to do but to come to me"—or (as we add, today) I will go after him. The "true believer" is under a duty to realize these values in society. He is under an obligation to use the available instruments of propaganda to assure acceptance of his views. It is not clear that, where the social weal is concerned, he is entitled, in imposing authority, to respect individual choice and caprice.

If one outlook on life is absolutely right, then others that depart from it are, *ipso facto*, wrong. If one party that has captured the spirit of this philosophy is absolutely right, then other parties are wrong, unpatriotic and treasonable. Moreover, the reasons for refraining from the use of force in implanting ideals are, in part, a doubt whether individuals will be advantaged by the coercive application of ideals. Where, however, an ideal is known absolutely and the question at issue is one exclusively of social action, it may cogently be argued that these restrictions do not apply. One party is entitled and has a duty to suppress the rest. The constitution is beyond discussion—freedom of discussion is the freedom of loyal members within the party to discuss the promotion of its ends.

It is beyond the scope of our undertaking here to ask whether there are any such absolute values, humanly ascertained, or to inquire into the epistemology of absolute ethics. It may, however, be suggested that any philosophy of liberal democracy, that is not to be intellectually contemptible, must examine this issue. It must discover whether it does not require as its basis (as the present writer believes) a metaphysical scepticism and an empiricism of approach in social issues consonant with the tradition of the school of Locke.

If, however, we have been right in our discussion of the philosophy of democracy, it is committed to tolerance, despite the heresy of Jean Jacques Rousseau and his compulsory civic religion. The question now arises, in the most severely practical form, whether democracy, as a social and political system, is entitled to resort to counter-propaganda on its own behalf.

Democracy, in the world at the present time, is temporarily on the defensive. We are passing through a political cycle, following a great war, during which the goods of liberty to which it peculiarly attaches importance are depressed in valuation. The practical issue is whether democracies, going beyond the recognized fields of party propaganda, should use governmental agencies to instil, and insist upon the acceptance of, their point of view—especially when dealing with movements that will themselves pursue this course. Sedition acts, for example, that bring within a widespread net those who endeavor to tamper with vital

spots, such as the army of the existing régime, are an implement of this kind. One recalls Jefferson's description of the British sedition legislation of those times as "Mr. Pitt's Bill against democratic societies." It is a government's business to govern—and firmly; to meet propaganda by propaganda; but not to terrorize citizens from free discussion.

A greater temptation for a democratic government is to use its system of universal and compulsory education as a weapon of propaganda. Peculiarly this has been the temptation of radical and anti-clerical governments in their war on what their supporters regarded as superstition. If, however, we are justified in regarding tolerance as one of the first of democratic values, a democratic régime cannot suitably be sustained by displays of intolerance. It is intellectually contemptible to require, as in the Yucatán, that teachers should take a pledge: "I declare myself an irreconcilable enemy of the Catholic religion. . . . I also declare myself disposed to take part in the campaign against fanaticism." To tyrannize is not the function of a democracy. What it can insist upon is the right of every child, not only to education, but to an education free in the sense of being exposed to such a variety of influences as gives moral training in choice. Peculiarly in education the democratic attitude is the experimental attitude. What is successful experiment must remain a matter for consensus in judgment.

If, on the other hand, democracy is not entitled to resort to effective counter-propaganda, then it would appear to be a system condemned, as indeed Plato thought it was, on attaining maturity to commit suicide. It would appear probably to be condemned to replacement by tyranny, such as that which was decorated by the genius of Julius, characterized by the megalomaniac madness of Caligula and Domitian and the despicable excesses of Commodus and Heliogabalus, and which, after two centuries of civic discord, plunged into the abyss of the Dark Ages. At the best, one looks forward to the new establishment of the Caesar-Pope and the Church-State, of which it is written that "there is nothing on land or sea comparable thereto."

#### IV

It is necessary, at this point, to return to our distinction between the theory of society appropriate to a voluntary association and that appropriate to a compulsive association, such as the State.

Where men have freely chosen to gather in a society, there is no tyranny in imposing upon them conclusions, as touching their fashion of life, of which they themselves have accepted the premises. Hence, a party, like a church, is entitled to impose a discipline—so long as there are other parties. Within these limits the Marxist is entitled to insist,

among Marxists, that there shall be no deviation from the Marx-Lenin line; and Mussolini is entitled to say that Fascism is "a way of life" or "monolithic" and the Fascist Society "like a violin in the hands of a master." The Jesuit general was entitled to insist that his society shall be "thus, or not at all." The principle, concerning values and standards, here involved is the same as that which Leo XIII enunciated, in *Immortale Dei*.

In the voluntary field the great tradition, concerning social values, of Plato, St. Thomas and Hegel holds good. The democrat also is entitled, within these limits of voluntary association, to a disciplined insistence upon the acceptance of certain values, and to propaganda upon their behalf. In an age which is now passionately insisting upon the reaffirmation of values, this conclusion is important. The democrat must have the courage to organize and to affirm his own values. He is in no wise necessarily condemned to share the liberal individualist psychology, of which the character was neither to give a lead nor to follow a leader, neither to organize nor to accept discipline. These values of democracy include the values of personality and personal initiative; of equal opportunity; of cooperation; of tolerance; of an "open world" in thought; and of the adventure of experiment. There is a duty of continuous experiment, justified by a hope of progress and owed to civilization. Only the relativism in the temper of democracy will safeguard the right to doubt, and progress against the pontiffs of dogma and intolerance. An experiment which may never be wrong has ceased to be any good as an experiment.

The modern world is one of enlarged hopes and of new complexities. The post-war world is one of disillusionment. Both characteristics tend towards a demand for uncritical and emotional faith. The temper of the irritated child is peculiarly likely to infect us, with demands that, if we can't get the machine to go as we wish, we shall smash it. A democracy which abnegates the right to organize on its own behalf, as Cromwell and the men of '76 organized, has nothing to offer to meet that mood, and will be passed over. Democracy, in its ultimate philosophy, may be allied with a scepticism about all human infallibilities; but it is neither a policy of inaction, futility nor ethical nihilism. Its values are those that matter most to man. It can constitute itself, granted sound organization, into a triumphant, voluntary movement.

We are, however, left with the field of coercion, in a democracy, restricted to the repression of overt acts of a seditious or otherwise illegal nature, such as cannot include the censorship of speech, press or other channels for the communication of ideas, where no proximate and



demonstrable social damage results. A democratic government is entitled to the fullest exercise of its constitutional powers within the scope of its mandate. It is not entitled to more. A democracy has the duty of resorting to revolution when constitutional powers are tampered with by absolutism. But a democracy is not entitled to pervert education to the ends of any dogmatic and compulsorily-accepted propaganda, however admirable in itself. The legitimate channels of propaganda, consistent with its own principles, are alone open to democrats. They are those of party and of a voluntary movement.

The Platonic philosophy has come back again into power in our own day with a resurgence of immense force. The man of the twentieth century demands to be provided with a way of life; carried away by some social movement; inspired by some myth in which he may believe, to take the place of the old orthodoxies. This is the explanation of the rise of the "political religions." It is at its peril that democracy does not provide such a myth. There is a democratic way of life (as Professor T. V. Smith has excellently shown). It is necessary to state it. Voluntary movements and party campaigns provide a way. If existing party organizations are obstructive, it may be well to recall the remark of Plato that the only reason why good citizens have a duty to go into politics is to keep bad citizens out. But a democratic *government*, as the custodian of the instruments of force, is completely precluded, by its own principles, from all use of propaganda, understood in the sense of the authoritative instillation of one view to the exclusion of others.

## V

The position is then that a democratic government, without forfeiting its own title to allegiance, is not entitled to use propaganda in the sense defined. It is, however, free and under an obligation to encourage voluntary agencies, and primarily party agencies, to put forward the views upon which its own authority rests. There is an entirely legitimate field of governmental party propaganda, as distinct from state propaganda. How to make that propaganda effective is the most important issue of current practical politics.

It is not enough merely to agree to the proposition of political philosophy that democratic values are sound and need propagandizing. It is also requisite that we consult political science to discover how that propaganda may be successful against the urge to power of its opponents. Political science is a quantitative study, concerned to supply principles for the art of associating predominant masses of men to achieve a given end. Democracy must permit the propaganda of other movements

a free rôle within the law. It must, therefore, the more certainly assure the successful rôle of its own propaganda.

That the principles of democracy, on the one hand, preclude it from the use of certain agencies of propaganda and, on the other hand, demand that it shall expose its citizens to the risk of hearing free criticism by the enemies of democracy, makes the task of successful propaganda immeasurably more difficult for it than for dictatorial governments. Reposing, however, on discussion, and not on an artificially imposed doctrine or myth, it does not have to fear the undermining of this myth surreptitiously or the collapse of artificially stimulated enthusiasm, such as makes every dictator a player to the gallery.

A democratic government has to confront certain contentions that have, since the War, attained wide currency and great popularity. It is contended that the individual achieves significant personality, not in that self-sufficiency which the Stoics held virtuous but which we now hold anti-social, but in and through a society organized by one rule embodying authoritative values. A society is virile and the experience of the individual vital when these values are boldly and unhesitatingly inculcated. There is today—partly owing to the decay of the orthodox religions—an almost religious demand for “leadership” in this sense and for the saving touch of a fanatical conviction.

About what these values may be there is more doubt—the glory of the State-Nation, the pride and purity of the Race-Nation, the achievement of the classless society, are the most obvious of those which make a claim to be so clearly good that all other considerations of civilization must be subordinated to their achievement. The one, true Athanasian faith, with its dogma of the roads to everlasting salvation, has fallen into the background; its Inquisition, receding into the mellow glow of history, has merely the honor of having inspired bigger and better inquisitions. Belief in absolute values is, moreover, today rather the characteristic of revolution and counter-revolution than of a cautious conservatism. It is contended that these values can only be realized through revolution and the supplanting of liberal democracy. It shows, it is argued, either a feeble intellect or a contemptible lack of spirit to refer these supreme issues to the play of differing opinions and to discussion by an untutored or deceived *Lumpenproletariat*. The poison of governmentally encouraged propaganda and lies must be met by more, and more virulent, propaganda for the cause. The message of history is that only violence wins.

More moderately stated, the argument is that the measure of human progress is the achievement of certain goals, for example, “race purity”

or the abolition of poverty. When these goals can only be attained by certain means, only the thin academic mind can object to the adoption of these "realistic" means, however bloody. The great religious faiths, to which human progress owes so much, have never regarded tolerance as a virtue. On the contrary, the early Christians felt themselves under an obligation, not to tolerate, but to smash idols—which is why they caused such dismay to philosophical old women, like Marcus Aurelius.

In practice, these absolutist doctrines of society, described above, have been victorious by attaching to themselves specific sections of society that have held the balance of power. With a greedy, if individualist, peasantry, a corrupt governing group and a weak middle class, the new industrial workers of Russia, stung to organization by the exploitation of a new, crude and disruptive capitalism, held the balance of power. In Fascist countries it has been a middle class, afraid of proletarianization, that has won, aided by a proletarian demand for economic security first, foremost and from any quarter.

It is not possible here to indicate in detail the specific nature of that propaganda which is likely to be successful in and for democracy. Much obviously must depend, even allowing for the international character of ideas and political movements, upon the time and the place. Certain general observations, however, are possible which may serve as concrete illustrations of legitimate democratic propaganda.

In Anglo-Saxon countries the artisan and technician groups or classes probably hold the balance of power. They decide middle-class opinion and profoundly influence the opinion of unskilled labor. These are, therefore, countries that, in a revolutionary situation, are potential fields for the acceptance of the Fascist absolute philosophy of government. The task of a successful democratic propaganda is to capture these groups, while not losing others. And, although Sir Norman Angell is doubtless right in insisting<sup>1</sup> on the moral obligation to be intelligent, a successful propaganda must be more than merely an academic program. It has got to be recognized that the traditional democratic appeal, which aroused enthusiasm during the last century, is now merely an historical curiosity, partly owing to a new confidence in what organized mass action will achieve, and partly to the new part played by the demand for economic security and physical well-being for classes hitherto below the economic danger line. The whole quality of demand in the political market has changed. Supply must change also.

<sup>1</sup>Norman Angell, *The Public Mind*, p. 206.

As Professor Lasswell says, in his able book which only sentimentalists will regard as cynical: "Every suggestion" in propaganda, "must have an interesting appeal to a definite group."<sup>2</sup> What in fact, then, of the democratic case appeals to the key-groups in Anglo-Saxon society?

The technician and artisan are people who regard themselves as performing the skilled part of the work of production. There is a natural antagonism between them and the power of the man who owns without exercising the skilled craft of management. In a craftsman's world there is resentment against oligarchic rule that is, in fact, a plutocracy. It should, therefore, be pointed out that the democratic system involves that there shall be no power over the life, liberty and pursuit of happiness of men without social accountability. This maxim must be applied realistically, and in the economic as well as in the civil field. Such wealth as gives arbitrary political power must either be abolished or those who administer it must be rendered strictly managerial in their function and socially accountable. The principle is as old as Aristotle. A democratic society cannot be a society of unequal individual power, divorced from social responsibility.

The task of our age is the abolition of such poverty as is inconsistent with human health and dignity. The task is that of the abolition of the proletariat and (subject to harmless differentia of ability and reward for service) the reduction of all to a middle stratum, a classless society. Contrary to the doctrine and prophecies of Marx, a middle class is unlikely to be ground away between the upper and nether millstones of the concentration of capital and the iron law of wages. In this technological age it is likely to increase in importance. The man who has made sacrifices to acquire skill must, then, be rewarded by security. He will not tolerate economic security being awarded in a fashion unrelated to such socially valuable sacrifice. To such as he democratic propaganda must, and will, appeal.

On the other hand, although the technician with a grievance, and especially the grievance of unemployment, may be the most resolute revolutionary, he is nevertheless a man who makes high demands on his world and who normally expects them to be gratified. He does not regard himself as a member of an oppressed class but as one who, by rights, should run the machinery of the world. He is the product of a highly complicated civilization and has a native objection to violence or to any condition of anarchy that will destroy that network and substitute conditions more primitive in which he has no place.

<sup>2</sup>H. D. Lasswell, *Propaganda Technique in the World War*, p. 202.

It is necessary, therefore, to make it clear that the process of levelling will not be one of levelling down to Asiatic conditions but one of levelling up, by drawing upon the resources made available by civilization. A planned society will give new scope for organizing ability, will attach new importance to the technician and will open up new avenues for those willing to assume managerial responsibility on a large scale. It is in a planned society that the technician is entirely indispensable—the key-man. It is with the raising of the standard of living of the common man that professional services—medical, dental, athletic, educational, artistic—become in demand on a great scale. But each man will be assured of the private ownership of those things that he immediately enjoys—not only his furniture but his house and even his plot of land.

The employed technician, as a man of skill who assumes responsibilities, is likely to be, more than most, an individualist. No one realizes more than he that progress depends upon minorities. He couples with this belief his prejudice against mass violence. These two demands—for minority safeguards and civic peace—democracy meets. Democracy is government by majority—but in the sense of the plurality of minorities—as the best method of preserving minorities from trespass upon each other. It guarantees minorities. Majority rule presupposes, indeed, that minorities are prepared to give way when an adverse vote is registered, and not to organize resistance. The democratic form of government rests on the supposition that there is an agreement among all parties in the State that the civil peace is worth preserving. A democratic government may be prepared to crush insurrection by a display of force. It is its duty as a government to do so, if other means are likely to be ineffective. But it does not rest upon the expectation of violence. Democracy may be enlarged, but it cannot be maintained, by the irreconcilables. Its propaganda will be that of the common adventure for civilization, the approach of experiment and tolerance, the cooperative commonwealth. Its propaganda will not be negative; it will be positive, and affirmative of new freedoms.

The peculiar weakness of democracy is disclosed, by scientific analysis, to be that of allocating disproportionate freedom to the individual at the expense of authority and of the security which authority guarantees—just as the technical weakness of dictatorship is the concentration of power in a few hands without proportionate compensation to citizens in liberty or even in security. Democracy is always in danger of dissolving into anarchy, political and moral. It provides a “buyer’s market,” a “liberty market.”

This weakness must be faced. Today the demand is for security, organization, authority. It is the duty of democrats to provide a disciplined, a Cromwellian, movement, competent to define and enlarge the liberties of the past and not afraid to provide impetus, by resolute organization and vigorous propaganda, for an affirmative movement of the future. There is no future for vacillation and genteel doubt. The future is that of fight—probably literally so. In time of war one does not inquire what instruments of propaganda one shall use. One uses all available—press, stage, pulpit, radio, telegraphic lobbying, public platforms. It is legitimate to do so, subject to the proviso that they shall not be state instruments. (It is a departmental issue whether, under a democracy, the radio should be subject to a state monopoly. It is at least questionable. It is a more significant infringement of free speech than the reduction of the power of a commercial press.) Democracy stands by the principle of free discussion. But it is not committed to any divorce between life and literature, nor need it be squeamish about the efficient use of propaganda, as emotionalized ideology, in making its views persuasive.

## VI

Propaganda is, in large measure, the gift to the world of universal education. It was the consequences of this new problem of the deliberate control of mass opinion that aroused the interest of Dicey, Lowell, Wallas, Le Bon and many others. I do not mean that there was no propaganda in the days of the Crusades or—for that matter of St. Paul. People have always been prone to cry "Great is Diana of the Illusions." But never before have such masses of people been directly politically effective through the ballot box, even to abolish their own effectiveness, and never have such masses been in a position, through the press, to acquaint themselves with apparently authoritative political information.

In war there are three fronts—military, economic and propagandist. By propagandist is here meant, in the words of a definition quoted by Lasswell, "the dissemination of interested fact and opinion"—patriotic truth, what Herr Hitler calls "our truth." Half of the more important governments of the world today rest on war for their support—domestic war. They have not neglected the physical-force front of soldiers, secret police, "sound courts" and the like. They are laboring hard on the obstinate economic front where ultimately their success, in dealing with unemployment and poverty, will be tested. But the propagandist front

is of the first importance—and is incidentally much cheaper than the economic front.

If this system of government is not to spread, it must be met by an appeal to reason and emotion which shall not despise the study of political method. Democratic principle affirms that the state must be tolerant of heterodox opinion; but the democratic movement neither need nor should be tolerant—it is not committed to a washy liberalism. One established maxim of successful propaganda is, not to compromise, but to attack and to focus the attack. The cause of reason is not forwarded by the generation of personal passion. If, however, that cause is to be defended, this will not be achieved by cowardice or vacillation in stating what are its enemies. If we believe that democracy is the rational system, we must accept the corollary of opposition to all brands of absolutism. That these twentieth century absolutisms may have carried through great public works, at this stage becomes irrelevant. The good points should have all been taken into consideration before the decision is taken to launch propaganda against these forms of rule. The only comment appropriate at this stage is that great public works were also executed by the benevolent despots. For that matter, the older Parthenon itself was the work of Peisistratus, tyrant of Athens and choice of the people. Public works, bread and circuses in Rome, Potsdam or New Orleans are nothing new as recommendations for rulers who destroy political liberty and the discussion which is the breath of a free civilization.

No mechanical use, however, of the material instruments of propaganda can be effective without a drive and leadership at least comparable to that of the Fascists and Marxists. It must yet be leadership with a difference. Leadership among the adherents of the political theologies means the right of the hierophants, initiated and conscious leaders, to impart the correct mythos to their less conscious followers and to instil it. It distrusts the common man, even in the act of interpreting—as the Jacobins did from their “Holy Mountain”—his interests.

Leadership in social democracy means the fighting affirmation of the right of every man to his own opinion, even of his right to be wrong in opinion. It means, literally, that the air is free. It means the affirmation of the duty of experiment, although of experiment guided by certain provisional, but well tried, concepts of social justice. It means the affirmation of a society so far equal that there is in it no power over man without accountability. And it means the use of all means of propaganda to these ends that does not exclude the right to propaganda of

another. It means an organized group determined to accept power if it receives a mandate from its co-citizens; and determined to govern with firm resolution, to effect its constitutional ends and economic policy, if it receives such a mandate. It, further, means that, despite this display of authority such as the times warrant and demand, it will yet be guided by the temper and belief of Roger Williams, when he wrote in his letter to Vane, "We have drunk of the cup of as great liberties as any people we can hear of under heaven."





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